Bibliographie sélective OHADA

The present article explores the implication of fairness as a regulatory and competition law concept applied to digital and Artificial Intelligence markets, in light of recent law and policy developments targeting the interaction between data, market power and competition law. Much of the policy discussions, legislative proposals as well some emerging case law elevate the matter of “fairness” in the context of digital markets and AI, creating both a novel regulatory framework as well as encouraging competition law to curb “unfairness” of said markets and related “unfair practices”. The interface between intellectual property rights and competition law is of utmost importance in this context, where we might find similar analogous insights as we can find regarding the matter of fairness within traditional EU competition law. Further, the question remains whether the “fairness norm” expressed in regulatory acts such Digital Markets Act, EU AI Act and the EU Data Act are akin to the “fairness” norms found in Union competition law, mainly under Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.

Recent empirical evidence suggests that labour markets are not as competitive as previously thought. In that context, mobilizing antitrust policy has been discussed as a possible solution. The proposition sounds counterintuitive, however. If workers are paid below the competitive level, doesn’t this promote consumers’ outcomes by reducing downstream prices? Given that antitrust policy promotes consumer welfare, why would antitrust authorities intervene against such a state of affairs? Besides, why would stepping up on antitrust enforcement improve workers’ outcomes? Their interests have traditionally been protected through their exclusion from the scope of antitrust enforcement, not by the enforcement of antitrust rules to their benefit. This thesis demonstrates that those spontaneous assumptions do not hold. Consumer welfare does not speak against the defence of workers’ interests. First, the focus on consumers is a by product of methods: it does not prevent consideration of other types of market participants. Moreover, consumers benefit from competitive labour markets. The welfare effects of monopsony power simultaneously worsen workers and consumers’ outcomes. As for the promotion of workers’ interests, it can be achieved through both positive and negative enforcement of antitrust. So far, the EU Commission has been less proactive than the American DOJ and FTC on the issue of antitrust enforcement in labour markets ( although the state of affairs is evolving). While this difference may stem from EU workers benefitting from higher levels of social protection than US workers, those higher levels of protection may not negate the usefulness of antitrust ’s intervention. The low levels of antitrust enforcement in EU labour markets may result from legal uncertainty and case law inconsistency more than an absence of harm. Just like the merger control apparatus, Article 101 and 102 TFEU can be used to scrutinize labour markets. While doing so involves some practical complexities, they can be overcome.

Competition law and intellectual property law share the objective of incentivising innovation. However, this objective is achieved in different ways, which, at times, can create tension between the two areas of law. It is imperative that this tension at the interface of competition law and intellectual property law is resolved in a manner that encourages innovation. Issues regarding the licensing of intellectual property, Standard Essential Patents, pay-for-delay agreements and no-challenge clauses are instances where the tension between competition law and intellectual property law is especially prevalent. These instances will be discussed in detail, and what is learnt from how the European Union and Australia handles it, will be applied to South Africa. The European Union, Australia and South Africa have different ways of dealing with situations where the exercise of intellectual property rights has an effect on competition. The European Union has block exemptions, which contains “safe havens” for conduct in specific circumstances. The block exemptions are often accompanied by guidelines, providing firms and individuals with greater detail in order to self-assess their compliance with the exemption. Australia has authorisation, notification and class exemption procedures. Firms can apply to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to authorise conduct that might potentially breach the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Exemptions may also be granted more broadly by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in terms of the class exemption procedures. In South Africa, the law concerning the interface between competition law and intellectual property is still in its infancy, and a lot can be learned from jurisdictions like the European Union and Australia regarding the most efficient way to handle this tension. Currently, the Competition Act 89 of 1998 in South Africa contains Section 10(4), the intellectual property exemption clause. A firm can apply to the Competition Commission for an intellectual property exemption from the application of Chapter 2 of the Competition Act “to an agreement or practice, or a category of agreements or practices” which pertains to the exercise of intellectual property rights. However, it is submitted that Section 10(4), by itself, is not the most efficient mechanism to resolve the tension that arises at the interface of competition law and intellectual property law in a way that incentivises innovation. It is proposed that the exemption provision can be made more effective if it is properly applied in conjunction with class exemptions and guidelines.

This thesis considers whether jurisdictional exigencies should influence competition law enforcement, with a specific focus on merger analysis. It examines various approaches and schools of thought regarding the goals of competition law and how these play out within jurisdictional parameters. The history of enforcement of American antitrust is scrutinised to establish the nature of the interplay between greater economic policy direction and the goals of competition law. The study also explores the issue of convergence and whether developing jurisdictions should align their competition law to that of developed jurisdictions with mature competition law.

