Bibliographie sélective OHADA

International investment agreements employ dispute settlement procedures that differ markedly from their counterparts in trade agreements. A prominent and controversial difference arises with respect to the issue of “standing”: Who has the right to complain to adjudicators about a violation of the agreement? While trade agreements limit standing to the member governments (state-to-state dispute settlement), investment agreements routinely extend standing to private investors as well (investor-state dispute settlement). We develop parallel models of trade and investment agreements and employ them to study this difference. We find that the difference in standing between trade and investment agreements can be understood as deriving from the fundamentally different problems that these agreements are designed to solve. Our analysis also identifies some important qualifications to the case for including investor-state dispute settlement provisions in investment agreements, thereby offering a potential explanation for the strong political controversy associated with these provisions.

This article argues for a fundamental raison d'être reconceptualization of international investment law (IIL) through Martha Fineman's 'vulnerability theory'. The theory helps identify the structural sources of IIL's shortcomings, whilst philosophically challenging the one-sided view that foreign investors are entitled to protections, but are free from obligations vis-à-vis the communities affected by their undertakings. Emphasizing the productive power of the state to take positive action that acknowledges ordinary citizens' embeddedness within, and dependence upon, surrounding structures, the vulnerability theory challenges the hegemonic perception of the state as a source of danger - a view which has hitherto undermined both the potency and the enforceability of investor obligations. Used as a heuristic device in studying both IIL's existing structures and the potential avenues for reimagining it, Fineman's theory not only shines a novel light on the foundational premises of IIL, but also grants theoretical traction to existing ideas about improving the system.

Private investors’ land rights vary from country to country, depending on the legal system in place. The degree of openness of land laws determines the degree to which both domestic and foreign investors are attracted, as the latter aims to invest in countries with legal systems offering the most secure and sustainable interests. How can Congolese land laws be made more attractive to private investors in the real estate sector? Using exegetical and comparative methods, we will test our hypothesis that reform to increase the rights of private national and foreign investors to access land would be an asset. By comparing Congolese land law with other legal systems, and with current social and economic realities, we have concluded that accommodating land rights is a prerequisite for increasing both domestic and foreign private investment in real estate and an essential step towards boosting and modernizing real estate investment in the DRC.

Les conflits entre État hôtes et investisseurs étrangers occupent, depuis une dizaine d’année le devant de la scène géopolitique. Le questionnement se porte aujourd’hui de façon globale sur l’articulation des méthodes de règlement de conflits particulièrement complexes en raison de leurs implications institutionnelles, juridiques et économiques. Cette thèse se consacre à appréhender le cadre de règlement des conflits d’investissements selon le modèle du système afin de déterminer les conditions nécessaires à la transformation profonde du Système de résolution des différends entre États-hôtes et investisseurs.L’analyse du Système de résolution des différends entre États-hôtes et investisseurs suppose d’abord d’en restituer le contexte historique et d’examiner les bases institutionnelles posées par le système CIRDI, celui-ci étant le fruit d’une idée, la substitution du droit à la force pour la résolution des différends d’investissement : « le paradigme juridictionnel ». Or, si des bases institutionnelles avaient été posées, celles relationnelles ne l’étaient pas. Il s’en suit un usage des mécanismes du Système de résolution des différends entre États-hôtes et investisseurs dans une logique défensive et adversariale. Cependant, la complexification croissante du monde et incidemment du système des investissements, conduit les acteurs de l’investissement à passer d’une logique adversariale à une logique de collaboration et de co-construction pour résoudre les inévitables problématiques auxquelles ils font face : « le paradigme consensuel ».Nous nous interrogeons alors sur les conditions nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de ce nouveau paradigme comme fondement du Système afin d’en provoquer la transformation profonde. L’application de concepts issus du champ d’étude de la complexité et des systèmes adaptatifs complexes permet de conclure que le consensualisme est tout à la fois le résultat et le moyen à mettre en œuvre pour faciliter cette transformation. Seule une démarche holistique, incluant l’ensemble des acteurs dans leur diversité, peut permettre de faire émerger des solutions innovantes à la hauteur des enjeux. Notre proposition est d’utiliser les outils et méthodes du Design Thinking appliqués au droit – le Legal Design- dont la démarche place les parties prenantes, et donc les éléments de culture et de contexte, au cœur du processus de conception de solutions, et susceptible de provoquer un changement dans la dynamique relationnelle des acteurs vers une logique de collaboration. Cette conclusion s’applique aux deux échelles retenues : celle de la transformation globale du Système de résolution des différends entre États-hôtes et investisseurs, et celle des projets d’investissement, dont une gouvernance participative doit être encouragée afin d’en permettre le succès et de permettre de réaliser une des vocations premières du système des investissements qu’est le développement des États d’accueil au bénéfice de leurs communautés. Conflicts between host states and foreign investors have been at the forefront of the geopolitical scene for the past ten years. Now the question is being raised on a global scale concerning the articulation of particularly complex conflict resolution methods because of their institutional, legal and economic implications. This thesis focuses on understanding the framework for resolving investment disputes based on the system model in order to determine which conditions are necessary for the profound transformation of the Dispute Resolution System between host states and investors.Before any analysis of the Dispute Resolution System between host states and investors can be undertaken, it is necessary to provide an insight into the historical context and to examine the institutional foundations of the ICSID system. These are the result of an idea, substituting international law to the use of force for the resolution of investment disputes: “the jurisdictional paradigm”. If institutional foundations were laid, relational ones were not. This resulted in the use of the Dispute Resolution System mechanisms between host states and investors in a defensive and adversarial logic. However, the increasing complexity of the world and, incidentally, of the investment system, has led investment players to move from an adversarial logic to one of collaboration and co-construction in order to resolve the inevitable problems they face: “the consensual paradigm”.We then question the conditions required for the implementation of this new paradigm as the foundation of the System in order to bring about its profound transformation. Applying concepts from the fields of study into complexity and complex adaptive systems leads to the conclusion that consensus constitutes both the outcome and the means to facilitate this transformation. Only a holistic approach, including all the actors involved and their diverse contexts, can make it possible to develop innovative solutions that meet these challenges. Our proposal is to apply Design Thinking tools and methods in a legal context – Legal Design. This approach places stakeholders, and therefore the elements of culture and context, at the heart of the process of designing solutions, and is therefore well suited to bringing about a change in the relational dynamics of the actors towards a logic of collaboration. This conclusion applies to both scales: that of the overall transformation of the Dispute Resolution System between host states and investors and that of investment projects, whose participative governance structure must be recognized as a crucial success factor and a means to support one of the primary purposes of the investment system, which is the development of host states for the benefit of their communities.

