Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Codes, laws and guidelines governing international commercial arbitration developed by such organizations as the International Court of Arbitration, the International Bar Association and the International Chamber of Commerce have been drafted against the background of Common Law and Civil Law values. In balancing these two great legal traditions, it was assumed that together they represent a composite legal tradition governing international commercial arbitration. The result of that assumption was decades of fine work enshrining international arbitration doctrines, principles, and rules of law and procedures that blend these two important legal traditions. More recent concerns have begun to raise such questions as: How pervasive are the Common and Civil Law traditions? Part I of this article asks: What is a legal tradition and how should it be distinguished from a legal culture in relation to international commercial arbitration? Part II reflects on the influence of legal culture on international commercial arbitration. Parts III, IV and V investigate the Common and Civil legal traditions in relation to national, regional and international commercial arbitration. Part VI evaluates the public traditions that surround international commercial arbitration. Part VII considers whether change in the traditions of international commercial arbitration represent culture change or culture shock. Part VIII emphasizes the value of building an inclusive international arbitration tradition. Part IX suggests ways in which international commercial arbitration can accommodate diffuse and changing local, regional and global influences upon it. Codes, laws and guidelines governing international commercial arbitration developed by such organizations as the International Court of Arbitration (ICA), the International Bar Association (IBA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have been drafted against the background of Common Law and Civil Law values. In balancing these two great legal traditions, it was assumed that together they represent a composite legal tradition governing international commercial arbitration. The result of that assumption was decades of fine work enshrining international arbitration doctrines, principles, and rules of law and procedures that blend these two important legal traditions. From the doctrine of freedom of contract to specific rules of evidence and procedures that govern arbitral hearings, the international arbitration community has sought to maintain the respected legal traditions that lawyer-arbitrators and counsel find familiar and comfortable. More recent concerns, partly expressed by William K. Slate II, President of the American Arbitration Association, have begun to raise such questions as: How pervasive are the Common and Civil Law traditions? Are they sufficiently uniform in nature and operation to justify their dominant status in formulating codes, laws and rules governing international commercial arbitration? And has international commercial arbitration become unduly reliant upon both the Common and Civil Law traditions at the expense of other legal traditions that operate against the background of different and changing legal cultures? Part I of this article asks: What is a legal tradition and how should it be distinguished from a legal culture in relation to international commercial arbitration? Part II reflects on the influence of legal culture on international commercial arbitration. Parts III, IV and V investigate the Common and Civil legal traditions in relation to national, regional and international commercial arbitration. Part VI evaluates the public traditions that surround international commercial arbitration. Part VII considers whether change in the traditions of international commercial arbitration represent culture change or culture shock. Part VIII emphasizes the value of building an inclusive international arbitration tradition. Part IX suggests ways in which international commercial arbitration can accommodate diffuse and changing local, regional and global influences upon it.

Tezimizin konusu ?Kambiyo Senetlerinde Sebepsiz Zenginleşme?dir. Kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme müessesesi TTK m.644'te düzenlenmiştir. TTK m.644'e göre keşideci ve kabul etmiş muhatap, hamilin poliçedeki hakkını zamanaşımı ya da poliçedeki hakkı koruyucu işlemleri kaybetmesi sebebiyle poliçedeki borcu ödemek yükümlülüklerinden kurtulmuş olsa dahi sebepsiz zenginleşme hükümleri ile takip edilebilirler. TTK m.644'te düzenlenmiş olan kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme müessesesi kambiyo senedindeki asıl alacak ile genel hükümlerde yer alan sebepsiz zenginleşme talebinden bağımsız kendine özgü bir talebi içermektedir. TTK m.644 TTK m.730 gereği çekler hakkında da uygulanır. TTK m.690'da açık bir atıf olmamasına rağmen bonolara da uygulanabilmelidir. TTK m.644'ün uygulanabilmesi için hamilin zarara uğraması şarttır. Hamilin zararı iki sebebe dayanmalıdır. Bunlar, zamanaşımı ve hamilin poliçedeki hakkı koruyucu işlemlerin yerine getirilmemesidir. Zamanaşımı süreleri kambiyo senetlerinin türlerine ve kambiyo senetlerindeki alacaklı ve borçluların kimliklerine göre değişik süreler olarak TTK'da tespit edilmiştir. Hamilin poliçeyi muhataba kabul için arz etmemesi, ödenmek üzere ibraz etmemesi ya da gerektiğinde protesto keşidesinin gerçekleştirilmemesi poliçedeki hakkın kaybına yol açan hakkı koruyucu işlemler olarak kabul edilmektedir. Hamilin poliçedeki hakkını kaybetmesi neticesinde borçtan kurtulan borçlular zenginleşmiş olarak kabul edilirler. Kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme talebine dayanan dava mutlak ticari davadır. Görevli ve yetkili mahkeme Ticaret Hukuku, Borçlar Hukuku Usul Hukuku prensipleri birlikte değerlendirilerek tespit edilmelidir. Ve bu davaya uygulanacak zamanaşımı süresi hakkında doktrinde ve mahkeme kararlarındaki ihtilaf bu konudaki boşluğun kanun koyucu tarafından doldurularak giderilmelidir. [...] Tezimizin konusu ?Kambiyo Senetlerinde Sebepsiz Zenginleşme?dir. Kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme müessesesi TTK m.644'te düzenlenmiştir. TTK m.644'e göre keşideci ve kabul etmiş muhatap, hamilin poliçedeki hakkını zamanaşımı ya da poliçedeki hakkı koruyucu işlemleri kaybetmesi sebebiyle poliçedeki borcu ödemek yükümlülüklerinden kurtulmuş olsa dahi sebepsiz zenginleşme hükümleri ile takip edilebilirler. TTK m.644'te düzenlenmiş olan kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme müessesesi kambiyo senedindeki asıl alacak ile genel hükümlerde yer alan sebepsiz zenginleşme talebinden bağımsız kendine özgü bir talebi içermektedir. TTK m.644 TTK m.730 gereği çekler hakkında da uygulanır. TTK m.690'da açık bir atıf olmamasına rağmen bonolara da uygulanabilmelidir. TTK m.644'ün uygulanabilmesi için hamilin zarara uğraması şarttır. Hamilin zararı iki sebebe dayanmalıdır. Bunlar, zamanaşımı ve hamilin poliçedeki hakkı koruyucu işlemlerin yerine getirilmemesidir. Zamanaşımı süreleri kambiyo senetlerinin türlerine ve kambiyo senetlerindeki alacaklı ve borçluların kimliklerine göre değişik süreler olarak TTK'da tespit edilmiştir. Hamilin poliçeyi muhataba kabul için arz etmemesi, ödenmek üzere ibraz etmemesi ya da gerektiğinde protesto keşidesinin gerçekleştirilmemesi poliçedeki hakkın kaybına yol açan hakkı koruyucu işlemler olarak kabul edilmektedir. Hamilin poliçedeki hakkını kaybetmesi neticesinde borçtan kurtulan borçlular zenginleşmiş olarak kabul edilirler. Kambiyo senetlerinde sebepsiz zenginleşme talebine dayanan dava mutlak ticari davadır. Görevli ve yetkili mahkeme Ticaret Hukuku, Borçlar Hukuku Usul Hukuku prensipleri birlikte değerlendirilerek tespit edilmelidir. Ve bu davaya uygulanacak zamanaşımı süresi hakkında doktrinde ve mahkeme kararlarındaki ihtilaf bu konudaki boşluğun kanun koyucu tarafından doldurularak giderilmelidir. The title of this thesies is "Unjustified Enrichment in Commercial Papers". The concept of Unjustified Enrichment in Commercial Papers was regulated in TTK (Code of Turkish Commerce) article 644. According to TTK article 644, drawer and drawee who accepted the bill of exchange, can be fallowed by unjustified enrichment regulations even the holder looses the rights in commercial papers because of prescription and negligence for saving the rights in commercial papers. The concept of unjustified enrichment which was regulated in TTK article 644 consists of independent, exceptional, and sui generis demand against the general regulations in Code of Obligations and basic relations in the commercial papers. TTK article 644 can be applied for the cheques because of the special rule in TTK article 730. TTK article 644 should be able to be applied for the promissory notes eventhough there is not any special rule in TTK article 690. For TTK article 644?s ability to apply holder should have a damage. And this damage must have one of two limited reasons. These are prescription and the negligence for saving the rights in commercial papers. Prescription timings were determinated according to the changing of the commercial papers? kinds and the the holders? and debtors? identities in the Turkish Commercial Code. If holder does not supply the bills of exchange to the drawee for acceptance or if holder does not supply the commercial paper for payment or if required, protesting is not cared by the holder, the debt gets lost. The result of the holder?s loss of the rights in commercial papers is the enrichment of the debtors. The case which is related to unjustified enrichment is the perfect commercial case. Authorized and charged court should be determinated by focusing the principles in Commercial Law, Obligation Law and Procedure Law. And the conflict for the prescription timings in scientific and courting decisions should be solved by the law maker.

