Bibliographie sélective OHADA

While a universally applicable multilateral agreement on investment is not yet available, a broad network of BITs and investment chapters in FTAs has been put in place to protect foreign investors and their investments. Meanwhile, investment arbitration has become a defining feature of modern international investment law over the recent decades, enabling foreign investors to launch an investment arbitration against host states, often without the need to go through local remedies before that. With the caseload of investment arbitration increasing at a rather rapid speed, such a dispute resolution method has also attracted fierce criticism. Many commentators have alleged, among other, that the decision-making of investment arbitrators has been inconsistent and unpredictable, that investment arbitration has become a threat to public interest, that investment arbitration proceedings are not transparent enough, that the arbitrators involved are not independent nor diverse enough, that the lack of an applellate mechanism compromises the quality of decision-making, and that investment arbitration has become far too costly and time-consuming. Against such a backdrop, the global community has made joint efforts to reform the investment arbitration system, not least through various initiatives developed at ICSID and UNCITRAL. Almost at the same time, national states also seem to have started to reconsider the costs and benefits of including investment arbitration in their investment agreements as a method for the resolution of disputes with foreign investors. Although the caseload of investment arbitration continues to grow and national states keep concluding IIAs containing investment arbitration clauses, at least some countries in their more recent investment treaty making practice have demonstrated a policy trend to rein in investment arbitration and ramp up the role of domestic courts in resolving investment disputes. They often do so by exiting the ICSID system, terminating their investment agreements with economic partners, excluding investment arbitration from their investment agreements, and conditioning investment arbitration upon the prior use of litigation via domestic courts. While the state practice mentioned above surely does not suggest the global society has any intention to abandon investment arbitration any time soon, it prompts us to take a step back and reconsider the role that domestic courts may play in resolving investment disputes, instead of solely focusing on the piecemeal reform of investment arbitration. When it comes to investor-state dispute resolution, domestic courts can indeed play different roles along the process. Like investment tribunals, domestic courts can also adjudicate investment disputes between foreign investors and local authorities. Such a judicial role sometimes is also confirmed in investment agreements through, for example, the exhaustion of local remedies rule, the clause demanding pursuit of local remedies prior to investment arbitration and the fork-in-the-road provision. In the context of non-ICSID arbitration, disputing parties are often entitled to applying for the review by domestic courts loci arbitri of the rulings and awards rendered by investment tribunals. Domestic courts loci arbitri would thus assume a supervisory role with regard to arbitration proceedings and arbitral outcomes, as they may set aside arbitration awards in question according to the review grounds enumerated in local arbitration laws. Moreover, domestic courts in a broader sense may be called upon to support the conduct and / or authority of investment arbitration, by recognizing and enforcing the investment awards rendered by arbitral tribunals and issuing interim measures of a judicial nature to facilitate the arbitration process. Since litigation through domestic courts and investment arbitration are two primary remedies that foreign investors often rely on for the resolution of investment disputes, this study constructs three models of institutional design with regard to the allocation of jurisdiction over investment disputes between domestic courts and investment tribunals. While the reality may turn out to be more complicated, such three models roughly represent the institutional choices facing national states. These three models are: (i) utter reliance on domestic courts as the exclusive forum for investor-state dispute resolution, (ii) investment arbitration operating as a substitute for litigation via domestic courts, and (iii) investment arbitration working as a complement to litigation via domestic courts. In order to conduct a comparative institutional analysis of the three models to reveal their respective tradeoffs, this study employs a goal based approach which is increasingly used to analyze the effectiveness of international adjudicatory mechanisms. As a result of the employment of the goal-based approach, the goals of investor-state dispute resolution are recognized as achieving fair and efficient dispute resolution, promoting state compliance with investment treaty norms, facilitating the objectives of the investment law regime, and legitimizing the underlying investment treaty regime. While the quality of the national judiciaries of many developing countries is not the same as it was decades ago largely due to the judicial reforms launched around the world, fairness and efficiency in dispute resolution still cannot be fully guaranteed in the domestic courts of those countries without a robust legal system and a good record of the rule of law. However, there are certain institutional characteristics of court litigation that may facilitate the efficiency in the resolution of investment disputes, such as the unique advantage of domestic courts that they can work as a single forum for dispute resolution and the better knowledge of court judges of the domestic legal framework at issue. Domestic courts also hold great potential in promoting the compliance by national states with investment treaty norms not least because they have more flexibility in awarding both primary and secondary remedies, but that of course depends on whether domestic courts can adjudicate investment disputes in a fair and impartial manner. Moreover, while utter reliance on litigation via domestic courts may strengthen the domestic rule of law and improve the investment climate in the long term by pressing host states to improve their legal systems and judicial institutions, it may also invite the politicization of investment disputes and the diplomatic intervention from home states in investor-state dispute resolution. Furthermore, despite the risks created for foreign investors, reliance on domestic courts as the exclusive forum may enhance the legitimacy of the investment treaty regime by reducing the sovereignty costs incurred