It is trite that environmental challenges remain one of the major global concerns and no doubt of great impact on human existence and wellbeing. This impact is a result of human activities on the natural ecosystem. This article examines the legal framework by the Nigerian state in regulating the activities of the multinational investors in the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta region of the country. It discusses the international, regional, and national legal framework in the protection of environment and environmental rights of the host community and foreign direct investment rights. The author demonstrates the imbalance in the protection of environmental and foreign direct investment rights from which suggestions are made towards correcting this injustice as caused by the existing legal framework.

International investment law is facing a legitimacy crisis, in which to tackle, substantial efforts are being made in structural and procedural areas. The first step to overcoming this crisis is identifying the roots of it. The lack of a dynamic balance between public and private interests is one of the main factors creating this legitimacy crisis in this legal system.[1] This paper focuses on the changes in the investment arbitration jurisprudence to create this balance. The findings of this paper can explain one of the convergence points of international trade and investment law. Such a claim is based on the evolution of international trade law in facing a similar legitimacy issue and the structural-procedural approach of this legal system in balancing public and private interests as an ultimate solution to the crisis.[2] From this perspective, one of the major factors in creating a legitimacy crisis in both legal systems is the dominance of the paradigm for preference of private interests; and one of the convergence points of international trade and investment law has been to replace it by accepting the paradigm of creating a dynamic balance between competing goals.[3] This paper examines this convergence in arbitral jurisprudence.IntroductionIn recent years, the legitimacy crisis of the regime of international investment law and, as a result, the investor-state dispute settlement system has been one of the most important and controversial topics in the academic environment and the practice of states consequently, serious efforts in various fields to tackle this crisis have begun. According to this paper, choosing an arbitration mechanism modeled on international commercial arbitration to resolve disputes between host states and foreign investors can be evaluated as a wrong and hasty action that, regardless of its factors and contexts, has changed the nature and function of this system over time.[4] It should be noted that the main factor in such consequences is how this dispute resolution system is used which, contrary to the accepted model, always puts the host states in a "respondent" position in possible future disputes and, as a result, disrupts the balance expected in any international dispute settlement system. On this basis, the confrontation of the host state's sovereign competence in ensuring public interests with the foreign investors’ ability to challenge this competence is brought into the spotlight: currently, within the regime of international investment law, host states have only responsibilities and obligations in contrast to extensive and exclusive rights and privileges recognized for foreign investors, and this can be considered as the most important factor disturbing the said balance. The main issue in this field is to analyze the role of the investment arbitral tribunals in creating such a balance. In this regard, the authors, by focusing on the nature of investment treaties, and the relations between the parties in investment disputes and with emphasis on the general legal regime governing international investment, consider creating a dynamic balance between public and private interests to be the key to solving the crisis. They emphasize that; As long as the rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute are based on imbalanced grounds, the change in nature of the disputes and the function of the system -as the main roots of this legitimacy crisis - will remain. In this remark, it is very important to focus on the two-sided nature (public-private) of the relationships established in the framework of investment treaties. The relationship between the host state and the foreign investor is created within the framework of investment treaties and in light of fundamental differences from purely private relationships in international commercial arbitration.[5] Note that any dispute arising from this relationship is affected by its inherently public nature governed by public international law.[6] Thus, a purely private attitude towards these relations does not seem viable. As Ian Brownlie has stated in the case of SME v. the Czech Republic, it can lead to ignoring some of the basic elements of the relevant investment treaty.[7] In other words, the right and duty of the host state in protecting and promoting public interests is a fundamental part of this relationship, and any indulgence of it leads to a serious disruption of the mentioned balance through which the system's legitimacy will be the first victim.It is clear that the main task of any dispute resolution system is to create such a balance, and on this basis, and compared to the WTO dispute resolution system, the role of the investment tribunals in this process is discussed. This jurisprudential convergence is in line with the goal of strengthening the legitimacy of the international investment law system as a whole.Based on the above, the first part of this paper focuses on the process of establishing the ISDS in international investment law and its characteristics, the factors of the crisis of legitimacy are analyzed with an analytical approach, while also explaining the nature of investment treaties and explaining the general legal regime governing international investment. Furthermore, the lack of a dynamic balance between public and private interests is emphasized as the main cause of the crisis. In the second part, while comparing the two legal systems of international trade and investment with a similar crisis of legitimacy, we will examine the interaction of investment arbitration with the WTO's jurisprudence in facing this crisis through a case study of several investment arbitral awards. [1]. David Gaukrodger, “The Balance between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A Scooping Paperˮ, OECD Working Paper on International Investment 2017/02, at 4.[2]. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, “Non-Discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?”, AJIL, Vol. 102, No.1, (2008), at 89.[3]. Jurgen Kurtz and Sungioon Cho, “Convergence and Divergence in International Economic Law and Politics”, EJIL, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2018), at 187.[4]. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor's Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionalityˮ, In Schill Stephan W., International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 76. [5]. Crina Baltag, “Reforming The ISDS System: In Search of a Balanced Approach?ˮ, Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2019), at 285.[6]. Ibid.[7]. Andreas Kulick, “Sneaking Through Backdoor – Reflections on Public Interest in International Investment Arbitrationˮ, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, No. 3, (2013), at 438.