Tahkim anlasması ile taraflar, aralarındaki uyusmazlığın tahkim yoluyla çözüleceği konusunda anlasmıslardır. Böyle bir seçim, aynı zamanda yine taraflarar asındaki hukuki uyusmazlıklar yönünden devlet mahkemelerinin artık herhangi bir yargı yetkisine sahip olmadığı anlamına da gelmektedir. ?rade serbestîsinin yaygın kabulü, mahkemelerin tahkime müdahalesini, her geçen zaman daha da azaltmıstır. Bugün artık hâkim eğilim, devlet mahkemelerinin müdahalesinin ya tahkime yardım edilmesi ya da kamu düzeninin korunması amacıyla sınırlandırılmasıdır. Kural olarak, tahkim anlasmasının geçerliliğinin tespiti ile birlikte mahkemeler, tarafları, genis anlamda tahkime yönlendirecekler; uyusmazlığın esasıyla ilgili ol arakherhangi bir yargılama yapmayacaklardır. Ancak bazen, tahkimle ilgili konularda mahkemelerin yardımı ve desteği hatta kimi hâllerde denetimi, kaçınılmazdır. Hakem heyetinin seçimi, delillerin toplanması, hep bu kapsamdadır. Hakemlerce verilen nihai kararın cebren icrası gerektiğinde, mahkemelerin hem yardım hem de denetim islevi, gündeme gelmektedir. Hakemin reddinde olduğu gibi yargısal temel hakların korunması gerektiğinde, yine mahkemelerin rolü kaçınılmaz olmaktadır. Geçen zaman içinde mahkemelerin tahkime karsı olan yoğun süpheleri; tahkim anlasmaları ile hakem kararlarını sıkça geçersiz sayarak tahkime olumsuz anlamda müdahale etmek seklindeki alıskanlıkları, artık neredeyse tümüyle değismis ve ortadan kalkmıstır. Denetime yönelik mahkeme müdahalesinin geçmiste çoğu zaman taraf iradelerinin hiç sayılması anlamına geldiği, bilinmektedir. Oysa bugün, özellikle de UNCITRAL Model Kanunu'nun 5. maddesiyle yaygınlık kazanan anlayıs, taraflara ve hakem heyetlerine, basta yargı yetkisi olmak üzere pek çok alanda, genis yetkiler tanımak; denetime yönelik mahkeme müdahalesinin en son anda ve son derece kısıtlı nedenlerle gerçeklesmesini temin etmektir. Tahkim anlasmasının geçerliliği, mahkemelerin tahkimde sıkça rol oynadığı alanlardan biridir. Fransız hukukunda, bu konuda ilk sözün hakemlere bırakıldığı; mahkemelerin ise ancak nihai karar sonrası dönemde etkin oldukları bilinmektedir. Hakem heyetinin seçimi, delillerin tespiti, geçici hukuki koruma tedbirlerine hükmedilmesi, tahkim yargılaması öncesi, mahkemelerin yardımını gerektiren konulardır. Geçici hukuki koruma tedbirlerine hükmedilmesi veya hükmedilenlerin icrasına karar verilmesi ile tahkimdeki sürenin uzatılması, tahkim yargılaması sırasında, mahkemelerin yardımını gerektiren meselelerdir. By entering into an arbitration agreement parties express their intention that all disputes between them be referred to and settled by arbitration. This choice at the same time manifests a decision against the competence of the state courts. By accepting the party autonomy the level of the court intervention has significantly diminished over the past years. The general trend is towards limiting court intervention to the cases where it is either necessary to support the arbitration process or required by public policy considerations. By finding the arbitration agreement between the parties valid, no court proceedings on the merits of the disputes can be brougt before the courts and all disputes covered by that agreement are referred to arbitration. There are, however, some situations where court intervention and assistance is needed. Courts may be asked to assist with the appointment of arbitrators, and the collective of evidence. They may also be asked to order protective measures where the arbitrators lack coercive power. Courts may also intervene to guarantee that the minimum requirements of precedural fairness by removing an arbitrator for his lack of impartiality. Courts have moved from strong scepticism resulting in extensive judicial intervention in the arbitration precess or the non-enforcement of arbitration agreement to a position in favor of arbitration giving priority to party autonomy and eschewing intervention. Supervisiory court intervention has the potential of disrupting the arbitration process and impeding the parties? quest for a speedy dispute resolution. It is a common feature of recent arbitration legislation to limit the scope for court intervention after the UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 5. The effect has been that the parties and the tribunals are given wider powers especially about the jurisdiction issues. The authority of the courts has been limited in some cases that could be used at the final stage under the listed the reasons. To what extent the courts can at the pre-award stage review the existance of a valid arbitration agreement is one of the main fields that the courts play role. In French law, the arbitrator has a right of first decision and any court review is deferred to the post-award stage. Establishing the arbitral tribunal, ordering protective measures are the topics need the assistance of the courts. Ordering protective measures or helping for their execution and the extending the time-limt of the arbitral jurisdiction are the issues met during the arbitral procedure.