This open-access book brings together international experts who shed new light on the status of social enterprises, benefit corporations and other purpose-driven companies. The respective chapters take a multidisciplinary approach (combining law, philosophy, history, sociology and economics) and provide valuable insights on fostering social entrepreneurship and advancing the common good. In recent years, we have witnessed a significant shift of how business activities are conducted, mainly through the rise of social enterprises. In an effort to target social problems at their roots, social entrepreneurs create organizations that bring transformative social changes by considering, among others, ethical, social, and environmental factors. A variety of social enterprise models are emerging internationally and are proving their vitality and importance. But what does the term “social enterprise” mean? What are its roots? And how does it work in practice within the legal framework of any country? This handbook attempts to answer these questions from a theoretical, historical, and comparative perspective, bringing together 44 contributions written by 71 expert researchers and practitioners in this field. The first part provides an overview of the social enterprise movement, its evolution, and the different forms entities can take to meet global challenges, overcoming the limits of what governments and states can do. The second part focuses on the emergence of benefit corporations and the growing importance of sustainability and societal values, while also analyzing their different legal forms and adaptation to their regulatory environment. In turn, the last part presents the status quo of purpose-driven companies in 36 developed and emerging economies worldwide. This handbook offers food for thought and guidance for everyone interested in this field. It will benefit practitioners and decision-makers involved in social and community organizations, as well as in international development and, more generally speaking, social sciences and economics.

Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres indépendants et examine différentes questions antitrust liées aux plateformes de gatekeeper. Le chapitre I explore le problème du verrouillage vertical dans les marchés bifaces. Dans le cadre des Accelerated Mobile Pages (AMP) de Google, le chapitre 2 examine la question de l'accès des plates-formes de contrôle d'accès aux données des utilisateurs professionnels. Le chapitre 3 se concentre sur le droit d'auteur numérique et étudie le comportement de Google consistant à utiliser le contenu des éditeurs pour afficher des réponses courtes sur les pages de résultats de recherche.Le premier chapitre examine comment l'intégration verticale d'une plate-forme monopolistique, qui se caractérise par des externalités de réseau bilatérales entre groupes, influe sur son incitation à s'engager dans le verrouillage en aval. Je me concentre sur un environnement où la plate-forme et les vendeurs en aval sont confrontés à l'incertitude quant aux gains du commerce au stade de la passation des marchés. Le choc aléatoire étant non contractile, la contractualisation crée des frictions qui faussent la structure tarifaire de la plateforme. En revanche, l'intégration verticale atténue ce problème en permettant à la plate-forme d'intégrer le choc aléatoire des prix à la consommation. En raison de l'interaction entre la friction des transactions et les externalités de réseau intergroupes, je trouve que l'intégration verticale pourrait réduire l'incitation de la plate-forme à la forclusion.Le deuxième chapitre est un travail conjoint avec Doh-Shin Jeon. Nous étudions comment l'adoption par les journaux d'AMP, un format de publication qui permet le chargement instantané de pages Web dans les navigateurs mobiles, modifie l'allocation des données et, par conséquent, les incitations des journaux à investir dans un journalisme de qualité. L'adoption d'AMP permet à Google d'obtenir des données sur les consommateurs à partir d'articles AMP et de les combiner avec d'autres sources de données sur les consommateurs pour améliorer le ciblage des publicités diffusées par Google sur d'autres sites Web. Même si une telle combinaison de données augmente l'efficacité statique, elle peut réduire l'efficacité dynamique lorsqu'elle diminue les revenus publicitaires par trafic de journal, réduisant ainsi la qualité du journalisme. Les journaux sont confrontés à un problème d'action collective car l'adoption de l'AMP par un journal génère des externalités négatives pour les autres journaux via le classement des recherches et la fuite de données. Google peut tirer parti de son pouvoir de marché dans la recherche et l'intermédiation publicitaire pour inciter les journaux à adopter AMP. Nous fournissons des recours politiques.Le troisième chapitre construit un modèle théorique de biens d'information divisibles pour examiner comment l'utilisation d'extraits par un moteur de recherche monopolistique impacte la consommation et la création de contenu. En affichant des extraits dans la zone de réponse sur les pages de résultats de recherche, le moteur de recherche dissocie les informations essentielles et les informations supplémentaires des articles. Elle crée donc deux effets opposés sur l'incitation des éditeurs à investir dans la qualité : l'effet de taille du marché et l'effet d'élasticité. Son impact sur le bien-être social est ambigu. D'une part, la boîte de réponse améliore l'efficacité de la recherche en offrant un accès plus large aux informations essentielles et en permettant aux consommateurs inframarginaux de substituer les informations essentielles à l'article complet. D'un autre côté, cela pourrait réduire le trafic sur le site Web, réduire les revenus publicitaires des éditeurs et les inciter à investir dans la qualité. J'examine les impacts des différentes politiques qui obligent le moteur de recherche à payer pour l'utilisation d'extraits.

