Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Is the human body a person or is it just a tool at its service? Is it an individual or is it just an object? In an attempt to solve this enigma, classical legal doctrine distinguishes the status of the body associated with a person from that which is dissociated from one. When the body is home to an individual, it is protected by civil and criminal laws relating to persons. When the body isn’t, or no longer is, home to an individual, it would then fall under the civil and criminal laws relating to goods. Laws relating to both goods and persons would thus work together to ensure a complete protection of the human body. The appearance of bodily marks, innate or wanted, on the legal scene (like tattooing, body painting, scarifications) provides a challenge: does it not upset the classical analysis? Does the human body not become a simple good owned by an individual? Why do bioethical laws not regulate these new cultural practices? Should they be left in a legal vacuum? Should the principle of respect for human dignity be reduced to respect for the will of the individual who must be able to transform his body as he sees fit under the auspices of an ever more liberal legal regime? The word «brand» is not neutral and evokes intellectual property: should the individual’s right to his body be fully attached to ownership rights? Should we permanently dissociate the body from the person? Is the human body a person or is it just a tool at its service? Is it an individual or is it just an object? In an attempt to solve this enigma, classical legal doctrine distinguishes the status of the body associated with a person from that which is dissociated from one. When the body is home to an individual, it is protected by civil and criminal laws relating to persons. When the body isn’t, or no longer is, home to an individual, it would then fall under the civil and criminal laws relating to goods. Laws relating to both goods and persons would thus work together to ensure a complete protection of the human body. The appearance of bodily marks, innate or wanted, on the legal scene (like tattooing, body painting, scarifications) provides a challenge: does it not upset the classical analysis? Does the human body not become a simple good owned by an individual? Why do bioethical laws not regulate these new cultural practices? Should they be left in a legal vacuum? Should the principle of respect for human dignity be reduced to respect for the will of the individual who must be able to transform his body as he sees fit under the auspices of an ever more liberal legal regime? The word «brand» is not neutral and evokes intellectual property: should the individual’s right to his body be fully attached to ownership rights? Should we permanently dissociate the body from the person?