L’étude des rapports qu’entretiennent l’arbitrage et le procès équitable dans les différents droits des îles de la zone sud-ouest de l’Océan indien prend toute sa dimension dès l’instant où la zone offre un patchwork de systèmes juridiques différents. La question est alors de savoir si dans les droits des îles des Grandes Mascareignes, l’arbitrage revêt le costume juridique français, sachant que le Nouveau Code de Procédure civile (NCPC) édicté en France le 5 décembre 1975 a été, suite à l’accession à l’indépendance de ces différentes pays, transplanté à Madagascar, aux Comores et à Maurice. La logique conduirait à répondre par l’affirmative. Mais la diversité du contexte, constitué soit de transposition du droit français de l’arbitrage, qui intègre le modèle de procès équitable notamment défini par l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, soit d’érection d’un droit interne de l’arbitrage composé partiellement de dispositions juridiques françaises, offre des situations inédites. Si à l’instar des grandes tendances, l’étude croisée des dispositions relatives à l’arbitrage et celles du procès équitable dans l’Océan Indien révèle une perméabilisation croissante de ce deux dernières sphères, et de là un risque de processualisation de l’arbitrage, l’institutionnalisation de l’arbitrage permet également aux parties, de trouver des garanties, ce qui est pleinement satisfaisant dans des pays où l’État de droit est défaillant et la justice étatique mise à mal de façon à assurer la sécurisation juridique des investissements et des échanges commerciaux. The study of reports stating that arbitration and fair judgment exist in the different laws of the islands in the south western zone of the Indian Ocean takes on a whole new dimension if the zone provides a patchwork of different legal systems. The question is whether or not arbitration is the same as in the French legal system. One must consider that the New Civil Procedure Code (NCPC) which was decreed in France on 5th December 1975, was transplanted to Madagascar, the Comoros Islands and Mauritius. Logic would thus lead one to believe the affirmative. However the diversity of the context, which is constituted either by transposing French arbitration law that integrates the decreed trial model as defined by article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, or the erection of internal arbitration law composed partially of French legal dispositions, provides some new situations. If, in accordance with the trends, the cross study of dispositions relative to arbitration and those of the fair trial in the Indian Ocean reveal that these two spheres are growing, and that a result of this there is a risk of procedure arbitration, the institutionalization of arbitration also allows for the concerned parties to find guarantees, which is very satisfying for countries whose state law is weak and where state justice has difficulty in ensuring legal security for investments and commercial exchange.

Cette thèse présente le parcours difficile du droit en matière d’investissements directs à l’étranger vers son internationalisation. La difficulté d’intégration dans le droit international des normes juridiques régissant l’investissement étranger a été due aux changements intervenus dans les relations internationales, à la suite de confrontations politiques, idéologiques et surtout économiques entre les pays. Les mécanismes conventionnels, les traités bilatéraux et la multiplication des arrangements régionaux ont contribué à une juridicisation nouvelle de la société mondiale. Cependant, ce n’est qu'un instrument multilatéral global, généralement accepté et qui échapperait de ce fait aux rapports de pouvoir au niveau mondial qui pourrait consacrer l’avènement d’un droit international en matière d’investissements directs étrangers. Assurant la stabilité du système multilatéral, il serait l’outil juridique qui permettrait de régir différemment la mondialisation économique.

Le démarchage par les établissements de crédit ne peut se résumer à l'étude de la seule loi de 2003, réformant le démarchage bancaire et financier. En effet, ce texte n'intègre nullement dans son champ d'application les produits et services non bancaires ainsi que les produits d'assurances que distribuent pourtant les banques. Des règles différentes peuvent donc trouver à s'appliquer, alternativement selon l'objet du démarchage, ou par cumul, lorsqu"il précède par exemple une vente à distance, transfrontière. Avec la transposition en France de la directive « vente à distance de services financiers », cette superposition de régimes protecteurs n'est plus justifiée. En effet, la protection de la personne démarchée est assurée, comme en matière de vente à distance, par une information précontractuelle renforcée et par l'introduction d'un délai de rétractation de quatorze jours. La définition du démarchage, limitée au démarchage « en face-à-face » à domicile, pourrait ainsi être harmonisée.

La gratuité est une notion juridique qui caractérise certains actes, dont les libéralités et les contrats de bienfaisance. Malgré sa juridicité, la notion est mystérieuse. En effet, elle n’est pas définie par le Code civil. Par ailleurs, elle est rattachée, dans l’imaginaire collectif, à des vertus morales délicates à appréhender juridiquement. Depuis quelques années, la gratuité connaît un essor sans précédent, du fait de son implication constante dans ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler la « nouvelle économie », issue du développement des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication. La question de la définition de la gratuité mérite donc d’être posée, tout comme celle de son traitement juridique. La gratuité apparaît alors comme une notion essentiellement technique, dépourvue de toute connotation morale, et indépendante du contexte économique et social dans lequel l’acte gratuit s’inscrit. Au contraire, ce contexte est, traditionnellement, prépondérant dans la détermination du traitement juridique de la gratuité. Selon le cadre dans lequel la gratuité intervient, elle est encouragée ou, au contraire, découragée, ce qui témoigne de son anormalité. Cependant, le développement actuel de la gratuité et le constat de son caractère essentiel dans l’économie de réseau, aboutit à une normalisation du traitement juridique de la gratuité. Gratuitousness is a legal concept which characterizes generous gifts, legacies and free services, among other things. Nevertheless, this concept is mysterious. Indeed, it is not defined in the Code Civil. Besides, in the collective imaginative world, gratuitousness is linked to moral virtues which are awkward to grasp in a juridical sense. Gratuitousness has been enjoying an unprecedented boom for several years because of its constant implication in what has come to be called “New Economy,” which itself was born from the development of the New Information and Communication Technologies. Thus, the question about the way we can define gratuitousness and the way we can deal with it juridically, is worth asking. In this respect, gratuitousness appears to be a concept which is essentially technical, devoid of any moral connotation, and independent of the economical and social context in which it takes place. Yet traditionally, the very context dominates the juridical treatment of gratuitousness. Depending on when and where gratuitousness occurs, it can be encouraged or, on the contrary, discouraged, which testifies to its abnormality. However, the current development of gratuitousness, and the fact that it is essential in network economy, leads to a standardization of the juridical treatment of gratuitousness.

The contractual intermediary, a qualifier more than a real qualification, designates those whose activity, from a contractual source, consists in bringing together two or more people with a view to concluding a contract. Unknown as much as unloved, these intermediaries who officiate in fields as varied as insurance, banking, transport or advertising in particular, are rarely grouped under a single term. Doctrine and case law deal separately with agents, commission agents, brokers, commercial agents, etc. This segregation does not make it possible to understand the object of the activity of intermediary, nor to highlight the common points that exist. among all these professionals.

Advancing technology has caused rapid and dramatic changes in the world of work. Labour law systems grounded in the industrial era, with their emphasis on collective bargaining, are not suitable in today’s world of work. Throughout the world, the ‘atypical employee’ is replacing the standard or typical employee whose terms and conditions of employment were generally regulated by collective agreements. Atypical employee’s terms and conditions of employment generally are not regulated by collective agreements. World– wide trends in the decentralisation of collective bargaining, decollectivisation and individualisation of the employment relationship have contributed to a decline in trade union power and influence. Consequently the number of workers covered by collective agreements has decreased. Collective bargaining has been rendered less effective because of the changing the world of work. The South African labour law system places a huge emphasis on collective bargaining, particularly at industry level, for the protection of employee interests. Given these trends in the changing world of work, the appropriateness of this emphasis on industry or central level collective bargaining is questioned. The vacuum left by the inadequacy and inability of trade unions to protect employee interests in a comprehensive manner by means of collective bargaining, needs to be addressed. The following alternative means of protecting employee interests are considered: (i) The socialisation of the law of contract; (ii) the interpretation given to the constitutional right to fair labour practices; and (iii) the role of good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. These alternative means of addressing legitimate employee interests could play a role in filling the vacuum created by trade union decline. The South African law of contract is capable of bridging the gap between law and justice by the application of the concepts of good faith and public policy, so that employment contracts may take cognisance of employee interests despite the imbalance of power between employer and employee. The protection of worker interests by means of the constitutional right to fair labour practices depends on the judge’s interpretation of what is fair. Implementation of good corporate governance codes can be influential in protecting and promoting employee interests.

L'uti possidetis a été appliqué, lors de la décolonisation afin de déterminer les frontières des nouveaux Etats, pour ses vertus défensives en Amérique latine, pour ses propriétés stabilisatrices en Afrique. Sa juridicité fut l'objet de contestations avant qu'il ne soit consacré en tant que principe général du droit international en 1986 par la Cour internationale de justice. La question de sa transposition en Europe aux cas de démembrement d'Etats en transformant les frontières des entités fédérés en frontières internationales a été au cœur d'une controverse juridique. Lors de la décommunisation, il a fallu déterminer le territoire – sphère de leur souveraineté – des Etats apparus au sein de la société internationale. De sa nature dispositive ou supplétive nombre d'auteurs y décèlent la source de ses caractéristiques lacunaires ou ambiguës car son application s'effectue à défaut d'accord entre les parties. Ses attributs paraissent surestimés au regard de ses effets pacificateurs. The uti possidetis was applied, at the time of decolonisation in order to determine the borders of the new countries, for its defensive virtues in Latin America and for its stabilising properties in Africa. Its legal worth was heavily debated before it was recognised as a general principle of law in 1986 by the International Court of Justice. The question of its application in Europe in cases of the break-up of states resulting in the transformation of the borders of previously federated states into international borders was at the heart of a legal controversy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was necessary to determine the territorial sovereignty of the new states that had appeared within the international order. Numerous authors identify the source of its incomplete or ambiguous characterictics are due its non-binding nature because its implementation is carried out without the agreement of all states concerned. Its advantages appear over-estimated relative to its pacifying effect.

Initialement confondues, ce n’est qu’avec l’adoption du Code des délits et des peines du 3 brumaire an IV, que la responsabilité civile et la responsabilité pénale se sont pour la première fois nettement distinguées. La justification de leur dissociation procédait alors de la volonté de distinguer deux objectifs différents, la réparation d’une part et la punition d’autre part, en les rattachant respectivement à un ordre de responsabilité lui-même différent. Aujourd’hui cependant, les liens qui unissent la responsabilité civile et la responsabilité pénale ne s’accordent que très imparfaitement avec ce qui a motivé, voilà plus de deux siècles, la consécration de leur séparation. En effet, ils témoignent de l’existence de deux évolutions, d’ailleurs contradictoires, dont l’une seulement est compatible avec la raison d’être de la nouveauté marquée par le Code du 3 brumaire an IV. Ainsi, et très logiquement au regard de ce qui a fondé leur dissociation, la responsabilité civile et la responsabilité pénale sont soumises à des régimes juridiques qui entretiennent entre eux des liens qui ne cessent de se distendre. Cette première tendance, qui doit être approuvée et qui pourrait même être amplifiée, s’explique par la nécessité de permettre à chaque ordre de responsabilité de remplir du mieux possible la fonction qui lui est assignée à titre principal, en s’affranchissant de considérations qui peuvent lui être étrangères. Ceci étant, et paradoxalement, la responsabilité civile et la responsabilité pénale développent toutes les deux des fonctions accessoires, lesquelles permettent alors d’établir entre celle-là et celle-ci l’existence de nouveaux liens. Cette seconde tendance doit toutefois, à l’inverse de la première, être désapprouvée, dans la mesure où elle a pour effet de rattacher à la responsabilité civile ou à la responsabilité pénale des fonctions que leur régime juridique ne leur permet pourtant pas, dans l’ensemble, d’atteindre correctement.

Ce travail poursuit deux objectifs principaux: un objectif juridique et un objectif d'ordre épistémologique. Il s'agit tout d'abord de rendre compte d'un point de vue juridique et empirique les implications du passage des Conventions de Lomé à l'Accord de Cotonou. Nous examinons les implications de la redéfinition des accords de coopération sur les politiques de développement des Etats ACP, et plus précisément l'évolution des obligations à la charge des deux groupes de pays dans les domaines du commerce international et des droits humains. Dans un premier temps, nous montrons que la non réciprocité des obligations commerciales entre les deux groupes de pays qui caractérisait les Conventions de Lomé est définitivement écartée au profit d'obligations réciproques et identiques pour les deux groupes de pays en conformité des dispositions de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. Le principe de l'inégalité compensatrice est abandonné au profit de la libéralisation commerciale. Le traitement spécial et différencié, pourtant consacré dans l'Accord instituant l'OMC, apparaît ainsi dépourvu d'une grande partie de son intérêt. Dans un deuxième temps, ce sont les obligations relatives au respect des droits humains qui retiennent notre attention. L'élargissement du champ de la coopération à des questions considérées depuis l'indépendance comme des questions relevant de la compétence interne des Etats, se traduit par une remise en cause de la souveraineté des Etats ACP. Le principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures, héritage de la décolonisation, est ainsi remis en question. Mais surtout, nous établissons que tous les droits humains ne sont pas concernés par cet élargissement. Le deuxième objectif de ce travail est d'ordre épistémologique. Il VIse à démontrer le caractère heuristique d'une analyse constructiviste du droit pour la compréhension de notre objet mais aussi l'intérêt de ce type d'approche au regard des débats qui structurent le champ disciplinaire sur les rapports entre les droits humains et le droit du commerce international. A travers l'étude de l'Accord de Cotonou, nous tentons de mettre en lumière le fait que les droits humains et règles de l'OMC n'évoluent ni de manière complémentaire ni séparément et qu'il ne suffit pas de raisonner en termes de «rattrapage» et de correctifs ponctuels afin d'harmoniser ces deux champs de règles. En conclusion nous constatons que cinq ans ont suffi aux institutions européennes pour réaliser un véritable «exploit» politique. Elles ont réussi à renverser l'ensemble des obligations économiques qui étaient à la charge des deux groupes de pays, à supprimer les protocoles produits en faveur des ACP, à faire adopter un programme de libéralisation commercial qui va au-delà de tout ce qui a été négocié jusqu'ici au niveau multilatéral et ce, sous couvert de mise en conformité avec les dispositions de l'ÜMC. Enfin, l'DE a fragilisé le Groupe ACP en le morcelant en six régions, dont certaines n'ont aucune existence institutionnelle, avec lesquelles elle négocie actuellement un vaste programme de libéralisation commerciale. En ce qui a trait au respect des droits humains on constate qu'à la différence des normes de l'OMC qui font l'objet de négociations permanentes et structurent le cadre institutionnel et le fond de la coopération, le respect des droits humains ne fait pas ou peu l'objet de négociations entre les deux groupes de pays. De plus, s'ils occupent désormais une place centrale dans le discours des institutions communautaires en charge du développement, le seul mécanisme mis en oeuvre pour sanctionner leurs violations est utilisé d'une manière partiale et sélective. Seule l'DE peut l'utiliser et elle ne choisit de le faire que quand la sanction infligée à un pays ACP ne met pas en péril ses propres intérêts. Bref, l'intégration des droits humains dans le cadre de la coopération contribue davantage aujourd'hui à une remise en cause de l'égalité souveraine des Etats qu'à la promotion des Pactes de 1966, au respect des normes de l'OIT ou du droit des réfugiés.

