Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Far from delimiting or fencing off, as the etymology of the verb “to define” would have us do, the definition of sustainability as it emerges from the directive is destined to spread to an exponential number of neighbouring lands. Sustainability is spreading to affect governance factors, and is now pollinating a growing number of companies, particularly SMEs and non-EU companies. Moreover, while a hasty reading of Article 2 of the CSRD might lead to conclude that sustainability can be summed up in a list of five factors, sustainability above all questions the contribution of the company, and the law governing it, to the sustainable development of societies. Indeed, it penetrates the companies, through the channel of “corporate sustainability”, seeking to ensure that environmental, social, human rights and governance issues are levers in decision-making within the companies, thus inviting them to act, beyond communicating. This renewal of sustainability is reinforced by a redefinition of the obligations imposed on companies: the fields covered by the required information are multiplied, the “comply or explain” principle is largely abandoned, and assurance on sustainability information becomes compulsory. La directive (UE) 2022/2464 en ce qui concerne la publication d’informations en matière de durabilité par les entreprises, ci-après dite « directive CSRD » (pour Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive), réforme la directive 2014/95 (dite NFRD pour Non Financial Reporting Directive), laquelle avait instauré le premier cadre de reporting extra-financier de l’Union européenne. La directive CSRD opère un changement terminologique en renommant les informations précédemment désignées par la directive NFRD comme « non financières » en « informations en matière de durabilité ». Or, un changement terminologique peut advenir sans pour autant observer un glissement sémantique qui opèrerait une évolution dans le sens et la signification des termes employés. A contrario, un changement sémantique peut aboutir sans qu’une substitution de terme n’accompagne l’évolution. Dès lors, le changement terminologique opéré par la directive CSRD s’accompagne-t-il d’un changement sémantique ? Par ailleurs, constitue-t-il un changement formel ou substantiel ? Autrement dit, le changement de mot permet-il une plus ample considération et une meilleure gestion des maux ? La question se pose dans la mesure où cette terminologie n’est en réalité pas inédite. La directive NFRD évoquait effectivement déjà « les informations sur la durabilité ». Par la suite, les lignes directrices de la Commission européenne sur l’information non financière de 2017 fixant une méthodologie pour la communication desdites informations ainsi que celles de 2019 sur les informations en rapport avec le climat2 avaient repris la formule. L’expression n’apparaît qu’au stade des considérants de la directive NFRD, et qu’à une seule reprise dans les lignes directrices précitées. Le terme était néanmoins présent et, surtout, il était employé comme synonyme de « non financière ». Partant, deux présuppositions en découlent : l’adoption du terme par la directive CSRD ne revêtirait qu’une modification formelle et le changement terminologique ne serait pas soutenu par une évolution sémantique. La présente contribution met à l’épreuve ces deux présuppositions en concluant que l’évolution ne se réduit pas à un simple changement de terme. Loin de borner ou clôturer, comme l’étymologie du verbe « définir » l’invite pourtant à le faire3 , la définition de la durabilité telle qu’elle ressort de la directive a plutôt vocation à se répandre sur un nombre exponentiel de terres avoisinantes. La durabilité se déploie pour toucher les facteurs de gouvernance et pollinise désormais un nombre croissant d’entreprises, notamment les PME et les entreprises de pays tiers. Par ailleurs, si une lecture hâtive de l’article 2 de la directive CSRD pourrait conclure que la durabilité se résume à l’énumération de cinq facteurs, la durabilité interroge surtout la contribution de l’entreprise et du droit l’encadrant au développement durable des sociétés. Elle pénètre en effet les murs de l’entreprise par le canal de la « durabilité de l’entreprise », en cherchant à ce que les thématiques environnementales, sociales, de droits de l’homme et de gouvernance soient des leviers dans la prise de décision à l’intérieur de l’entreprise les invitant ainsi à agir, au-delà de communiquer. Ce renouvellement de la durabilité est renforcé par une redéfinition des obligations à l’égard des entreprises : les champs couverts par l’information exigée sont multipliés, le « comply or explain » majoritairement abandonné, et l’assurance sur les informations en matière de durabilité devient obligatoire. Pour de plus amples informations, le présent article est disponible intégralement en français à la Revue trimestrielle de droit financier, sous la référence suivante : insérer ici la référence exacte quand elle sera disponible.

L’extension des obligations d’information en matière de durabilité aux entreprises de pays tiers est présentée comme l’un des principaux apports de la directive CSRD, permettant de saisir les impacts sociaux et environnementaux du groupe transnational de sociétés. L’effectivité de la directive à l’égard de ces groupes semble toutefois relative. D’un côté, la directive saisit le groupe comme unité au travers de la filiale européenne en l’obligeant à publier une information couvrant le groupe entier. Mais d’un autre côté, elle laisse une large place à l’autonomie de la filiale en retenant une limitation de l’obligation au stade de l’exécution : si la société mère ne lui fournit pas l’information, la filiale peut se contenter de publier une information partielle accompagnée du refus de la société mère. La directive se contente donc d’exercer une contrainte réputationnelle sur le groupe transnational. Ce manque d’effectivité invite à réfléchir à des moyens d’y remédier, dont le principal semble être une restriction de l’accès au marché européen en l’absence d’une information consolidée suffisante en matière de durabilité. Parallèlement, la directive CSRD pourrait se trouver renforcée par la multiplication des obligations « ascendantes » en matière de durabilité, invitant le groupe transnational à rationnaliser la publication d’information afin de satisfaire les exigences des différents systèmes auxquels il est soumis. The extension of the sustainability reporting obligations to non-EU companies is presented as one of the CSRD’s major contributions, making it possible to grasp the social and environmental impacts of transnational corporate groups. However, the effectiveness of the Directive with regard to these groups seems relative. On the one hand, the Directive captures the group as a unit through the European subsidiary, binding it to publish consolidated information at a global level. On the other hand, it leaves room for the subsidiary’s autonomy, by limiting the obligation at the performance stage: if the parent company fails to provide the information, the subsidiary can simply publish a partial information, accompanied by the parent company’s refusal. The Directive therefore imposes a merely reputational constraint on the transnational group. This lack of effectiveness calls for remedies, the main one being restricting access to the European market in the absence of sufficient consolidated sustainability information. At the same time, the CSRD could be strengthened by the multiplication of “bottom-up” sustainability obligations, inviting the transnational group to rationalize the publication of information in order to meet the requirements of the various systems to which it is subject.

