Bibliographie sélective OHADA

<p>This thesis seeks to ascertain the rules of private international law determining the procedural law of international commercial arbitral proceedings. In an Introduction, the author outlines the fundamental notions, introduces the topic and the major doctrines and issues, and sets out his methodology and structure of the work.</p> <p>The thesis examine first, as a preliminary issue, the considerations influencing the assumption of jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings. Chapter 1 discusses the various theories on the <em>lex arbitri</em> (the law supplying the general legal framework of an arbitration) as relevant to the procedural law, and concludes that they are deductive and therefore unable to satisfactorily to determine the applicable procedural law. Chapter 2 analyses major national laws as case-studies of the technique and scope of application of international arbitration law, and suggests a model of legislative and court jurisdiction based on the legal concept of 'seat of the arbitration' and on considerations based on the most appropriate court to control an arbitration. Chapter 3 discusses the obligations of the state of the seat under the European Convention on Human Rights and confirms the findings in Chapter 2.</p> <p>In a second part, the thesis elaborates on the title and extent of permissible municipal law interference. Chapter 4 tests the validity of the propositions derived from Chapters 2 and 3 against arbitral practice and concludes that seldom will arbitrators derogate from the law of the seat. Chapter 5 examines the particular case of arbitrations with states and similar entities.</p> <p>The third part discusses the relevance of compliance with the law of the seat at the stage of enforcement of an award. Chapter 6 deals with the technical issue of whether annulment at the place of making precludes enforcement in other <em>fora</em>. That chapter gives the opportunity to discuss models of separation of international jurisdiction and co-operation between different jurisdictions from a practical perspective. It thus serves as a convenient introduction to Chapter 7, which discusses the more abstract question of the nexus required between an arbitral award and the municipal law of the state of rendition in order for the award to enter, <em>in limine</em>, the scope of application of the international instruments in the field.</p> <p>The thesis ends with Conclusions in the form of model provisions for municipal law and arbitration rules.</p>

This study has two purposes. First, it intends to clarify to what extent there is a right of direct action in Swedish law. Second, it attempts to establish the implications of different rules governing the direct action claim. The concept of direct action is used where the following conditions are fulfilled. (1) A creditor (C) is entitled to make a claim against his debtor's (D's) debtor, or the debtor of his debtor's debtor etc., or both, (against DD). (2) C's right remains the same where D (or an intermediary party) goes bankrupt or a seizure is made of the relevant claim against DD. (3) C's claim against DD does not exceed his claim against D. (4) C's claim against DD does not exceed D's (or an intermediary party's) claim against DD, or the claim that D (or an intermediary party) would have had against DD, if there had been no excuses from liability. (5) DD's performance to C will entail a corresponding reduction of C's claim against D. (6) C's right to bring action against DD is independent of (other) recognisedprinciples of law. Analyses are made of cases where D has concluded a transaction with C on DD's behalf but in his own name or without authority, and cases where DD has, in a contract with D, assumed an obligation, which is closely linked to D's obligation towards C. The study also includes cases where a breach of contract by DD has caused a breach of contract by D against C, and cases where DD's tortious act (or omission) or breach of contract against D has caused consequential loss to C.

Le discours doctrinal a un caractere theorique singulier. Descriptions de l'etat du droit positif et prescriptions pour en changer s'y conjuguent inseparablement. Toutes produisent des representations de la realite que la connaissance juridique va assimiler et qui joueront un role cle dans ses mutations. Mais le droit toujours se dedouble. Systeme formel hierarchise de normes d'une part, ensemble informel anarchique de questions d'autre part. Et entre les deux, entre la validite des regles et les ambiguites de leur contenu, entre la determination des regles applicables et l'opportunite politique de leur application : il y aura toujours l'argumentation. L'examen de l'usage doctrinal des concepts de " permanence ", d'" unite " ou de " securite juridique " montre l'ambivalence du discours des juristes. En toute neutralite, la doctrine decrit et prescrit les solutions positives et futures par un discours qui mele l'ambigu au tabou, l'indicible au non-dit, et le mythe a l'esprit de la loi ou de la jurisprudence. Est-ce alors infamant de presenter la doctrine de droit prive comme gardienne d'un temple ou l'on preche le culte de la solution unique ? serait-ce un blaspheme d'en denoncer le dogme ? serait-il heretique de penser que les juristes se nourrissent d'illusions ? serait-il plus calomnieux encore de dire que loin de se bercer d'illusions, les juristes sont en realite des illusionnistes ? le dogme de la solution unique est une croyance trop simpliste aujourd'hui pour que les juristes y adherent mais il les sert et les rassure. C'est une rhetorique, voire une sophistique, de l'eviction des solutions possibles dont ils usent comme substitut d'une theorie de leur propre discours.

Le droit réel de disposer, et specialement le quasi-usufruit, est le droit de disposer du bien d'autrui pour son propre compte, comme le propriétaire lui-meme, mais a charge d'en respecter la destination et d'en assurer la restitution à l'identique, en équivalent ou en valeur. Il remplit une fonction de credit immediat ou une fonction de credit a moyen ou long terme, selon qu'il prend la forme d'un quasi-usufruit ou d'un gage ou d'une hypotheque. Quasi-usufruitier, depositaire irregulier, creancier gagiste ou hypothecaire, sont, en effet, tous titulaires d'un droit reel de disposer : ils ont le droit de detruire le bien d'autrui, de l'aliener ou de le grever de droits reels, pour leur profit personnel et sans en devenir proprietaires. Car leur droit de disposer est distinct de celui inclus dans la propriete (v. Art. 544 c. Civ. ). Il est autonome et ne s'identifie pas a un mode d'acquisition de la propriete d'autrui ou a un diminutif du droit de propriete : c'est un droit reel forme d'une utilite du bien d'autrui (l'abusus), constitue par l'affectation de la valeur du bien d'autrui au disposant ou a un bien du disposant, et soumis au droit de propriete de celui-ci. Il est dote d'un regime juridique precis : il suit les regles de constitution et d'extinction des droits patrimoniaux, sous reserve des adaptations imposees par son contenu (l'abusus), par son objet (notamment les biens incorporels) ou par le contrat qui le porte (par exemple le contrat de depot qui prend alors la configuration du depot irregulier et se distingue du pret de consommation puisqu'il n'est pas translatif de propriete).

The concepts public policy and public interest often obtain an imprecise content as a criterion for contractual justice in South African law. The consequence of this is some degree of legal uncertainty. This is the problem raised in the present dissertation. From the cases and literature the causes of the problem became clearer and it became evident that the correct basis to deal with this problem is the systematisation of this sphere of the law of contract, which also implies the circumspect dealing with concepts. This was confirmed by the examination of a number of foreign legal systems. It appeared moreover that in these systems too, general criteria are used to evaluate contractual justice, namely: in German law the concepts gute Sitten and Treu und Glauben, in Dutch law the concepts goede zeden, openbare orde, as well as redelijkheid en billijkheid (goede trouw) and in English law the concept public policy and possibly in future also the concept good faith. The foreign systems furthermore provided some solutions regarding the practical implementation of the systematisation. The proposed systematisation firstly implies that public policy and public interest should be understood correctly as a general criterion in this sphere, which means that it has a normative character as well as a flexible nature, which necessarily causes some degree of legal uncertainty. It also implies that public policy and public interest - correctly orientated - should be seen as pivotal to one of the requirements for a valid contract, which is traditionally known as the requirement of legality, but which probably should rather be known as the requirement of lawfulness. This requirement should in addition be understood in a broad sense as also relating to the effect of contracts, and consequently to contractual justice, seen as the relative balance between the interests of the parties. The systematisation furthermore includes the understanding that in this sphere a judge has a limited discretion in exercising a law-creating power. The discretion is limited, especially to prevent a judge from reaching a decision on account of a purely subjective opinion. Regarding this limited discretion an established system of guidelines currently does not exist in South African law, but in the present dissertation a step in this direction was made. The gist of these guidelines is that the nature and the context of the relevant contract or contract term should be observed. The individual case should, however, not be over-emphasised, since that may lead to a superabundance of legal uncertainty and to the misuse of public policy and public interest as a defence. Regarding practical application the systematisation includes in short that various facets of public policy and public interest are distinguished, namely legislation and common law, established views and customs (boni mores), and thirdly public policy and public interest as such, concretised by the concept good faith as the underlying principle. It is submitted that the proposed systematisation could contribute to decreasing the imprecise use of the concepts public policy and public interest and concomitant legal uncertainty.