While electronic commerce in South Africa is still comparatively small, it is growing rapidly. The advent of the internet has potentially fundamental impacts on business and the law both locally and internationally. It is submitted the free competition on the internet is important and will continue to be so in the future. The research in this thesis relates to the rise of so-called internet monopolies (such as Google, Facebook and Amazon) and its implications for competition law enforcement. A particularly problematic aspect of the products provided by some of these companies is that their products and services are ostensibly free to consumers. This thesis examines whether the traditional model for the regulating abuse of dominance would be effective in the instance where such an internet monopoly is charged with a contravention under South African competition law. The research and analysis in the thesis are effectively divided into three parts. The first considers whether abuse of dominance related to the internet deserves closer analysis and also assesses the purposes of competition law and how these are changing (or should change) in the light of new technology and markets. The second part deals with abuse of dominance both generally and specifically in relation to the internet. In this context, the thesis considers how harms may manifest and how dominance may be determined in the context of the internet. The final part considers specific issues that may be problematic in light of the internet. The interrelationship between intellectual property and competition law is analysed, along with aspects pertaining to the assertion of jurisdiction, the nature of competition law enforcement and the extent to which different jurisdictions may (and/or should) cooperate in dealing with abuse of dominance on the internet. The thesis submits that the South African legislative framework for regulating abuse of dominance on the internet is broadly fit for purpose, but that there is a need for developing new approaches and policy within that framework. It contributes to the existing body of knowledge and discourse by providing a comprehensive overview of the regulatory framework in South Africa, informed by comparative analysis; by applying this in a new context (hitherto under-researched in the South African context), and by offering concrete suggestions to frame policy and approach.

The Competition Act 89 of 1998 applies equally to all firms with regard to anti-competitive behaviour regardless whether it is privately or publicly owned. Therefore it applies to stateowned enterprises (SOEs) if their actions fall short of the Act. There is however one aspect relating to SOEs which is not covered by the application of the Competition Act but may have a significant impact on free and fair competition and can be of big concern for private competitors of SOEs. Since discriminatory policies during Apartheid have created a huge inequality gap in post-Apartheid South Africa, the government has to be actively involved in the economy to address the inequality. Therefore the government uses SOEs as vehicles to achieve its developmental goals. As a result SOEs in South Africa which are active market participants may always rely on the financial support of the state. They may do so purely because of their crucial governmental mandates regardless of financial mismanagement, poor corporate governance and deep seated corruption in almost every SOE. Even though the fundamental need for the existence of SOEs in South Africa is acknowledge, it is argued that state financial aid could qualify as a state-initiated constraint on competition in South Africa as it creates an uneven playing field between SOEs and their private competitors, which is always skewed in favour of the SOEs. It may create warped incentives and SOEs may not compete efficiently if they know that they are protected by a state sponsored safety net. This dissertation asks the question whether the time has not arrived in South Africa for state aid to SOEs to be subjected to a certain degree of scrutiny in order to bring about a level playing field between SOEs and their private competitors. It is recognised that privatisation of SOEs is not always the better option as it could threaten the delivery of basic services and goods to poorer South Africans. Hence, the dissertation investigates whether a state aid control model, based on the European Union state aid rules, is not perhaps a solution to address the potential distortion of free and fair competition by state financial aid. It proposes a customised state aid control regime for South Africa which provides for an active role by the competition authorities in state aid decisions and it presents draft legislation which could be used as a basis for the implementation in South Africa of a regulated system of state financial aid to SOEs (and even private enterprises where applicable).

The thesis contributes to the debate on the EU’s approach to the business practice of resale price maintenance (RPM), which is widely criticized as too strict and in conflict with what is considered to be the consensus in the economic literature. The thesis critically dissects the economic consensus, on which the critique against the EU’s approach is based, by analyzing the empirical evidence that is cited to support the claim that RPM can frequently be explained by the service-based RPM models and shows that there is no convincing evidence that would support the significance of these positive RPM models that predict positive effects on welfare. To support this finding the thesis collects new evidence by surveying the marketing literature and shows that not only is there no convincing evidence that the positive RPM models frequently apply, but to the contrary there is evidence that these models are inconsistent with the real world phenomenon of RPM. Having refuted the service-based models the thesis takes up the scientific challenge that “it takes a theory to beat a theory” and proposes to fill the gap with three price-based models. The thesis offers an analysis of the three price-based RPM models, first from the perspective of welfare effects and then from a broader economic perspective in an attempt to ultimately show that the EU approach to RPM can be justified based on these economic models. All three models explain the situation in which RPM is used by a branded good manufacturer to create the perception of high quality, which is used either as a credible quality signal, becomes a component of the product or is used to bias the consumer decision; they thus enter the difficult terrain of consumer preference formation and of markets for the intangible components of a product.

No abstract available.

Healthcare markets have started being created in Europe. Indeed, some European countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, have started adopting the choice and competition model for healthcare delivery. Taking as a starting point that as health systems in Europe move towards market driven healthcare delivery, the application of competition law in these systems will increase, the goal of this doctoral thesis is (a) to identify some of the competition problems that may be raised in light of the reality that especially in hospital and medical markets the pursuit of competition and the pursuit of essential dimensions of healthcare quality may inevitably clash (b) to demonstrate that competition authorities would be unable to address some of these competition problems if they did not pose and address a fundamental question first: how should we define and assess quality in healthcare? How should we take healthcare quality into account in the context of a competition analysis? In delving into these questions, this doctoral thesis explores how the notion of healthcare quality is defined from antitrust, health policy and medicine perspectives and identifies three different models under which competition authorities may actually assess how a specific anticompetitive agreement or hospital merger may impact on healthcare quality. These are: (a) the US market approach under which competition authorities may define quality in healthcare strictly as choice, variety, competition and innovation (b) the European approach under which competition authorities may extend the notion of consumer welfare in healthcare so that it encompasses not only the notions of efficiency, choice and innovation, but also the wider objectives and values European health systems in fact pursue (c) the UK model under which competition authorities may cooperate with health authorities when they assess the impact of a specific transaction on healthcare quality. The thesis identifies the main merits and shortcomings of these models and emphasizes that what is crucial for the adoption of a holistic approach to healthcare quality is not only the model under which healthcare quality is actually integrated into a competition analysis but also competition authorities’ commitment to protect all dimensions of this notion.

In South Africa compliance with competition law has become a major concern for firms that achieve and maintain certain levels of success and growth in the market, as their actions are often a source of complaints and litigation by rivals and competition authorities. With substantial financial penalties often levied against them for a variety of conduct deemed to constitute an abuse of their market position, dominant firms must constantly be aware of the likely impact of their business strategies and actions on both rivals and consumers. What were once thought to be normal and economically sound business practices and decisions, such as cutting prices to attract customers, have now acquired new meanings, with devastating consequences for dominant firms. So, are dominant firms under attack from competition law? In this study I aim to determine this. I track the historical development of competition law in three jurisdictions: South Africa, America, and the EU, with the aim of identifying traces, if any, of hostility towards dominant firms in the origins of competition law. I further investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of certain aspects of existing abuse of dominance provisions manifest as hostility towards dominant firms. While acknowledging the important role that competition law enforcement plays in promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare, I conclude that significant unjustified economic and legal prejudice is suffered by dominant firms as a result of the way in which certain abuse of dominance provisions have been formulated and applied. I also offer appropriate recommendations.

The interaction between competition law and intellectual property law has often attracted divergent views from scholars and practitioners of each respective sphere of law. Whereas some argue that the two are in conflict with each other and cannot be reconciled. The aforementioned tension between competition law and intellectual property law has been traced to the objectives of each. On the one hand, intellectual property rights confer upon their owners an exclusive right to behave in a particular way while on the other hand competition law strives to keep markets open. Other scholars have argued that, in real sense and practice, the two are actually not in conflict but rather that they complement each other. The question then becomes, is there really an irreconcilable difference between the two areas of law? This paper seeks to establish how the two aspects of law interact and seeks to propose that there be created a balance to alleviate the perceived conflict between the two. This paper will identify the areas in which the balance can be struck. It will also seek to establish how the Kenyan legislative framework as well as the courts has dealt with the conflict. It will proceed from understanding the goals and objective of both intellectual property law and competition law. This will provide the backdrop against which the alleged conflict originates from. A comparative study with other developed jurisdictions will be undertaken so as to advise on the route that should be taken by Kenya on the interface and a conclusion drawn on how the two areas relate and recommendations drawn from the issues identified in the study made.

