Bibliographie sélective OHADA

The global financial crisis led to the introduction of special resolution regimes for financial institutions. The most prominent innovation of these resolution regimes is the so-called bail-in tool, which allows regulators to recapitalise financial institutions by expropriating shareholders and creditors. This thesis analyses the conditions under which a hypothetical bail-in of a financial institution would constitute a compensable breach of international investment law. It identifies the issues that are most likely to be relevant if a bail-in were to be litigated before an investment arbitration tribunal. The thesis first addresses jurisdictional issues, in particular the question of whether bail-inable instruments can even be considered an investment in procedural terms. The analysis then continues to substantive standards of protection. It deals comprehensively with the question of expropriation and related issues such as compensation, the right to regulate, and causation. It concludes with possible violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard.