Bibliographie sélective OHADA

In recent years, investment arbitration tribunals are increasingly confronted with allegations of corruption, mostly invoked by host States as a defense to investors’ claims. After an affirmative finding of an alleged corrupt act between the investor and a public official of the host State in the establishment or conduct of the investment, tribunals have adopted a binary approach to the issue – if they uphold allegations of corruption, they completely dismiss the investor’s submissions. This binary approach has resulted in an asymmetry of liability for the two parties to a corrupt act (i.e., investors and host States/host State officials), failing to take into account the inherent bilateralism of corruption and the fact that domestic laws and international norms have outlawed both the act of offering and of accepting bribes. In particular, public officials’ free participation in a corrupt act to advance investments is attributable to the host State and requires State responsibility under international law. Moreover, the increasingly prevalent practice of inserting anti-corruption provisions in investment treaties has reinforced this lop-sided feature, as well as offering only weak effectiveness in terms of deterring corruption. After a careful examination of the treatment of corruption issues in investment arbitration and investment treaties, this thesis proposes a paradigm shift from the current asymmetric approach to a more balanced approach. It calls on investment tribunals to take a dual-track approach that investigates both corruption and investors’ claims, and ensures that each party assumes responsibility for its own misconduct. It also proposes that treaty drafters include anti-corruption provisions that impose strong obligations of anti-corruption on both sides of corruption (i.e., investors and host States) rather than merely on a single party to it

This thesis explores the regulation of airport charges, which is an important but marginalised topic. It particularly examines how private law instruments can play a role in the regulatory process. Airports used to be subject to traditional regulation, which operates in a command-and-control mode. As the airport industry becomes increasingly complicated, traditional regulation seems problematic. First, the method that is associated with traditional regulation to draw a line between regulated and unregulated airports has downsides. Second, the international regulatory framework on airport charges lacks binding rules. This suggests that traditional regulation is not the best niche for airport charges regulation. Third, good regulation needs independent regulatory bodies, which are hard to achieve in practice.In this context, this thesis argues that a private law approach can serve as a more flexible and effective way to regulate airport charges. There are two instruments under this overarching approach. First, contracts can be adopted to incorporate airport charges regulations. Second, robust corporate governance generates the effect of good regulation. This is an interdisciplinary work that has engaged air law, contract law, corporate law, competition law, and aviation business and management. It also employs the method of case studies. Chapter 4 examines the regulation of airport charges in the UK, Canada, and India. The three case studies demonstrate that private law instruments have been implicitly implemented to different degrees in these countries. These demonstrate the feasibility of applying private ordering in the regulatory process. I also look into the regulation of countries and regions including Australia, Ireland, the EU, and Germany throughout this thesis. This study also examines a specific sector of airport charges, namely, charges for ground-handling services. This sector possesses a unique feature in that it is between aeronautical and non-aeronautical services. A private law approach can also be adopted in the regulation of charges relating to ground-handling services. Additionally, ICAO as an important international organisation governing international air transport can also contribute to a private law approach of airport charges through its soft-law making function. This thesis aims to shed light on a private law approach, as an innovative regulatory mechanism, to airport charges. That said, regulation by this approach and traditional regulation are not contradictory but can cooperate to an extent, depending on how much power one wants to give to private ordering

In recent years, investor-State tribunals have often permitted shareholders' claims for reflective loss despite the well-established principle of no reflective loss applied consistently in domestic regimes and in other fields of international law. Investment tribunals have justified their decisions by relying on definitions of "investment" in investment agreements that often include "shares", while the no-reflective-loss principle is generally justified on the basis of policy considerations pertaining to the preservation of the efficiency of the adjudicatory process and to the protection of other stakeholders, such as creditors. Although these policy considerations militating for the prohibition of shareholders' claims for reflective loss also apply in investor-State arbitration, they are curable in that context and must be balanced with policy considerations specific to the field of international investment law that weigh in favor of such claims: the protection of foreign investors in order to promote trade and investment liberalization.