by national states and putting domestic investors and foreign investors on the same footing. Investment arbitration operating as a substitute for domestic courts, on the other hand, demonstrates certain advantages, which are typically affiliated with international arbitration, in achieving the fair and efficient resolution of investment disputes. Unlike domestic courts, which are an integral part of the state apparatus, investment arbitrators are often immune from the influence of domestic politics and are thus believed to be independent and impartial. Meanwhile, the specialization of arbitrators in a particular area of knowledge and the procedural flexibility of arbitration proceedings, among others, are expected to improve efficiency in the resolution of investment disputes. However, empirical evidence presented in the literature sometimes suggests that, in reality, investment arbitrators may not be that unbiased and investment arbitration proceedings often drag on with a bill of a massive amount. Besides, although investment tribunals have a broad scope of jurisdiction over the behavior of different government branches, the practical difficulties they face in awarding primary remedies may damage their ability in promoting state compliance with investment treaty norms. In addition, the introduction of investment arbitration grants to foreign investors a standing in international arbitration proceedings, to a large extent reducing the need for diplomatic protection and home state intervention. However, the positive impact of investment arbitration in facilitating the development of the domestic rule of law and the maintenance and increase of foreign capital is less certain. As for the preservation of the legitimacy of the underlying investment treaty regime, investment arbitration as an alternative to domestic courts cannot be relied on to produce much positive impact. For instance, the increasing sovereignty costs and financial burden imposed on national states would probably prompt more of them to turn against the investment treaty regime. The complement model, in which domestic courts assumes primary jurisdiction and investment tribunals secondary jurisdiction over investment disputes, stands a good chance in keeping the advantages of both court litigation and investment arbitration while avoiding their disadvantages. In the complement model, domestic courts will act as the first line of defense in adjudicating investment disputes, and the institutional advantages of court litigation will be enabled to release their potential. At the same time, even if foreign investors are not satisfied with the judicial outcome or regard the court proceedings as corrupt or unfair, they may escalate the specific disputes to investment tribunals for further consideration. Since court judges are more knowledgeable and experienced in the interpretation and application of domestic law, the legal analysis of court judges will also benefit the decision-making of investment arbitrators in the subsequent arbitration proceeding. Allowing domestic courts to have a first try at investment disputes will also increase the likelihood that primary remedies could be accorded, thus the unique advantages of primary remedies in promoting state compliance with investment treaty norms are not discarded in the complement model. Moreover, the complement model is also more promising in facilitating the achievement of the objectives of the investment treaty regime, and that is because domestic courts are not marginalized in the complement model, the antagonism between foreign investors and host states may be expected to decrease, and the depolicization of investment disputes will not be lost since investment arbitration is kept as an option. Furthermore, the complement model strikes a better balance among the interests of foreign investors, host states and other stakeholders, thus it is more likely to preserve and even enhance the legitimacy of the underlying investment treaty regime than the other two institutional choices. Although the complement model serves the goals of investor-state dispute resolution the best in theory, not any casual combination of court litigation and investment arbitration will do the job; instead, only a smart mix of the two dispute resolution methods can give full play to the advantages of the complement model. Now, we switch to the supervisory role of domestic courts in investor-state dispute resolution. While a systemic appellate mechanism has not been created for investment arbitration, disputing parties may rely on setting-aside proceedings in non-ICSID arbitration to challenge arbitration awards. In other words, domestic courts loci arbitri may conduct a judicial review of the rulings and awards made by investment tribunals. However, a theoretical analysis of the judicial review mechanism supported by empirical evidence has shown that the mechanism has several flaws, which include but are not limited to the points that follow immediately. Since there is only a casual link between the seat of arbitration and the investment dispute, it is inappropriate to subject the decision-making of arbitrators to the judges from the place where the arbitration proceedings took place. The very fact that review courts have been overwhelmingly located within the developed North could raise concern that the judicial review mechanism is inherently biased against developing countries which have already shown a somewhat negative sentiment towards investment arbitration. Given that judicial review proceedings could easily go through more than one instance of court proceedings in many jurisdictions, the dispute resolution process may consume more time and generate higher costs. From this point of view, the judicial review mechanism favors the richer party in investment arbitration and could become a weapon of dilatory tactics available for such a party. Considering the higher error costs relating to investment arbitration than that relating to commercial arbitration, limited review grounds and a copious amount of deference to arbitral tribunals may not prove to be as effective in the scrutiny of investment awards. Moreover, the idiosyncrasies as to review grounds and standards across jurisdictions indicate that inconsistency would also probably permeate the judicial review practices, which would then encourage forum shopping that leads to increased costs and decreased efficiency. In addition, as both review courts and enforcement courts may exercise control over investment awards, the setting-aside decision may be merely disregarded at the enforcement stage and the overall efficiency of investor-state dispute resolution may be reduced. In order to overcome many of the flaws mentioned above, a delocalized form of review should be introduced to take place of the current judicial review mechanism.