La Directive du 14 décembre 2022 concernant la publication d’informations en matière de durabilité pousse les grandes entreprises européennes à identifier, et par-là espère-t-on à prévenir ou limiter, les risques écologiques et sociaux de leurs activités. Sont concernées non seulement les atteintes à l’environnement et aux droits humains qui pourraient menacer la solidité financière des entreprises concernées, mais aussi celles qui exposent les droits de l’homme et l’environnement à des risques intrinsèquement significatifs, indépendamment de leurs ramifications financières éventuelles. La finalité prêtée à cette transparence imposée est de rendre le tissu productif européen plus soutenable. Les commentateurs insistent généralement sur le rôle des parties prenantes dans ce gain de soutenabilité : la mise en transparence des pratiques des entreprises est supposée renforcer le pouvoir de pression et de négociation des syndicats et associations. Toutefois, l’enjeu du reporting institué par la Directive du 14 décembre 2022 n’est pas seulement d’informer les tiers, ou d’infuser dans l’entreprise la crainte de pressions externes, mais aussi de pousser les dirigeants d’entreprise à réfléchir plus avant au modèle d’affaires choisi et à la configuration de la chaîne de valeur associée. En d’autres termes, le modèle de gouvernance qui inspire la fabrique du droit européen du reporting sur la durabilité n’est pas seulement celui du Panoptique benthamien, mais aussi le précepte gestionnaire qui veut que l’« on (ne) gère (que) ce que l’on mesure ». Deux logiques distinctes sous-tendent ainsi la régulation par l’information à l’œuvre : l’amélioration des pratiques des entreprises est réputée procéder tantôt de pressions externes ou du risque de telles pressions (gouvernance par les parties prenantes ou par la seule transparence), tantôt de la réflexion interne (gouvernance réflexive). Bien que ces deux ressorts de la régulation par l’information soient théoriquement compatibles, leur articulation pratique pose des problèmes. Ainsi, une réglementation minutieuse du mode de fabrication des informations pourrait à la fois favoriser la comparabilité des données dont se nourrissent les pressions externes, et alimenter une mise en conformité de pure forme, au détriment d’une réelle réflexion sur la stratégie de l’entreprise et son modèle d’affaire. Si les entreprises conservent une réelle marge de manœuvre dans la fabrique de l’information sur la durabilité, c’est ainsi afin d’éviter de sacrifier la gouvernance réflexive sur l’autel de la gouvernance par les parties prenantes. L’espoir placé dans une telle régulation par l’information pourra sembler, à certains, comme un vœu pieu. Plutôt que de supplier les grandes entreprises multinationales de réinterroger leurs pratiques et leurs modèles d’affaire, pourquoi ne pas les contraindre à le faire ? La régulation par l’information n’est assurément pas une panacée, mais elle est peut-être l’une des rares options effectivement disponibles aujourd’hui pour rendre les pratiques des grandes entreprises plus compatibles avec les objectifs écologiques collectifs (à côté des subventions publiques et de la commande publique). Dans cette perspective, et compte tenu des débats persistants sur ce en quoi consiste une production durable, l’écueil fondamental de la Directive n’est peut-être pas d’avoir conservé l’orientation réflexive des textes qui l’avaient précédée, mais de l’avoir insuffisamment « outillée ». En effet, le texte ne garantit pas que les dirigeants des grandes entreprises réfléchissent vraiment au modèle d’affaire des entreprises qu’ils dirigent, et à sa compatibilité avec les limites des écosystèmes. Cet article propose plusieurs pistes afin d’y remédier et, ce faisant, d’amplifier la réflexivité environnementale des grands groupes.

The principle of independence of legal persons within corporate groups means that the rights and obligations of each company in the group are assessed individually, without taking account of the fact that they belong to the group. However, in terms of reporting obligations, the CSRD directive provides for a derogatory system of “consolidated sustainability reporting” for groups of companies. In essence, this requires the dominant company to provide sustainability information on behalf of all group companies under its control. This logic is not new, and has its origins in the system of consolidated accounts which, in terms of financial reporting, obliges the parent company to communicate on the financial position and results of group companies as if they were a single entity. This substantial approach to accounting law, which aims to communicate information that is useful for economic decision making, seeks to reflect the reality of transactions, beyond their legal form. From this point of view, the group is considered to be a single entity, due to the dominant company’s power of control over the resources of its subsidiaries. This logic has permeated company law, and the obligation to draw up consolidated financial statements is enshrined both in European Union directives and in the French Commercial Code. The legal basis for this is the control of the dominant company, i.e. the power of the parent company to impose its views on its subsidiaries at shareholders’ meetings, and to exert influence over the management of its subsidiaries. The consolidated reporting regime had been extended to non-financial information since the NFRD directive in 2014, at European level, and since the law of July 12, 2010, in domestic law. It is set out in Article 29 bis of the CSRD Directive, with a few changes. Consolidated sustainability information reveals an extension of the consolidation logic. Indeed, consolidated sustainability reporting requires the publication of strategic and qualitative information that goes far beyond the scope of financial data required for consolidated accounts. Moreover, unlike the obligation to draw up consolidated financial statements, the system provides for an exemption from the obligation to provide information, on an individual basis, at the level of each subsidiary, so that the obligation only weighs on the head company of the group. We have thus moved from a purely informative and descriptive consolidation logic to the obligation for the head company of the group to report on the environmental and social consequences of the activity of the companies in the group. As a result, the consolidation of information within groups obliges, to a certain extent, the head companies to assume the risks generated by the activity of all the companies included in the scope of consolidation and, above all, the measures implemented to deal with them. Stakeholders of the parent company or of one of the group’s subsidiaries will theoretically be able to have an overall view of the activities of the companies in the group, without the head company being able to conceal activities with harmful social and environmental consequences within a subsidiary. This is all the more true given that the scope of consolidation is broadly understood, since the consolidation thresholds are calculated and added up at the level of all the companies in the group, on the one hand, and that the CSRD directive provides for the inclusion of non-European parent companies which carry out an activity in the European Union through a subsidiary or branch, on the other. However, this observation must be tempered by the conditions under which the information obligation is implemented. Although the CSRD requires that information be traceable, this is hardly sufficient to ensure that the consolidated sustainability report remains comprehensive. The provision of global data on the environmental and social risks generated by the activities of group companies leaves considerable scope for concealing individual data, specific to the sustainability impacts of each subsidiary, and encourages deceptive transparency. It therefore seems essential to require that subsidiaries be exempted from the requirement to provide detailed information on a subsidiary-by-subsidiary basis, to ensure that the consolidated reporting system is not just a tool for optimizing information within groups.

