Bibliographie sélective OHADA

This thesis focuses on the interaction of two categories of non-state actors, private sector corporate actors and non-governmental organizations, with states in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) through a lens of public international law. It builds on the premise that the notion of states as the only subjects of international law is not adequate for a modern system of global governance, as it does not reflect the realities of fast-paced globalization and increased co-operation in a world where the boundaries of the private and public are increasingly blurred. It does not necessarily provide solutions for participation of non-state actors in the WTO, but demonstrates that developments in international relations warrant more space for participation of non-state actors, and that the current system of the WTO fails to provide sufficient space for participation. The thesis argues that, for both historical and pragmatic reasons, developments in the areas of GATT and international trade law occurred outside their natural course, leading to the myth of a “self-contained” trade regime not part of public international law. The WTO, unlike its predecessor, enjoys a proper institutional framework and mandate; one can no longer use the excuse of institutional handicap for excluding it from the system of global governance. Liberalization of international trade has far-reaching consequences which are not limited to the trade arena and the WTO, its member states, and scholars of international trade law have to assume their role in the broader context of an international legal order. Non-state actors’ formal participation can contribute to striking a balance between different forces and interests at work in the area of trade liberalization and its interplay with other non-trade issues. After setting the framework for the study, the thesis outlines modes of participation of non-state actors in the creation and modification of WTO law as well as in its enfor

The reform of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism has provoked much debate among legal scholars and practitioners. The critiques of ISDS mainly arise from concerns regarding the legitimacy of the mechanism such as the perceived tolerance for the lack of impartiality and consistency. To allay these concerns, there have been proposals to reform ISDS by establishing investment courts with tenured judges and appellate tribunals. However, international adjudication systems like ISDS cannot be fully analogized to domestic courts in common law countries: ISDS falls into a broader international regime where there are neither hierarchical/centralized decision-making and enforcement authorities nor a multilateral investment treaty, and the rules and principles on foreign investment protection are fragmented in around three thousand Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Against this backdrop, this thesis argues that, although there is a general agreement among the international community to further legalize international investment law, the process of legalization via the specific avenue of reforming the adjudication mechanism (i.e. ISDS) is subject to (1) the institutional constraint of international investment law, especially the lack of shared understanding among the international community regarding the treatment of foreign investments, and (2) the internal constraints of adjudication as a mode of social ordering. It further cautions that pursuing predictability while disregarding the low level of shared understandings regarding investment protection may cause more legitimacy problems than it solves

This thesis critically assesses the effectiveness of WTO legal rules in the regulation of international trade in petroleum and highlights potential conflicts between competing resources of energy from the WTO regime’s perspective. The theoretical framework of the thesis is built on the concepts used in natural resource economics, trade theories and international relations. On the basis of Hotelling’s rule of natural resource economics, it proposes a model that reconciles the use of petroleum and the development of renewable sources of energy in the power generation sector, which prospectively can be adopted with respect to the transport sector and other sectors involving energy use. The proposed model may improve global sustainable development. However, it is argued that WTO rules are not properly designed to regulate trade in petroleum and, if applied without due respect to specific issues pertaining to the petroleum industry, would obstruct the achievement of the social optimum, and detrimentally affect the national economies of WTO members and global welfare in general. To improve the WTO system, I propose a reformation of its normative ideology through the introduction of the strategic trade policy theory in complement to the neoclassical theory of trade, at least when trade in energy is concerned. On the basis of the study of the applicability of WTO rules to trade in petroleum and a review of proposals put forward by other scholars to improve the regulation of trade in energy, it is argued that the most effective way to improve the trading regime is to negotiate a new general agreement on trade in energy.The role of the WTO in the regulation of trade in energy is analyzed through a regime management theory borrowed from international relations studies. It is argued that the WTO as a regime manager is capable of improving the regime by properly maintaining the existing equilibrium and by initiating, and leading in negotiations of a new equilibrium.

For the past twenty years, international commercial arbitration scholarship has mainly focusedon the private dimension of international arbitration. Part of a greater movement toward the privatization of justice and law, this understanding of the discipline has obscured arbitrators'adjudicative role. By reflecting on different adjudicative models and by analyzing the form andcontent of arbitral decisions, new light can be shed on our understanding of international commercial arbitration.

The arbitration of internal trust disputes has attracted significant attention in the arbitration and trust law communities in recent years with draft clauses and rules produced by arbitral institutions, several states undertaking legislative reform in order to provide such arbitrations with a statutory basis and numerous scholars as well as practitioners writing articles on the subject. Such enthusiasm is justified on the basis that arbitration has several advantages over litigation, such as confidentiality, international enforceability of judgments, the ability to choose one’s judge and the power to tailor the procedure. Notwithstanding these advantages, trust arbitration has failed to make any great inroad into trust disputes due to the many novel and complex points of legal practice and theory which it entails. For example, although arbitration does not typically involve minors or legally incapable parties’ trusts do, and thus trust arbitration raises numerous due process and human rights concerns. Similarly, court supervision and enforcement of trusts is sometimes considered essential to the very nature of trusts and questions therefore arise concerning the extent to which arbitral tribunals could supplant courts in that regard. Another complication is that trusts are not contracts and questions therefore arise about how to bind individuals to a trust arbitration agreement, particularly as regards beneficiaries who may be unascertained, minor or legally incompetent at the time the trust was created. The aim of this thesis is to analyse and present potential solutions to these complications from an English law perspective, although other common law legal systems will be analysed where relevant