Promotional competitions are competitions in which prizes are awarded by lot or chance in order to promote goods or services. Due to the chance element, these competitions are often categorised as lotteries or gambling. Initially, South African legislation did not make provision for the running of promotional competitions, but this situation changed when the Lotteries Act, 1997 came into force. Currently, promotional competitions are regulated by the Consumer Protection Act, 2008 (CPA). This thesis examines the regulation of promotional competitions in South Africa. It commences with a background discussion, which touches on the relevant terminology and some sociological aspects. It then considers the consequences of gambling and the need for and nature of regulation, and deals with the marketing and consumer protection contexts. This is followed by a brief overview of the global and South African history of gambling, lotteries and promotional competitions, which includes a discussion of South African case law. Foreign law relating to promotional competitions in New Zealand and Great Britain is explored in order to compare this to the South African position. This is followed by an examination of the current regulation of promotional competitions in South Africa, including a discussion regarding the interplay between the CPA and the Lotteries Act and a detailed analysis of the CPA’s provisions. The self-regulation of promotional competitions is discussed as well. The concluding chapter of this thesis contains recommended solutions for the problems identified in the analysis of the relevant legislation.

La responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet fait débat dans un univers numérique de plus en plus complexe. Les intermédiaires offrent des services en ligne. Ils créent ou facilitent des transactions entre des parties tierces (hébergement, e-commerce, fournisseurs d'accès…). A la fin des années 1990, un consensus s'est établi sur l'instauration d'une responsabilité limitée pour ces acteurs, dans le but de favoriser leur développement ainsi que celui d'Internet par des externalités croisées. Cependant, l'apparition régulière de nouveaux usages a induit des externalités négatives affectant certains agents économiques. La multiplication récente de décisions de jurisprudence parfois contradictoires, en particulier dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle, vient désormais remettre en cause cette exemption. Elle fait naître un risque juridique pour les intermédiaires d'Internet. Ces-derniers doivent alors prendre en compte ce nouveau contexte dans leurs modèles d'affaires. Notre recherche étudie les comportements spécifiques que la responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet engendre à travers l'exemple de la propriété intellectuelle. En premier lieu nous décrivons l'évolution historique de cette responsabilité. Nous développons ensuite un modèle théorique simple qui explore l'influence du risque légal dans un contexte de concurrence entre un intermédiaire et un ayant droit du copyright. Enfin nous étendons ce modèle de concurrence aux différents comportements de protection que peuvent choisir les intermédiaires.

Dommage économique causé par les cartels: une évaluation pour les pays en voie de développement (En collaboration avec Marc IVALDI, L'École d'économie de Toulouse et CEPR et Frédéric JENNY, ESSEC Business School, Paris) : La détection et la sanction des cartels reste toujours d'une grande importance pour les autorités de la concurrence développées en raison d'une compréhension claire de leur danger potentiel, et donc des avantages de leur dissuasion. Néanmoins, les pays en développement ont souvent du mal à créer ou à renforcer leur autorité de la concurrence - l'exécution d'une division antitrust est coûteuse et la preuve à l'appui concernant les avantages potentiels est toujours manquante. Présente étude fournit la preuve quantitative manquante. Elle propose une évaluation du dommage économique total causé par les cartels en termes de chiffre d'affaires affecté par les pratiques collusoires ainsi qu'en termes de profits excessifs des ententes découlant de surcharge des consommateurs. Les résultats suggèrent que le préjudice économique totale estimé en termes de profits excessifs divisés par le PIB correspondant peut atteindre jusqu’à 1%. En outre, comme la probabilité annuelle maximale de découvrir une entente déjà existante est estimée à environ 24%, il est suggéré que le dommage économique réel dépasse nos estimations, au moins quatre fois. / Évaluation de la précision des outils proposés dans les lignes directrices sur les fusions (En collaboration avec Marc Ivaldi, L'École d'économie de Toulouse et CEPR et Jérôme Foncel, EQUIPPE, Université de Lille) : Présente étude propose une évaluation complète de la précision de deux outils proposés par les lignes directrices sur les fusions les plus avancés - le critère traditionnel HHI et un plus récent UPP - et défini les conditions économiques qui favorisent les prédictions trompeuses. Les simulations de Monte-Carlo sont utilisées pour créer des économies qui sont utilisés pour mesurer les effets des fusions et d'évaluer la performance des outils d'évaluation choisis. Les résultats suggèrent que le test HHI à une capacité très faible de déterminer le potentiel de l'augmentation des prix lorsqu'il est appliqué à un marché de produits différenciés. Dans son tour, le test UPP peut aussi être très trompeur, même si l'on a une information parfaite sur les principaux ingrédients nécessaires pour le calculer. L’étude démontre que certains d'erreurs de type I et de type II se produit parce que les tests de type UPP par construction ne tiennent pas compte de la ‘pression’ sur le prix subie par le partenaire de fusion. Elle aussi explique comment ce dernier peut être réglé en tenant compte du degré de transmission croisé correspondant. / Le rôle du degré de transmission croisé dans les évaluations des fusions : Présente étude démontre que l'ignorance de l’effet de transmission croisé, et en particulier de son signe, peut conduire à des conclusions erronées dans presque toutes les étapes d’évaluation d’une fusion, y compris la procédure de définition du marché et l'évaluation des effets coordonnés et unilatéraux. Par conséquent, l’étude aussi offre un examen des propriétés de l'ensemble de la matrice des degrés de transmission dans un cadre suffisamment général et en même temps plus pratique pour les concentrations horizontales et tire les caractéristiques exactes des systèmes d'offre et de demande qui affectent le signe du degré de transmission croisé.

State aid law is made up of rules and procedures whose main characters are the Member States – as the addressees of the norms – and the Commission – as their enforcer. The prominent position of these two actors often overshadows the impact that the administration of the rules on State aid has on private undertakings, be it the beneficiaries of State aids or their competitors. This thesis is concerned with the latter. The aim of the thesis is to assess the extent to which competitors may rely on the rules on State aid to protect themselves against the potentially harmful effects of subsidies and other forms of state, financial assistance to firms. This endeavour raises two challenges. The first challenge is to identify the channels through which competitors may voice their interest in the context of a system of governance to which they are in principle alien. This is the issue of access. The second challenge is assess the likelihood that the Commission shall heed to the concerns voiced by competitors. In other words, the challenge is to gauge the power of influence that competitors may exert through each of these channels. This is the issue of leverage. In order to carry out this inquiry, the thesis scrutinizes the means of redress available to competitors before national courts (“private enforcement”), as well as the opportunities that they have to make their voice heard in the course of the Commission’s procedures (“public enforcement”) – namely, the possibility to lodge complaints, the possibility to participate in the consultation phase of Article 108(2) TFEU and the possibility to seek the judicial review of State aid decisions.

This thesis explores the way in which EU and U.S. antitrust rules address opportunistic conducts that emerge in the context of standard essential patents (SEPs). The analysis finds that the two systems have very different scopes in addressing those practices: conduct lawful under U.S. antitrust law is condemned by the EU competition law and vice versa. In contrast to other fields of antitrust, the differences between the EU and U.S. approach do not arise from the application of different legal standards, but rather reflect the core divergences in the statutory texts that address unilateral practices. The analysis also shows that both in the European Union and in the United States, competition authorities have tried to increase the scope of competition law—first, by stretching the antitrust doctrines outside established borders, and second, by advocacy measures designed to avoid opportunism related to SEPs. The thesis shows, nonetheless, that both approaches are problematic and a more cautious strategy is needed to avoid the risk of injecting imbalance in the standardization context.

Competition law and intellectual property rights (IPRs) have evolved historically as two separate systems of law. There is a considerable overlap in the goals of the two systems of law because both are aimed at promoting innovation and economic growth. Yet there are also potential conflicts owing to the means used by each system to promote those goals. IP laws generally offer a right of exclusive use and exploitation to provide a reward to the innovator, to provide an incentive to other innovators and to bring into the public domain innovative information that might otherwise remain trade secrets. Competition authorities regulate near monopolies, mergers and commercial agreements with the aim of maintaining effective competition in markets. This article introduces the concept of IPRs and Competition law. It highlights important areas of conflict between the two laws and also deals with the Indian antitrust law. It concludes by trying to harmonize the conflicts.