La place de l'arbitrage en droit de l'investissement est discutée. Les réfutations à son encontre grandissent. De nombreuses problématiques édulcorent la définition même de la notion d'investissement. Les controverses doctrinales restent toujours nombreuses et débattues à ce sujet. De même, des doctrines s'affrontent sur la question de savoir s'il faut ou non élaborer un corps de règles cohérentes pour des sentences arbitrales homogènes. L'opposition à l'arbitrage dans le droit de l'investissement se retrouve aussi dans les problématiques liées à l'exequatur des sentences arbitrales liées à l'arbitrage d'investissement dans l'Union européenne. Un manque de soutien apparent au développement de l'arbitrage dans l'Union européenne s'est installé, comme le démontre le récent traité CETA conclu entre l'Union européenne et le Canada. L'arbitrage d'investissement ferait courir le risque d'un recul de la souveraineté. En effet, du fait l'arbitrage d'investissement, les Etats seraient moins incités à légiférer sur des matières pouvant avoir un impact sur l'activité d'une entreprise étrangère, par crainte d'une procédure arbitrale. Un lien délicat apparait alors, entre souveraineté et arbitrage d'investissement. Plusieurs doctrines se sont longtemps affrontées, notamment celle élaborée par Calvo et Drago en Amérique Latine entre 1870 et 1900, proposant de réduire les droits des investisseurs étrangers, face à une doctrine opposée, celle militant pour un standard minimum international de protection des investisseurs étrangers. Or, une renaissance de ces débats apparaît aujourd'hui, avec une problématique liée à la souveraineté de plus en plus ancrée dans les débats liés à l'arbitrage d'investissement. Pourtant, l'arbitrage d'investissement doit être perçu comme une méthode permettant à des investisseurs de bénéficier d'un arbitre indépendant et permettant de « dépolitiser » les contentieux. Mais des Etats admettent de moins en moins que leurs lois établies démocratiquement pour l'intérêt général puissent être contestées par des investisseurs étrangers devant un tribunal arbitral. Des auteurs parlent de « chilling effect », par lequel des Etats n'osent plus légiférer, par crainte de contentieux ultérieurs. De plus en plus d'Etats refusent que leur droit soit remis en cause par des juges privés. Plusieurs questions se posent. Est-il toujours concevable de protéger davantage un investisseur étranger qu'un investisseur national ? Est-il légitime de privilégier des juges privés, plutôt que des juges nationaux pour trancher les litiges en matière d'investissement ? L'utilité de l'arbitrage peut être comprise, dans des pays où la justice étatique est dite « corrompue » ou « biaisée ». En pareille situation, un investisseur étranger est légitime à vouloir saisir un arbitre neutre et indépendant. Mais la légitimité d'avoir recours à l'arbitrage dans des pays développés bénéficiant d'une justice étatique indépendante pose plus de difficultés. Dès lors, faudrait-il limiter l'arbitrage d'investissement aux pays souffrant d'un déficit d'indépendance de justice étatique ? Et donc d'exclure ce mode de règlement des litiges en la matière dans l'Union européenne ? La « politisation » du débat est en pleine renaissance. L'arbitrage d'investissement est un domaine relativement jeune et il convient de se demander s'il s'agit là d'un mode de règlement des litiges adéquat et d'un mode adapté au commerce international en général ? Assistera-t-on prochainement ou assiste-t-on déjà à ce que des auteurs qualifient de « fin de cycle » ? Il s'agit de questions ancrées dans l'actualité, que ce soit en France ou ailleurs dans le monde. The place of arbitration in investment law is discussed. The rebuttals are growing. Many issues water down the very definition of the notion of investment. The doctrinal controversies are still numerous and debated on this subject. Similarly, doctrines clash on the question of whether or not it is necessary to develop a body of coherent rules for homogeneous arbitral awards. The opposition to arbitration in investment law is also found in issues related to the exequatur of arbitral awards related to investment arbitration in the European Union. An apparent lack of support for the development of arbitration in the European Union has set in, as demonstrated by the recent CETA treaty concluded between the European Union and Canada. Investment arbitration would run the risk of a decline in sovereignty. Indeed, because of investment arbitration, States would be less encouraged to legislate on matters that could have an impact on the activity of a foreign company, because of the fear of arbitration proceedings. A delicate link then appears between sovereignty and investment arbitration. Several doctrines have long clashed, in particular the one developed by Calvo and Drago in Latin America between 1870 and 1900, proposing to reduce the rights of foreign investors, in front of an opposing doctrine, that campaigning for a minimum international standard of protection for foreign investors. A revival of these debates is appearing today, with an issue linked to sovereignty increasingly rooted in the debates linked to investment arbitration. However, investment arbitration must be seen as a method allowing investors to benefit from an independent arbitrator and allowing disputes to be “depoliticised”. But states admit less and less that their laws democratically established for the general interest can be challenged by foreign investors before an arbitration tribunal. Authors talk about the “chilling effect”, by which States no longer dare to legislate, because of the fear of subsequent litigation. More and more States refuse to have their rights challenged by private judges. Several questions arise. Is it always conceivable to protect a foreign investor more than a national investor ? Is it legitimate to favor private judges, rather than national judges, to settle investment disputes ? The usefulness of arbitration can be understood in countries where state justice is said to be “corrupt” or “biased”. In such a situation, a foreign investor is legitimate in wanting to seize a neutral and independent arbitrator. But the legitimacy of having recourse to arbitration in developed countries benefiting from independent state justice arouses more difficulties. Therefore, should investment arbitration be limited to countries suffering from a lack of independence of state justice ? And therefore to exclude this method of settling disputes in this area in the European Union ? The “politicization” of the debate is in full revival. Investment arbitration is a relatively young field and it is worth asking whether it is an adequate mode of dispute resolution and a mode suitable for international trade in general ? Will we soon witness or are we already witnessing what some authors describe as the “end of the cycle” ? These are issues rooted in the news, whether in France or elsewhere in the world.

