Bibliographie sélective OHADA

The present article explores the implication of fairness as a regulatory and competition law concept applied to digital and Artificial Intelligence markets, in light of recent law and policy developments targeting the interaction between data, market power and competition law. Much of the policy discussions, legislative proposals as well some emerging case law elevate the matter of “fairness” in the context of digital markets and AI, creating both a novel regulatory framework as well as encouraging competition law to curb “unfairness” of said markets and related “unfair practices”. The interface between intellectual property rights and competition law is of utmost importance in this context, where we might find similar analogous insights as we can find regarding the matter of fairness within traditional EU competition law. Further, the question remains whether the “fairness norm” expressed in regulatory acts such Digital Markets Act, EU AI Act and the EU Data Act are akin to the “fairness” norms found in Union competition law, mainly under Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.

Recent empirical evidence suggests that labour markets are not as competitive as previously thought. In that context, mobilizing antitrust policy has been discussed as a possible solution. The proposition sounds counterintuitive, however. If workers are paid below the competitive level, doesn’t this promote consumers’ outcomes by reducing downstream prices? Given that antitrust policy promotes consumer welfare, why would antitrust authorities intervene against such a state of affairs? Besides, why would stepping up on antitrust enforcement improve workers’ outcomes? Their interests have traditionally been protected through their exclusion from the scope of antitrust enforcement, not by the enforcement of antitrust rules to their benefit. This thesis demonstrates that those spontaneous assumptions do not hold. Consumer welfare does not speak against the defence of workers’ interests. First, the focus on consumers is a by product of methods: it does not prevent consideration of other types of market participants. Moreover, consumers benefit from competitive labour markets. The welfare effects of monopsony power simultaneously worsen workers and consumers’ outcomes. As for the promotion of workers’ interests, it can be achieved through both positive and negative enforcement of antitrust. So far, the EU Commission has been less proactive than the American DOJ and FTC on the issue of antitrust enforcement in labour markets ( although the state of affairs is evolving). While this difference may stem from EU workers benefitting from higher levels of social protection than US workers, those higher levels of protection may not negate the usefulness of antitrust ’s intervention. The low levels of antitrust enforcement in EU labour markets may result from legal uncertainty and case law inconsistency more than an absence of harm. Just like the merger control apparatus, Article 101 and 102 TFEU can be used to scrutinize labour markets. While doing so involves some practical complexities, they can be overcome.

Competition law and intellectual property law share the objective of incentivising innovation. However, this objective is achieved in different ways, which, at times, can create tension between the two areas of law. It is imperative that this tension at the interface of competition law and intellectual property law is resolved in a manner that encourages innovation. Issues regarding the licensing of intellectual property, Standard Essential Patents, pay-for-delay agreements and no-challenge clauses are instances where the tension between competition law and intellectual property law is especially prevalent. These instances will be discussed in detail, and what is learnt from how the European Union and Australia handles it, will be applied to South Africa. The European Union, Australia and South Africa have different ways of dealing with situations where the exercise of intellectual property rights has an effect on competition. The European Union has block exemptions, which contains “safe havens” for conduct in specific circumstances. The block exemptions are often accompanied by guidelines, providing firms and individuals with greater detail in order to self-assess their compliance with the exemption. Australia has authorisation, notification and class exemption procedures. Firms can apply to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to authorise conduct that might potentially breach the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Exemptions may also be granted more broadly by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in terms of the class exemption procedures. In South Africa, the law concerning the interface between competition law and intellectual property is still in its infancy, and a lot can be learned from jurisdictions like the European Union and Australia regarding the most efficient way to handle this tension. Currently, the Competition Act 89 of 1998 in South Africa contains Section 10(4), the intellectual property exemption clause. A firm can apply to the Competition Commission for an intellectual property exemption from the application of Chapter 2 of the Competition Act “to an agreement or practice, or a category of agreements or practices” which pertains to the exercise of intellectual property rights. However, it is submitted that Section 10(4), by itself, is not the most efficient mechanism to resolve the tension that arises at the interface of competition law and intellectual property law in a way that incentivises innovation. It is proposed that the exemption provision can be made more effective if it is properly applied in conjunction with class exemptions and guidelines.

This open-access book brings together international experts who shed new light on the status of social enterprises, benefit corporations and other purpose-driven companies. The respective chapters take a multidisciplinary approach (combining law, philosophy, history, sociology and economics) and provide valuable insights on fostering social entrepreneurship and advancing the common good. In recent years, we have witnessed a significant shift of how business activities are conducted, mainly through the rise of social enterprises. In an effort to target social problems at their roots, social entrepreneurs create organizations that bring transformative social changes by considering, among others, ethical, social, and environmental factors. A variety of social enterprise models are emerging internationally and are proving their vitality and importance. But what does the term “social enterprise” mean? What are its roots? And how does it work in practice within the legal framework of any country? This handbook attempts to answer these questions from a theoretical, historical, and comparative perspective, bringing together 44 contributions written by 71 expert researchers and practitioners in this field. The first part provides an overview of the social enterprise movement, its evolution, and the different forms entities can take to meet global challenges, overcoming the limits of what governments and states can do. The second part focuses on the emergence of benefit corporations and the growing importance of sustainability and societal values, while also analyzing their different legal forms and adaptation to their regulatory environment. In turn, the last part presents the status quo of purpose-driven companies in 36 developed and emerging economies worldwide. This handbook offers food for thought and guidance for everyone interested in this field. It will benefit practitioners and decision-makers involved in social and community organizations, as well as in international development and, more generally speaking, social sciences and economics.

ENGLISH ABSTRACT: While electronic commerce in South Africa is still comparatively small, it is growing rapidly. The advent of the internet has potentially fundamental impacts on business and the law both locally and internationally. It is submitted the free competition on the internet is important and will continue to be so in the future. The research in this thesis relates to the rise of so-called internet monopolies (such as Google, Facebook and Amazon) and its implications for competition law enforcement. A particularly problematic aspect of the products provided by some of these companies is that their products and services are ostensibly free to consumers. This thesis examines whether the traditional model for the regulating abuse of dominance would be effective in the instance where such an internet monopoly is charged with a contravention under South African competition law. The research and analysis in the thesis are effectively divided into three parts. The first considers whether abuse of dominance related to the internet deserves closer analysis and also assesses the purposes of competition law and how these are changing (or should change) in the light of new technology and markets. The second part deals with abuse of dominance both generally and specifically in relation to the internet. In this context, the thesis considers how harms may manifest and how dominance may be determined in the context of the internet. The final part considers specific issues that may be problematic in light of the internet. The interrelationship between intellectual property and competition law is analysed, along with aspects pertaining to the assertion of jurisdiction, the nature of competition law enforcement and the extent to which different jurisdictions may (and/or should) cooperate in dealing with abuse of dominance on the internet. The thesis submits that the South African legislative framework for regulating abuse of dominance on the internet is broadly fit for purpose, but that there is a need for developing new approaches and policy within that framework. It contributes to the existing body of knowledge and discourse by providing a comprehensive overview of the regulatory framework in South Africa, informed by comparative analysis; by applying this in a new context (hitherto under-researched in the South African context), and by offering concrete suggestions to frame policy and approach.

The thesis contributes to the debate on the EU’s approach to the business practice of resale price maintenance (RPM), which is widely criticized as too strict and in conflict with what is considered to be the consensus in the economic literature. The thesis critically dissects the economic consensus, on which the critique against the EU’s approach is based, by analyzing the empirical evidence that is cited to support the claim that RPM can frequently be explained by the service-based RPM models and shows that there is no convincing evidence that would support the significance of these positive RPM models that predict positive effects on welfare. To support this finding the thesis collects new evidence by surveying the marketing literature and shows that not only is there no convincing evidence that the positive RPM models frequently apply, but to the contrary there is evidence that these models are inconsistent with the real world phenomenon of RPM. Having refuted the service-based models the thesis takes up the scientific challenge that “it takes a theory to beat a theory” and proposes to fill the gap with three price-based models. The thesis offers an analysis of the three price-based RPM models, first from the perspective of welfare effects and then from a broader economic perspective in an attempt to ultimately show that the EU approach to RPM can be justified based on these economic models. All three models explain the situation in which RPM is used by a branded good manufacturer to create the perception of high quality, which is used either as a credible quality signal, becomes a component of the product or is used to bias the consumer decision; they thus enter the difficult terrain of consumer preference formation and of markets for the intangible components of a product.

No abstract available.

In South Africa compliance with competition law has become a major concern for firms that achieve and maintain certain levels of success and growth in the market, as their actions are often a source of complaints and litigation by rivals and competition authorities. With substantial financial penalties often levied against them for a variety of conduct deemed to constitute an abuse of their market position, dominant firms must constantly be aware of the likely impact of their business strategies and actions on both rivals and consumers. What were once thought to be normal and economically sound business practices and decisions, such as cutting prices to attract customers, have now acquired new meanings, with devastating consequences for dominant firms. So, are dominant firms under attack from competition law? In this study I aim to determine this. I track the historical development of competition law in three jurisdictions: South Africa, America, and the EU, with the aim of identifying traces, if any, of hostility towards dominant firms in the origins of competition law. I further investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of certain aspects of existing abuse of dominance provisions manifest as hostility towards dominant firms. While acknowledging the important role that competition law enforcement plays in promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare, I conclude that significant unjustified economic and legal prejudice is suffered by dominant firms as a result of the way in which certain abuse of dominance provisions have been formulated and applied. I also offer appropriate recommendations.

The interaction between competition law and intellectual property law has often attracted divergent views from scholars and practitioners of each respective sphere of law. Whereas some argue that the two are in conflict with each other and cannot be reconciled. The aforementioned tension between competition law and intellectual property law has been traced to the objectives of each. On the one hand, intellectual property rights confer upon their owners an exclusive right to behave in a particular way while on the other hand competition law strives to keep markets open. Other scholars have argued that, in real sense and practice, the two are actually not in conflict but rather that they complement each other. The question then becomes, is there really an irreconcilable difference between the two areas of law? This paper seeks to establish how the two aspects of law interact and seeks to propose that there be created a balance to alleviate the perceived conflict between the two. This paper will identify the areas in which the balance can be struck. It will also seek to establish how the Kenyan legislative framework as well as the courts has dealt with the conflict. It will proceed from understanding the goals and objective of both intellectual property law and competition law. This will provide the backdrop against which the alleged conflict originates from. A comparative study with other developed jurisdictions will be undertaken so as to advise on the route that should be taken by Kenya on the interface and a conclusion drawn on how the two areas relate and recommendations drawn from the issues identified in the study made.

La responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet fait débat dans un univers numérique de plus en plus complexe. Les intermédiaires offrent des services en ligne. Ils créent ou facilitent des transactions entre des parties tierces (hébergement, e-commerce, fournisseurs d'accès…). A la fin des années 1990, un consensus s'est établi sur l'instauration d'une responsabilité limitée pour ces acteurs, dans le but de favoriser leur développement ainsi que celui d'Internet par des externalités croisées. Cependant, l'apparition régulière de nouveaux usages a induit des externalités négatives affectant certains agents économiques. La multiplication récente de décisions de jurisprudence parfois contradictoires, en particulier dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle, vient désormais remettre en cause cette exemption. Elle fait naître un risque juridique pour les intermédiaires d'Internet. Ces-derniers doivent alors prendre en compte ce nouveau contexte dans leurs modèles d'affaires. Notre recherche étudie les comportements spécifiques que la responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet engendre à travers l'exemple de la propriété intellectuelle. En premier lieu nous décrivons l'évolution historique de cette responsabilité. Nous développons ensuite un modèle théorique simple qui explore l'influence du risque légal dans un contexte de concurrence entre un intermédiaire et un ayant droit du copyright. Enfin nous étendons ce modèle de concurrence aux différents comportements de protection que peuvent choisir les intermédiaires.

Competition law and intellectual property rights (IPRs) have evolved historically as two separate systems of law. There is a considerable overlap in the goals of the two systems of law because both are aimed at promoting innovation and economic growth. Yet there are also potential conflicts owing to the means used by each system to promote those goals. IP laws generally offer a right of exclusive use and exploitation to provide a reward to the innovator, to provide an incentive to other innovators and to bring into the public domain innovative information that might otherwise remain trade secrets. Competition authorities regulate near monopolies, mergers and commercial agreements with the aim of maintaining effective competition in markets. This article introduces the concept of IPRs and Competition law. It highlights important areas of conflict between the two laws and also deals with the Indian antitrust law. It concludes by trying to harmonize the conflicts.