Adoptée après la mise en application des textes relatifs à la finance durable, mais avant la proposition de directive sur le devoir de vigilance, la CSRD vient parfaire l’édifice législatif sur lequel l’Europe construit sa stratégie en matière de durabilité dans le prolongement du Green Deal. Elle est porteuse d’avancées majeures puisqu’elle renforce les exigences entourant le reporting de durabilité, mais reste laconique sur la phase pourtant cruciale d’élaboration de l’information préalablement à la publication. Cet article tente d’esquisser, à l’aune de l’obligation de s’informer pour informer, un régime afin d’encadrer ce travail préalable. Si cette piste soulève davantage de questions qu’elle n’apporte de réponses, elle permet au moins de mettre en lumière la manière dont la substance et le périmètre de l’information influent sur le comportement que l’on peut attendre de la part des entreprises assujetties. Adopted after the implementation of the texts relating to sustainable finance, but before the proposal for a directive on due diligence, the CSRD completes the legislative edifice on which the European Union is building its sustainability strategy in the wake of the Green Deal. It represents a major step forward, as it strengthens the requirements for sustainability reporting, but remains silent on the crucial phase of preparing information prior to publication. This article attempts to sketch out, in the light of the obligation to obtain information in order to inform others, a framework for this preliminary work. While this approach raises more questions than it answers, it does at least shed light on the way in which the substance and scope of the required information influence the behaviour that can be expected from the undertakings subject to the CSRD.

Le secteur informel constitue une véritable économie parallèle avec des conséquences néfastes. Face à cela, le législateur de l’OHADA, dans l’Acte uniforme révisé relatif au Droit commercial général du 15 décembre 2010 a introduit un nouveau personnage, l’entreprenant. Il est aisé de reconnaître l’attractivité du statut de l’entreprenant suscitée par la volonté louable du législateur OHADA de formaliser le secteur informel, à travers la simplification et la flexibilité de l’accès au statut, la gratuité des formalités, un régime attractif constitué d’obligations réduites et des avantages du commerçant. Cependant, dans les Etats membres, le statut de l’entreprenant est confrontée à des difficultés dues à une insécurité liée aux lacunes de la réglementation de l’OHADA et à des incertitudes relatives au renvoi pour les mesures fiscales et sociales incitatives qui viennent réduire l’attractivité du statut de l’entreprenant. The informal sector constitutes a veritable parallel economy with harmful consequences. Faced with this, the OHADA legislator, in the Revised Uniform Act on General Commercial Law of December 15, 2010, introduced a new character, the entrepreneur. It is easy to recognize the attractiveness of the status of the entrepreneur aroused by the laudable will of the OHADA legislator to formalize the informal sector, through the simplification and flexibility of access to the status, the free formalities, an attractive regime consisting of reduced obligations and merchant benefits. However, in the Member States, the status of the entrepreneur is faced with difficulties due to insecurity linked to the shortcomings of the OHADA regulations and to uncertainties relating to referral for the tax and social incentive measures which reduce the attractiveness of the entrepreneur status.