L'arbitrage étant une institution basée sur la volonté des parties, le consentement à la procédure arbitrale multipartite soulève de nombreuses questions relativement à la manière dont les parties expriment leur intention de faire partie d'une instance unique. Cette étude vise à déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles l'arbitre peut arriver à unifier la résolution des litiges qui impliquent les groupements de sociétés. Le plus naturel des moyens pour aboutir à une procédure multipartite est de prévoir cette possibilité à travers la convention d'arbitrage. Cela peut notamment provenir de la signature d'une convention d'arbitrage unique par toutes les parties concernées. Dans certains cas précis, l'arbitrage multipartite peut également résulter de plusieurs conventions d'arbitrage spécialement lorsque les parties participent à la réalisation d'un même ouvrage. Cependant, il arrive souvent qu'une partie qui n'a pas signé la convention d'arbitrage soit obligée à participer à l'instance. Même sans y être obligée, une partie non-signataire de la convention d'arbitrage peut aussi demander de participer à l'arbitrage pour défendre ses intérêts. Pour pouvoir admettre la participation à la procédure d'un tiers non-signataire de la convention d'arbitrage, les arbitres ont recours à plusieurs notions prévues par les droits internes. C'est ainsi que la levée du voile corporatif, la théorie de la réalité économique et le principe de l'estoppel constituent les meilleurs outils pour les arbitres d'amener à la procédure, par force ou sur demande, un non-signataire de la convention d'arbitrage. Enfin, les mécanismes du Code civil servent efficacement à neutraliser les effets du principe de relativité de la convention d'arbitrage. Il s'agit notamment de la bonne foi, du mandat, de la stipulation pour autrui et de la cession.

Le principe est admis, aujourd’hui plus que par le passé sans doute, que l’ensemble des biens de la personne garantit l’exécution par elle des obligations dont elle est tenue. Mais le souci de l’humanisation des procédures forcées de recouvrement conduit aussi, légitimement, à écarter de la saisie certains biens du débiteur. Ces règles, combinées à des degrés variables dans les différents systèmes d‘exécution, sont consacrées par les articles 50 alinéa 1 et 51 de l’Acte uniforme OHADA portant organisation des procédures simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies d‘exécution. L’énoncé de ces articles invite à une lecture des législations nationales afin de déterminer, dans le détail, les effets qui doivent ou non être saisis. A la lumière des textes appliqués au Cameroun, lesquels entretiennent de nombreuses similitudes avec ceux en vigueur dans les autres États signataires du Traité de Port-Louis, il apparaît qu’ils ne sont pas en harmonie avec les données socio-économiques en Afrique aujourd’hui.

Todo trabajo de investigación presupone siempre una causalidad y unos objetivos en perfecta armonía con la máxima escolástica:finis est primus inintentionem, ultimus in executionem. En consecuencia, el objeto de nuestra investigación, en relación con esa máxima, es el estudio de la transmisión de acciones y participaciones sociales con prestaciones accesorias, a sabiendas de que dicha transmisión en las sociedades de capital ha planteado siempre, en nuestro Derecho, una gran complejidad técnico-jurídica -sobre todo cuando nos encontramos con prestaciones accesorias de carácter personalísimo, y no sólo por la falta de previsión legal, sino también por la inexistencia de un tratamiento doctrinal adecuado y una escasa atención jurisprudencial-, y de que es igualmente constatable que tampoco el Derecho comparado aporta soluciones a nuestro supuesto, quizás porque predomina fuera de nuestras fronteras el sistema de cuota única o por cabeza. Para poder desarrollar convenientemente este estudio es metodológicamente positivo dividir el trabajo en tres capítulos. El primero de ellos analiza la prestación accesoria como parte integrante de la posición jurídica de socio y las especialidades que plantea la transmisión de la cuota social a la que aparece vinculada la prestación. Entendemos que es inexcusable profundizar en este tema, antes de afrontar el análisis del régimen jurídico-positivo de transmisión de acciones y participaciones sociales con prestaciones accesorias previsto por nuestro legislador.

This dissertation examines the part of the representations of the law in the development of legal cultures process, from its illustration into relations with the land. Three different legal contexts, these of France and of two of its former colonies, Quebec and Senegal, are particularly revealing of the relationship between law's legitimacy and normative production. Referring to the legal concept of property, and examining the mechanisms of the French legal model used by the Quebecois – both Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal –, and the Senegalese populations and elites, this study highlights the impediments of diffusion for this legal model and culture, both in Quebec and Senegal, and shows that the law is no object of universal representations and practices. The historical prospect, which is necessary to the study of the legal culture as well as the legal processes, makes it possible to consider, contemporary legal practices under the angle of the relationship between the relevant legal cultures, in terms of confrontation or exchange. Two questions, then, arise: that of the nature of the law that results from the exchanges, and that of the relationship between both the legality and legitimacy of the so produced law. Does the legal meeting lead to a situation of mixed law, or does it give rise to a situation of legal pluralism? This theoretical question cannot be dissociated from that of the legitimacy of the normative production, and leads to an examination of the involved populations' very practices.

The research defines derivatives as private contracts, with future rights and obligations imposed on all parties, used to hedge or transfer risk, which derives value from an underlying asset price or index, which asset price or index may take on various forms. The nature of derivatives is that the instruments are intended to be risk management tools. The objectives of derivatives are either to hedge a risk, or to speculate. Derivatives may be classified by the manner in which they are traded, either over the counter (OTC) or on exchange. Alternatively, derivatives may be classified on the basis of structure and mechanisms, i.e. forwards, futures, options or swaps. Risk and risk management are defined in the third chapter with the focus on merchant banking. The nature of risk is that it is inherent in all activities. The nature of risk management is that it aims to ensure that the risks faced by the merchant bank are managed on a daily basis. The objective of risk management is to ensure that losses are minimised and the appropriate level of risk is taken in order to maximise profits. Risk may be classified as operational, operations, market, systemic, credit and legal risk. A comprehensive discussion of credit risk is presented, as it pertains to the legal risk in derivatives in a merchant bank. This includes insolvency, set-off, netting, credit derivatives and collateral. Legal risk is defined as the risk of loss primarily caused by legal unenforceability (i.e. a defective transaction, for instance a contract), legal liability (i.e. a claim) or failure to take legal steps to protect assets (e.g. intellectual property). The nature of legal risk is that it is caused by jurisdictional and other cross-border factors, inadequate documentation, the behaviour of financial institutions, a lack of internal controls, financial innovation or the inherent uncertainty of the law. The objectives of legal risk management in derivatives are to avoid the direct and indirect costs associated with legal risk materialising. This includes reputational damage. Derivatives attract specific legal risks due to the complexity of the instruments as well as the constant innovation in the market. There remains some legal uncertainty regarding derivatives in terms of gaming, wagering and gambling, as well as insurance. The relationship between risk and derivatives is that due to the complexity and constant innovation associated with derivatives, there are some inherent risks to trading in derivatives. It is therefore important to ensure that there is a vested risk management culture in the derivatives trading environment. Chapter four gives an overview of derivatives legislation in foreign jurisdictions and in South Africa. The contractual and documentation issues are discussed with reference to ad hoc agreements, master agreements and ISDA agreements. The practical implementation issues of master agreements and ad hoc agreements are also discussed. The recommendations are that legal risk management be approached in a similar manner to credit, market and other risk disciplines. A legal risk management policy needs to be developed and implemented. The second recommendation is that a derivative to manage the legal risk in derivatives be developed.

La création intellectuelle accompagne l’humanité. On peut même affirmer que c’est elle qui révèle l’homme à lui-même. Si le droit prend en considération la création en proposant un certain nombre de régimes spécifiques, la nature protéiforme de la propriété intellectuelle ne permet toutefois pas d’appréhender la création sous l’angle de l’unité. Or il s’agit bien d’une notion unitaire. L’étude tant du domaine (première partie) que des caractères (deuxième partie) conduit ainsi à montrer que la création intellectuelle est la manifestation objectivée d’une activité humaine, ce qui lui permet d’être appréhendée par le droit d’abord en tant que chose concrète, ensuite en tant que bien – droits portant sur la chose et sur ses utilités. Si l’on présente souvent la propriété intellectuelle comme étant le droit du reproductible, le caractère de reproductibilité de la création ne permet pas toutefois de la distinguer des autres choses. Il s’agit alors de chercher les spécificités de la création dans son origine, la volonté humaine. Aussi se dessine clairement l’idée que seule la liberté de l’agent –le créateur - dans la réalisation de l’objet –la création - permettra de caractériser une création. La liberté est donc non seulement le critère de la création en tant que produit de l’activité intellectuelle, mais elle est surtout la condition sine qua non de l’existence et de la reconnaissance de celle-ci.

This article suggests that the trend of accepting the supremacy and direct application of international law represents a rethinking of the relationship between international and national law, and that its full implications are yet to be explored. The Article seeks to build on current writings on the subject by analyzing certain regional arrangements and judicial approaches relevant to, but often ignored in the discussion. It attempts not to situate these arrangements or approaches within or outside of the monist/dualist paradigm, but to assess the practical significance of these arrangements for international law, national law, and their respective subjects.