There is a growing stream of critics who see investment arbitration in favor of foreign investors and as a negative force as opposed to sustainable development. The phenomenon of third-party funding and its use in investment arbitration has increased such concerns. Third-party funding is basically the payment of all or a part of the arbitration costs of one of the parties of dispute by a third party funder which in return, the funder receives a percentage of the output of the award if successful. The purpose of this article is to explain and analyze the theoretical differences between pros and cons of third-party funding regarding the access to justice, screening mechanism for the claims, and the financial consequences on the host state. In this article, the advocates see third-party funding as a means of access to justice for aggrieved investors in investment claims, while the adversaries refering on the profitability of third-party funding, see this method in arbitration a form of wealth transfer from public sector to private corporations and also refer to the asymmetric structure of the investment arbitration regime as well as the risks arising from the transfer of management and control of arbitration process to the third party funders. یک جریان رو به رشدی از منتقدان وجود دارد که داوری سرمایه‌گذاری را به نفع سرمایه‌گذاران خارجی و بعنوان یک نیروی منفی در تضاد با توسعه پایدار می‌داند. پدیده تأمین مالی ثالث و بکارگیری آن در داوری سرمایه‌گذاری به این نگرانی‌ها افزوده است. تأمین مالی ثالث اساساً پرداخت تمام یا بخشی از هزینه‌های داوری یکی از طرفین دعوی توسط تأمین کننده شخص ثالث است که در ازای آن، تأمین کننده مالی درصدی از رأی صادره را در صورت پیروزی دریافت می‌نماید. هدف مقاله، تشریح و تحلیل اختلافات نظری موافقان و مخالفان تأمین مالی ثالث در خصوص دستیابی به عدالت، غربالگری دعاوی و تبعات مالی آن بر دولت است. در این مقاله موافقان، تأمین مالی ثالث را ابزاری جهت دستیابی به عدالت برای سرمایه‌گذاران زیان‌دیده در دعاوی سرمایه‌گذاری در نظر می‌گیرند در حالی که مخالفان با اتکا به اهداف سودآوری تأمین مالی ثالث، این روش را در داوری نوعی انتقال ثروت از بخش عمومی به بخش خصوصی می‌دانند و به ساختار نامتقارن رژیم داوری سرمایه‌گذاری و خطرات ناشی از انتقال مدیریت و کنترل فرایند داوری به تأمین کنندگان شخص ثالث نیز اشاره می‌نمایند.

L’objectif de cet article est d’identifier, dans le cas spécifique des pays de l’Afrique des Grands Lacs, les canaux de transmission par lesquels les flux entrants d’investissements directs étrangers (IDE) peuvent avoir une influence positive sur la croissance économique.  Nous employons à la fois la méthode des moindres carrés généralisés simple (MCG) et la méthode des moindres carrés généralisés réalisables (MCGR) pour vérifier l’évidence empirique de cette relation, entre les IDE et la croissance, sur les données de la période 1970-2019. Les résultats montrent que les IDE ont un impact positif sur la croissance économique, mais qui dépend fortement de la stabilité macroéconomique. D’autre part, nous ne trouvons pas l’incidence des facteurs tels que le développement financier, l’ouverture commerciale et le capital humain comme canaux de transmission de l’effet positif des IDE sur la croissance.

The right to water in investment arbitration has been one of the most contentious issues before investment arbitration tribunals in recent decades. The privatization of public services, including water and sanitation, and assigning them to foreign investors has caused the right to water as a vital benefit being repeatedly raised in investment arbitrations. However, due to tribunals’ narrow interpretation of jurisdiction and applicable law, this fundamental human right has been considered irrelevant and ignored, and this has fueled the legitimacy crises in investment arbitration. This research seeks to indicate the potentiality of more protection of the right to water through balancing the states international obligations in the two areas of investment law and human rights law. Proposed methods for integrating human rights with investment law include the correct interpretation of jurisdictional clauses and the applicable law based on the treaties interpretation principles, systematic integration and the inclusion of new clauses in investment agreements. طرح حق بر آب در داوری سرمایه‌گذاری یکی از مناقشه‌انگیزترین مباحث پیش روی دیوان‌های داوری در چند دهه اخیر بوده است. خصوصی‌سازی خدمات عمومی از جمله آب و فاضلاب و سپردن آنها به سرمایه‌گذاران خارجی موجب شده تا حق بر آب بعنوان یک منفعت عمومی و حیاتی بارها در داوری‌های سرمایه‌گذاری مطرح شود. با تفسیر مضیق محاکم از شروط صلاحیتی و قانون حاکم، این حق بنیادین بشری در برخی موارد نامربوط و نادیده تلقی شده و این امر به بحران مشروعیت در داوری سرمایه‌گذاری دامن زده است. این جستار می‌کوشد تا امکان حمایت بیشتر از حق بر آب را از طریق برقراری تعادل بین تعهدات بین‌المللی دولت‌ها در دو عرصه حقوق سرمایه‌گذاری و حقوق بشر نشان دهد و در پایان روش‌هایی را برای ادغام این دو از جمله تفسیر درست شروط صلاحیتی و قانون حاکم با تکیه بر اصول تفسیر معاهدات، تلفیق سیستمیک و گنجاندن بندهای جدید در موافقتنامه‌های سرمایه‌گذاری پیشنهاد کند.

Au cours des dernières décennies, le régime de règlement des différends entre investisseurs et États (« RDIE »), par le biais de l’arbitrage ad hoc, a été l’objet d’un examen approfondi et de critiques croissantes. Au fur et à mesure que les États défendeurs de diverses régions ont perdu des affaires d’arbitrage d’investissement, ils ont été comme désenchantés par ce type de mécanisme de résolution des litiges, dans ce qui est désormais connu comme le contrecoup de l’arbitrage d’investissement. Plus récemment, ces critiques se sont intensifiées au point que l’Union Européen a remplacé le RDIE contemporain par une cour permanente d’investissement pour régler ces différends. Une approche intermédiaire de la réforme du système par l’établissement d’un organe d’appel visant à donner de la cohérence aux nombreuses sentences arbitrales ad hoc est également envisagée. Cette thèse analyse les principales critiques du système du RDIE actuel afin d’examiner sa pertinence et effectue une comparaison entre les options de réforme, la manière dont elles sont censées résoudre les défauts du système, ainsi que les implications découlant de certaines des solutions les plus débattues. L’objectif de la thèse est de faire valoir qu’une refonte radicale ou révolutionnaire du système d’arbitrage des investissements ne fera que générer des incertitudes, susciter des problèmes juridiques et pratiques très complexes, et ne n’apportera finalement pas de meilleurs résultats. L’accent devrait plutôt être mis sur une indispensable évolution ou réforme substantielle au niveau des traités, afin de tirer les leçons des cas passés et de s’assurer que la rédaction des traités répond mieux aux défis actuels. = The dispute settlement regime between investors and States through ad hoc arbitration has come under heavy scrutiny and mounting criticism in the past few decades. As respondent States in various regions have lost investment arbitration cases, those States have become disenchanted with this form of dispute resolution mechanism in what has become known as the backlash against investment arbitration. More recently, these critiques have escalated to the extent that the European Union has replaced it with a completely new scheme that includes dismantling the investment arbitration system by replacing it with a permanent investment court to settle such disputes in its trade agreement. An intermediate approach to reforming the system, the establishment of an appellate body aimed at providing consistency to the numerous ad hoc arbitration awards, is also being considered. This thesis analyses the main criticisms of the current investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system to determine its validity and carries out a comparison between the policy reform options, how they are intended to solve the system’s purported flaws, as well as the implications arising from some of the hotly debated options. The aim of the thesis is to argue that drastic overhaul or revolutionary reform to the investment arbitration system will only lead to uncertainties, more complex legal and practical problems and would not yield better results. Instead, the focus should be on the evolution of substantive reform at the treaty level, to address the lessons learned from past cases and ensure that treaty drafting responds to current day challenges.

La négociation est une institution fascinante du droit de l’investissement, polyvalente et multifonctionnelle. L’étude systématisée de la négociation dans le droit de l’investissement fait ressortir que cette institution est plus qu’un simple moyen permettant de parvenir à des accords. En réalité, la négociation est partout dans le droit de l’investissement. Il s’agit de la seule institution véritablement transversale au droit des investissements, qui intervient de nombreuses manières dans les rapports entre les investisseurs et les États d’accueil. Nous pouvons attester de l’existence des négociations avec la négociation des accords internationaux d’investissement ou de contrats d’investissement entre l’État d’accueil et l’investisseur. De surcroît, la négociation est un instrument au service de l’instance juridictionnelle qui sert aux arbitres dans l’interprétation des accords ainsi que pour la détermination de la responsabilité des parties. Si les divers rôles de la négociation dans le droit de l’investissement ont fortement contribué à l’évolution du droit international, la négociation reste une institution peu connue. Sa nature, sa portée, et son contenu juridique restent peu étudiés et non systématisés dans le droit de l’investissement. De ce fait, cette recherche offre une analyse approfondie de la négociation afin de trouver sa place dans l’ordre juridique de l’investissement (en général) et dans le règlement des litiges (en particulier). Nous examinerons dans cette recherche les nombreux apports de la négociation au droit de l’investissement permettant d’affirmer que la négociation constitue le mécanisme essentiel dans la conclusion des accords ; qu’elle impose aux parties des comportements précis ; qu’elle est un instrument qui permet aux tribunaux internationaux de déterminer la responsabilité des parties en fonction de leurs actions et inactions ; enfin, qu'elle constitue un instrument qui aide la justice arbitrale à interpréter les accords ponctuels. Ainsi, cette recherche a pour ambition de comprendre la nature, la portée et les fonctionnalités de la négociation dans le règlement des litiges transnationaux d’investissement. Negotiation is a fascinating instrument of Investment Law, versatile and rich in legal content. The systematic study of negotiation in Investment Law reveals that this institution is much more than just an instrument for reaching agreements. In fact, negotiation is everywhere. It is the only institution of Investment Law that is truly transversal, intervening in many layers of the relationship between investors and Host States. We can recognize the existence of negotiations from the very beginning of an investment process (the negotiation of a contract between the investor and the Host State), as well as negotiations over the course of the life and operation of an investment, and negotiations at the termination of a transnational investment project. Moreover, negotiation is an instrument that serves arbitral tribunal as element for the interpretation of the agreements, and the determination of the parties’ liability. The various roles of negotiation in Investment Law have certainly contributed to the evolution of international law. Nevertheless, negotiation remains an unknown institution to lawyers, regarding its nature, scope, uses and legal content. Investment law requires a thorough analysis of this institution and a structure that adapts to the transnational legal order. In this research, we will examine numerous contributions of negotiation to Investment Law: as a necessary mechanism for the conclusion of agreements that impact Investment Law; as a mandatory rule that it imposes specific behaviors on the parties in respect to the principle of good faith; as an instrument that serves international tribunals to determine the parties’ liability for their actions taken over the course of negotiations, and as an instrument to assist the justice system to construe contracts. Thus, the ambition of this research is to comprehend the nature, scope, and the features of negotiation in International Investment Law. La negociación es un instrumento fascinante de Derecho de las inversiones, a la vez versátil y rico en contenido legal. El estudio sistematizado de la negociación en el Derecho de las inversiones revela que esta institución es mucho más que un instrumento para alcanzar acuerdos. En realidad, la negociación está en todas partes en el derecho de las inversiones. Es laúnica institución verdaderamente transversal al Derecho de las inversiones, que interviene de varias formas en la relación entre inversionistas y los Estados receptores de inversión. Podemos constatar la existencia de las negociaciones desde el inicio de un proceso de inversión (en la negociación de un tratado bilateral deinversión, o de un contrato entre el inversionista y el Estado anfitrión), negociaciones durante la vida y la operación de una inversión y negociaciones encaminadas a la terminación o liquidación de la inversión transnacional. Resalta, además, que la negociación es un instrumento al servicio de la instancia jurisdiccional, que sirve a los árbitros en su tarea de interpretación de acuerdos, y a la determinación de la responsabilidad de las partes. Los diversos roles que presenta la negociación en el Derecho de las inversiones ciertamente han contribuido a la evolución del Derecho internacional. Sin embargo, la negociación sigue siendo una institución poco conocida por los juristas, especialmente en lo tocante a su naturaleza, alcance, usos y contenido legal. ElDerecho de las inversiones requiere de un análisis exhaustivo de esta institución, acompañado de una estructura que se adapte al orden legal transnacional.En esta investigación examinaremos las diversas contribuciones que hace la negociación al Derecho de las inversiones, a saber: se muestra como un mecanismoinevitable para concluir acuerdos que terminan contribuir en la evolución del Derecho de las inversiones; impone a las partes comportamientos específicos enrespeto del principio de la buena fe; es un instrumento para que los tribunales internacionales determinen la responsabilidad de las partes en razón de sus accionesdurante la fase de negociación y se constituye en un instrumento que asiste al sistema de justicia en la tarea de interpretar los acuerdos. La ambición de esta investigación no es otra cosa que comprehender la naturaleza, el alcance y la funcionalidad de la negociación en el Derecho internacional de las inversiones.