It is trite that environmental challenges remain one of the major global concerns and no doubt of great impact on human existence and wellbeing. This impact is a result of human activities on the natural ecosystem. This article examines the legal framework by the Nigerian state in regulating the activities of the multinational investors in the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta region of the country. It discusses the international, regional, and national legal framework in the protection of environment and environmental rights of the host community and foreign direct investment rights. The author demonstrates the imbalance in the protection of environmental and foreign direct investment rights from which suggestions are made towards correcting this injustice as caused by the existing legal framework.

L’avènement du système comptable OHADA est une innovation de grande envergure dans l’organisation de la profession comptable dont l’importance pour les gestionnaires des plus petites entreprises de l’informel ne souffre d’aucune contestation. Aujourd’hui, mieux qu’hier, il s’avère impossible de s’en passer dans la mesure où ce nouveau système de gestion constitue une panacée aux maux qui rongent l’organisation comptable dans les entreprises, d’où l’adaptation au changement est plus que nécessaire.

The paper aims to review the relation between Corporate Governance, Risk Management and Performance. We reviewed these variables and develop a Theoretical and Analytics framework. First introduction (study background, Problem Statement, Research Objectives and research questions). Second literature review (A) financial performance such as ROA, ROE, EPS and Tobin’s Q, (B) Corporate Governance as Board of Directors, Board Composition, CEO Duality and Board Size (C) Risk Management. Third, we discussed Underpinning Theories such as, Agency Theory and Institutional Theory. Fourth, we developed a Theoretical Framework where we illustrated (A) Corporate Governance and Financial Performance, (B) Risk Management and Financial Performance (C) Compliance with Accounting Standards and Financial Performance. Finally, we developed a comprehensive reviewing based on above variables.

This study aims to understand the accounting effects of the Corona pandemic in more depth and clarity, where the study explores the accounting choices during the pandemic period and the impact of the firm's strategic orientation and its social responsibility performance on those choices. Using data from non-financial Saudi companies, the accounting choices divided into aggressive accounting strategy and conservative accounting strategy, and regression models used to examine the study hypotheses. The results of the study provide a clearer and in-depth vision about the nature of accounting practices during the pandemic and indicated that business strategy affects accounting choices, while corporate social responsibility does not affect. The results can imply useful information for the market regulators that help them in controlling and stabilizing the market, as well as for professional accounting organizations to help them issue guidelines for accounting work during crises.

The procedure of liquidation of assets can be closed for the extinction of liabilities or for insufficient assets. The court may then, at the request of any interested person or ex officio, at any time during the proceedings and after a report by the official receiver, close the proceedings. In case of insufficiency of assets, the business disappears and, perhaps, the hope of any payment to creditors as well. For a long time, it was accepted that the closure for lack of assets allows creditors to resume individual proceedings against the debtor, especially if the latter returns to better circumstances. This traditional solution has been abandoned. According to OHADA Uniform Act on the organisation of collective procedures for the settlement of liabilities, revised on 10 December 2015, closure for insufficiency of assets no longer automatically gives creditors the right to take individual action. Thus, when a liquidation leads to a shortage of assets, the satisfaction of creditors remains uncertain. The objective of this study is to show that despite this reform, the protection of creditors’ rights has not changed significantly in the event of insufficient assets. Indeed, any possible recourse to the recovery of their claims remains paralysed by certain measures that infringe their rights. The infringements can be described as severe or moderate depending on the case.

International investment law is facing a legitimacy crisis, in which to tackle, substantial efforts are being made in structural and procedural areas. The first step to overcoming this crisis is identifying the roots of it. The lack of a dynamic balance between public and private interests is one of the main factors creating this legitimacy crisis in this legal system.[1] This paper focuses on the changes in the investment arbitration jurisprudence to create this balance. The findings of this paper can explain one of the convergence points of international trade and investment law. Such a claim is based on the evolution of international trade law in facing a similar legitimacy issue and the structural-procedural approach of this legal system in balancing public and private interests as an ultimate solution to the crisis.[2] From this perspective, one of the major factors in creating a legitimacy crisis in both legal systems is the dominance of the paradigm for preference of private interests; and one of the convergence points of international trade and investment law has been to replace it by accepting the paradigm of creating a dynamic balance between competing goals.[3] This paper examines this convergence in arbitral jurisprudence.IntroductionIn recent years, the legitimacy crisis of the regime of international investment law and, as a result, the investor-state dispute settlement system has been one of the most important and controversial topics in the academic environment and the practice of states consequently, serious efforts in various fields to tackle this crisis have begun. According to this paper, choosing an arbitration mechanism modeled on international commercial arbitration to resolve disputes between host states and foreign investors can be evaluated as a wrong and hasty action that, regardless of its factors and contexts, has changed the nature and function of this system over time.[4] It should be noted that the main factor in such consequences is how this dispute resolution system is used which, contrary to the accepted model, always puts the host states in a "respondent" position in possible future disputes and, as a result, disrupts the balance expected in any international dispute settlement system. On this basis, the confrontation of the host state's sovereign competence in ensuring public interests with the foreign investors’ ability to challenge this competence is brought into the spotlight: currently, within the regime of international investment law, host states have only responsibilities and obligations in contrast to extensive and exclusive rights and privileges recognized for foreign investors, and this can be considered as the most important factor disturbing the said balance. The main issue in this field is to analyze the role of the investment arbitral tribunals in creating such a balance. In this regard, the authors, by focusing on the nature of investment treaties, and the relations between the parties in investment disputes and with emphasis on the general legal regime governing international investment, consider creating a dynamic balance between public and private interests to be the key to solving the crisis. They emphasize that; As long as the rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute are based on imbalanced grounds, the change in nature of the disputes and the function of the system -as the main roots of this legitimacy crisis - will remain. In this remark, it is very important to focus on the two-sided nature (public-private) of the relationships established in the framework of investment treaties. The relationship between the host state and the foreign investor is created within the framework of investment treaties and in light of fundamental differences from purely private relationships in international commercial arbitration.[5] Note that any dispute arising from this relationship is affected by its inherently public nature governed by public international law.[6] Thus, a purely private attitude towards these relations does not seem viable. As Ian Brownlie has stated in the case of SME v. the Czech Republic, it can lead to ignoring some of the basic elements of the relevant investment treaty.[7] In other words, the right and duty of the host state in protecting and promoting public interests is a fundamental part of this relationship, and any indulgence of it leads to a serious disruption of the mentioned balance through which the system's legitimacy will be the first victim.It is clear that the main task of any dispute resolution system is to create such a balance, and on this basis, and compared to the WTO dispute resolution system, the role of the investment tribunals in this process is discussed. This jurisprudential convergence is in line with the goal of strengthening the legitimacy of the international investment law system as a whole.Based on the above, the first part of this paper focuses on the process of establishing the ISDS in international investment law and its characteristics, the factors of the crisis of legitimacy are analyzed with an analytical approach, while also explaining the nature of investment treaties and explaining the general legal regime governing international investment. Furthermore, the lack of a dynamic balance between public and private interests is emphasized as the main cause of the crisis. In the second part, while comparing the two legal systems of international trade and investment with a similar crisis of legitimacy, we will examine the interaction of investment arbitration with the WTO's jurisprudence in facing this crisis through a case study of several investment arbitral awards. [1]. David Gaukrodger, “The Balance between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A Scooping Paperˮ, OECD Working Paper on International Investment 2017/02, at 4.[2]. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, “Non-Discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?”, AJIL, Vol. 102, No.1, (2008), at 89.[3]. Jurgen Kurtz and Sungioon Cho, “Convergence and Divergence in International Economic Law and Politics”, EJIL, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2018), at 187.[4]. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor's Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionalityˮ, In Schill Stephan W., International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 76. [5]. Crina Baltag, “Reforming The ISDS System: In Search of a Balanced Approach?ˮ, Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2019), at 285.[6]. Ibid.[7]. Andreas Kulick, “Sneaking Through Backdoor – Reflections on Public Interest in International Investment Arbitrationˮ, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, No. 3, (2013), at 438.

Cet article, est une contribution à la réflexion sur le statut de l’arbitre en droit OHADA, entamée par plusieurs chercheurs africains, et au centre de laquelle se trouve la problématique de l’immunité en droit de l’arbitrage OHADA. Le débat sur le choix d’un système d’immunité et la définition d’un véritable statut pour l’arbitre est toujours d’actualité. Cet article fait le point global des approches et conceptions sur l’immunité diplomatique des arbitres de la CCJA. En effet, le débat sur la responsabilité touche de façon étroite celui du statut de l’arbitre : la responsabilité étant la résultante d’un statut, cela nous permettra d’aborder la question du statut juridique de l’arbitre en droit OHADA. Dans un contexte où les différentes législations, la jurisprudence ou encore les conventions internationales, n’abordent que très peu le statut de l’arbitre, la détermination des éléments permettant de préciser les contours des devoirs, droits et obligations de l’arbitre, contribuera de façon certaine à mieux appréhender la mission de l’arbitre.

The courthouses are, in our states, the places of legal reading - a culture constantly policed and hardened by jurisprudence and praetorian practices; themselves difficult to abandon notwithstanding the pressure and scope of new laws didn’t stop swelling. Indeed, legal practitioners are still unable to agree on the foundations, perception, conceptualization and implementation procedure of this important judicial institution. Certainly, the fog that hung over the identification of the « article 49 judge » in the Congolese judicial system is now lifted. However, this is not the case for appeals against decisions of the presidential court which, in principle, are provisionally enforceable and sometimes, on the spot. In addition, differences of opinion subsist as to the form of the act carrying the defense to be executed. So many problematic questions around which this reflection is articulated; but in a fairly limited format given the presentation requirements of a scientific article. Les palais de justice sont, dans nos Etats, les hauts lieux de la culture juridique – culture sans cesse policée et durcie par la jurisprudence et les pratiques prétoriennes; elles-mêmes difficiles à abandonner nonobstant la pression et la portée des lois nouvelles. Depuis l’adhésion de la République démocratique du Congo à l’OHADA – et nonobstant la supralégalité du droit uniforme africain des affaires – la polémique sur les défenses à exécuter n’a pas cessé d’enfler. En effet, les praticiens du droit n’arrivent toujours pas à s’accorder sur les fondements, la perception, la conceptualisation et la procédure de mise en œuvre de cette importante institution judiciaire. Certes, le brouillard qui planait sur l’identification du « Juge de l’article 49 » dans le système judiciaire congolais est aujourd’hui levé. Il n’en est pas cependant le cas des régimes d’appel contre les décisions de la juridiction présidentielle qui, par principe, sont exécutoires par provision et, parfois, sur minute. Par ailleurs, des divergences de vues subsistent quant à la forme de l’acte emportant la défense à exécuter. Autant des questions problématiques autour desquelles s’articule cette réflexion; mais dans un format assez limité compte tenu des exigences de présentation d’un article scientifique.

Since the earlier indirect Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) provisions failed to hold investors responsible for human rights abuses, the recent hardening process of direct CSR clauses has resulted in incorporating CSR clauses under sections or chapters entitled “investors obligations” and tying CSR obligations to binding human rights and environmental prohibitions, as well as to human rights obligations established by the host state's legislation. This paper provides a non-exhaustive analysis of recent developments in treaty practice based on research primarily sourced from investment agreements concluded between 2012 and 2021, doctrinal input, and normative analysis. As shown in this paper the hardening process has not yet been completed, and reformations are necessary. Specifically, new investment agreements should enshrine investor human rights obligations as legally binding obligations, consider violations of these CSR obligations as part of investment disputes and provide direct remedies to victims. This study contributes to the literature on the international responsibility of TNCs with regard to human rights by examining the process of hardening up the CSR obligations within investment agreements as an approach that could lead to effective human rights protection.