Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Ex aequo et bono is a long-lived legal concept that enables arbitrators to decide a dispute based on notions of fairness instead of a strict application of legal norms. Jurists generally agree that arbitrators authorised to decide commercial disputes ex aequo et bono can more easily tailor arbitral procedure to achieve an efficient and fair dispute resolution process. They therefore agree that ex aequo et bono arbitration maximises procedural flexibility. However, this flexibility is now perceived more as a negative rather than a positive, despite the potential of ex aequo et bono to mitigate growing concerns about the ‘over-judicialisation’ of arbitration – the increasing formalisation and inefficiency of arbitral procedure. Commentators usually assert that ex aequo et bono introduces excessive unpredictability into arbitration and encourages arbitrators to abuse their discretion. As a result, ex aequo et bono has remained unpopular to this day. This thesis challenges this overly negative conception of ex aequo et bono. It does so particularly under the UNCITRAL Model Law, as an important foundation stone of the global commercial arbitration regime. The thesis investigates significant divergence in the understanding of ex aequo et bono across state jurisdictions and international arbitration institutions. It also analyses the core trends in actual legal practice and in thinking about the principle. The thesis thereby demonstrates that the Model Law requires arbitrators to ensure that their arbitral awards are based on three objective elements: contract terms, trade usages, and mandatory rules of law. Accordingly, while the Model Law allows arbitrators deciding ex aequo et bono to invoke their subjective conceptions of fairness as the ultimate gap-filler when discerning the intention of the parties, the scope for doing so is not unduly expansive. Further, the refinement of various legal theories underpinning international commercial arbitration has enabled parties to determine and challenge more readily the arbitrators’ subjective ideas of fairness. The thesis therefore concludes that the flexibility inherent in ex aequo et bono needs to be both re-evaluated and rejuvenated. It urges the international arbitration community to adopt a revitalised conception of ex aequo et bono to counter-balance the encroaching ‘over-judicialisation’ of arbitration.