Derrière les controverses qui jalonnent l’histoire de l’idée de Constitution économique émerge la question éminemment politique de la marge de manœuvre laissée aux autorités publiques dans la sphère économique. La notion cristallise ainsi une tension fondamentale : entre démocratie et État de droit, quel doit être modèle d’organisation et d’ordonnancement juridique de l’économie? Des physiocrates aux néolibéraux, de la République de Weimar à l’intégration européenne, des constitutions nationales à la Global Governance, cet ouvrage collectif nous invite dès lors à explorer la généalogie du concept polémique de Constitution économique. Les auteurs ouvrent alors, à travers un dialogue interdisciplinaire constant, une réflexion globale autour des enjeux juridiques et politiques du processus actuel de constitutionnalisation de l’ordre de marché en Europe.

Conséquence de la compétition que les États se livrent pour attirer le maximum d’investisseurs, la mise en concurrence des systèmes juridiques nationaux s’est traduite par une libéralisation continue du droit qui a eu un effet direct sur l’idée de Constitution économique. Celle-ci a non seulement vu son épaisseur normative se renforcer du fait de la neutralisation des dispositifs juridiques dirigistes mais elle s’est également universalisée en raison de la conversion de la quasi-totalité des pays au dogme de « l’attractivité ». Toutefois, ce mouvement généralisé vers le tout libéral commence à être remis en cause sous l’effet de facteurs divers qui se traduisent par une demande sociale et politique pour plus de régulation étatique. Il en résulte à la fois un regain de l’unilatéralisme qui affecte la force des principes qui sous-tendent l’idée de constitution économique et une prise en compte plus affirmée des valeurs et intérêts collectifs qui altère la substance de ces principes.

Sometimes foreign investors after the dispute have arisen or when it is predictable and with the intention of bringing the dispute to arbitration, change their nationality or acquire new nationality. The phenomenon called Nationality Planning eases foreign investors’ access to a desirable treaty and increases the chance of bringing disputes against host states.So host states try to avoid these disputes by raising objections to Ratione Temporis or claiming abuse of rights. Arbitration tribunals’ approach towards their Ratione Temporis and abuse of rights is material in host states’ success in limiting Nationality Planning. So the question to be answered is that what requirements are considered by arbitrations in determining Ratione Temporis and abuse of rights and how these two are different. Arbitral precedent shows that these tribunals make distinction between cases of nationality planning contrary to their Ratione Temporis and cases that are considered as abuse of rights. However, in practice their strict approach results in limited acceptation of objections to Ratione Temporis or abuse of rights claims. گاه سرمایه‌گذار خارجی پس از بروز اختلاف یا زمانی که اختلاف قابل پیش‌بینی است و به قصد طرح دعوی در مرجع داوری، اقدام به تغییر تابعیت یا کسب تابعیت جدید می‌نماید. این اقدام که برنامه‌ریزی تابعیت نام دارد، دسترسی سرمایه‌گذار خارجی به یک معاهده سرمایه‌گذاری مطلوب را تسهیل کرده و احتمال طرح دعوی علیه دولت میزبان را افزایش می‌دهد. از این‌رو دولت‌های میزبان تلاش می‌کنند با طرح ایراد به صلاحیت زمانی یا سوء استفاده از حق، مانع پذیرش چنین دعوایی شوند. رویکرد مراجع داوری در احراز صلاحیت زمانی خود و تشخیص موارد سوء استفاده از حق، در موفقیت یا عدم موفقیت دولت میزبان در مقابله با برنامه‌ریزی تابعیت تعیین‌کننده است. بنابراین باید به این پرسش پرداخته شود که مراجع داوری چه شرایطی را برای احراز صلاحیت زمانی و سوء استفاده از حق در نظر می‌گیرند و چگونه میان این دو تمایز قائل می‌شوند. رویه مراجع داوری حاکی از آن است که این مراجع میان مواردی از برنامه‌ریزی تابعیت که مانع صلاحیت زمانی آن‌هاست و مواردی که سوء استفاده از حق تلقی می‌گردد، تمایز قائل می‌شوند. هرچند رویکرد سخت‌گیرانه آنها در عمل موجب می‌شود تنها در موارد محدودی ایراد به صلاحیت زمانی یا ادعای سوء استفاده از حق مورد پذیرش واقع شود.

