Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.

The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) seeks to promote the achievement and maintenance of a fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible market place for consumer products and services in South Africa. Moreover, the CPA seeks to provide an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and efficient system of redress for consumers. Notably, the CPA provides that the supplier should not supply or enter into an agreement to supply any goods or services at a price that is unfair, unreasonable, or unjust. This is generally aimed at combating any problems that are suffered by consumers when accessing goods and services in South Africa. Accordingly, various regulatory bodies and related role-players were established to enforce consumer rights and provide redress mechanisms to vulnerable and affected consumers. These consumer protection bodies and related roleplayers include the National Consumer Commission (NCC), the National Consumer Tribunal (NCT), provincial consumer courts, ordinary courts and other alternative dispute resolution agencies. These bodies and role-players are statutorily obliged to resolve consumer disputes in South Africa. However, there are some uncertainty challenges regarding the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and consumer protection regulatory bodies in relation to disputes that relate to the consumers’ right to fair, just and reasonable prices, terms and conditions of goods and services. This article discusses the role of the NCC, the NCT, provincial consumer courts, ordinary courts and other alternative dispute resolution agencies in the regulation of prices for goods, services and access to redress for affected consumers under the CPA. This is done to provide some recommendations that could resolve jurisdictional and regulatory challenges in relation to the price and access to goods and services under the CPA.

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.