Bibliographie sélective OHADA

In principle, contracts are enforceable mutually beneficial agreements. In the event of a breach of contract, many national, supranational, and international legal systems—as well as recent European harmonization projects on private law—turn to cure regimes for the furtherance of such (assumed) contractually generated welfare. Namely, a mandatory Nachfrist-mechanism, a hierarchy of remedies, and debtor’s (in sales law: seller’s) rights to cure—before and after performance date—are normative devices intended to perform and preserve contracts, employing purportedly better, more cost-effective remedies for breach. Discussion of the utility of these legal institutions undisputedly belongs to the debate on modern contract law. In this thesis, one of these cure-oriented devices is exhaustively analyzed: the seller’s right to cure after performance date under Article 48 CISG1. Whereas according to paragraph (1) the seller—provided that certain preconditions are met—can impose subsequent performance on the aggrieved buyer, under paragraphs (2-4) they can merely offer cure within a period of time, irrespective of any preconditions. Article 48 CISG’s systematic setting, comparative law framework, origin, forerunners, preconditions for existence—general and specific—performance in practice, legal consequences—with regards to both the breach-of-contract regime and the availability of other remedies under the CISG—, and economic-behavioural implications are exegetically analysed. A particular focus is given to the allocation of contractual risk (see epigraph 3.2.9). Finally, conclusions are drawn at two levels: one concerning the CISG’s regime and another related to general Contract law.