Measures taken by governments during armed conflict to safeguard their essential interests sometimes cause damages to foreign investors. The investors thus affected seek remedies in the arbitration tribunals invoking breach of host government obligations to protect investments. The host government also usually attempts to assert as defense non-precluded measures to prove its irresponsibility, or if it proves responsible, justify it by resorting to circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the customary international law. But since different courts do not consider the same requirements to invoke these rules, there is no certainty that the parties to the lawsuit will be able to invoke them and, as a result, the scope of government's obligations to protect the foreign investor during the armed conflict is obscure. To clarify the scope of the host government's obligations to protect the foreign investor during armed conflicts and balance the interests of the investor and the host government during the investment disputes arising from the armed conflict, this article explores the possibility and requirements of invoking circumstances precluding wrongfulness and non-precluded measures and the relationship between them. اقداماتی که دولت‌ها در زمان مخاصمات مسلحانه در جهت حفظ منافع اساسی خود انجام می‌دهند گاه موجب ورود خسارت به سرمایه‌گذاران خارجی می‌گردد. سرمایه‌گذاران آسیب‌دیده در محاکم داوری با استناد به نقض تعهدات حمایتی توسط دولت میزبان، خسارات وارده به خود را طلب می‌نمایند. دولت میزبان نیز معمولاً برای اثبات عدم مسئولیت خود به شرط اقدامات منع نشده مندرج در معاهده سرمایه‌گذاری استناد می‌کند و یا در صورت اثبات مسئولیت، به منظور توجیه آن به معاذیر رافع وصف متخلفانه در حقوق بین‌الملل عرفی متوسل می‌شود. اما از آنجا که محاکم مختلف، شرایط یکسانی را جهت استناد کشور میزبان به شرط اقدامات منع نشده و معاذیر رافع وصف متخلفانه در نظر نمی‌گیرند، قطعیتی در امکان استناد به آن‌ها وجود ندارد. در نتیجه، قلمرو تعهد دولت به حمایت از سرمایه‌گذار خارجی در زمان مخاصمات مسلحانه در هاله‌ای از ابهام فرو رفته است. این مقاله با هدف روشن ساختن قلمرو تعهد دولت میزبان به حفاظت از سرمایه‌گذار خارجی در هنگام مخاصمات مسلحانه و به منظور توازن منافع سرمایه‌گذار و دولت میزبان در دعاوی سرمایه‌گذاری ناشی از مخاصمات مسلحانه، امکان و الزامات استناد کشور میزبان به معاذیر عرفی رافع وصف متخلفانه و شرط اقدامات منع نشده و ارتباط میان آنها را مشخص می‌نماید

For the first time, a monograph provides a systematic, in-depth account of contract interpretation in investment treaty arbitration and offers a conceptual paradigm that would enhance the quality of the tribunals’ reasoning.; Readership: The monograph is of relevance for legal scholars, practitioners and policymakers in the field of investment treaty arbitration. The book will also be of additional value to postgraduate and doctoral students.

The global financial crisis led to the introduction of special resolution regimes for financial institutions. The most prominent innovation of these resolution regimes is the so-called bail-in tool, which allows regulators to recapitalise financial institutions by expropriating shareholders and creditors. This thesis analyses the conditions under which a hypothetical bail-in of a financial institution would constitute a compensable breach of international investment law. It identifies the issues that are most likely to be relevant if a bail-in were to be litigated before an investment arbitration tribunal. The thesis first addresses jurisdictional issues, in particular the question of whether bail-inable instruments can even be considered an investment in procedural terms. The analysis then continues to substantive standards of protection. It deals comprehensively with the question of expropriation and related issues such as compensation, the right to regulate, and causation. It concludes with possible violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard.