Bibliographie sélective OHADA

La cession des titres sociaux est une opération fréquente dans le monde des sociétés commerciales. L'espace des affaires OHADA ne déroge point à cette situation. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la rupture dudit contrat, le législateur communautaire prévoit une résiliation unilatérale par le cédant, sans une quelconque protection réservée au cessionnaire. De ce fait, cette procédure risquée conduit à s'interroger sur les garde-fous réservés au profit du cessionnaire, visant à sauvegarder ses intérêts et, à la limite bénéficier d'une réparation par voie de droit en termes pécuniaires du fait des préjudices subis.

Le droit communautaire de l’OHADA prévoit un ensemble de règles propres à la restructuration d’entreprise qui peut prendre la forme d’une fusion, d’une scission ou d’un apport partiel d’actif. Ces opérations entraînent, pour la plupart, la dissolution sans liquidation des sociétés qui disparaissent, la transmission universelle de leur patrimoine aux sociétés bénéficiaires ainsi que l’acquisition par les associés des sociétés qui disparaissent, de la qualité d’associés des sociétés bénéficiaires. En principe, les conséquences fiscales applicables sont celles de la cessation d’entreprise, avec un coût fiscal dissuasif. Afin d’alléger les conséquences fiscales de telles opérations, il a été mis en place un régime fiscal de faveur propre à permettre la prise en compte du caractère intercalaire de telles opérations en leur faisant bénéficier d’une neutralité fiscale. OHADA Community law provides for a set of rules specific to the restructuring of a company which may take the form of a merger, a division, or a partial contribution of assets. These operations lead, for the most part, to the dissolution without liquidation of the companies that disappear, the universal transfer of their assets to the beneficiary companies and the acquisition by the members of the companies that disappear of the status of partners of the beneficiary companies. In principle, the applicable tax consequences are those of the cessation of business, with a dissuasive tax cost. To reduce the tax consequences of such transactions, a favorable tax regime has been set up to allow the intercalary nature of such transactions to be considered by allowing them to benefit from fiscal neutrality.

In law it is common to encounter two separate pieces of legislation which govern a single matter or transaction, for example, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act) and the Securities Transfer Act 25 of 2007 both of which address the sale of shares. Similarly, the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Income Tax Act) and the Companies Act both have regulations which govern, respectively, tax law and company law matters in South Africa. These two Acts overlap in various business and commercial fields as tax is frequently an important component of any business transaction undertaken by a company. Issues, however, arise when the regulations in these two Acts, are inconsistent. This can be observed if one compares the current South African Income Tax and Companies Act, specifically as regards the sections involving merger and amalgamation transactions. Section 44 of the Income Tax Act governs merger and amalgamation transactions from a tax perspective and provides for tax rollover relief if certain requirements are met. The regulations governing mergers and amalgamations under the Companies Act are contained in sections 113, 115 and 116 of the Act. Although these sections in both Acts address the same transaction – a merger or amalgamation between two or more companies – there are several discrepancies between the regulations in the two Acts which appear to operate entirely independently of one another. In practice, one often sees that other sections in the Companies Act and Income Tax Act are used to achieve a merger due, in the main, to the uncertainties in the application of the relevant merger sections in the two Acts and the limited interaction between them. This study identifies and assesses the impact of the discrepancies identified in these two Acts in relation to merger and amalgamation transactions. The study makes recommendations to address these discrepancies and to align the South African Companies Act and Income Tax Act as regards merger/amalgamation transactions.

Le législateur OHADA a importé les formes françaises de sociétés commerciales. Il a, cependant, omis d’introduire dans son acte uniforme de 1997 sur les sociétés commerciales, la société par actions simplifiée connue en France depuis 1994. Toutefois, conscient de l’incapacité des formes sociétaires initialement créées à répondre aux exigences de flexibilité des entrepreneurs africains, il entreprend en 2014 une réforme qui a donné naissance à une nouvelle forme de société au caractère hybride : La SAS qui cumule la puissance financière des sociétés par actions et une liberté conventionnelle quasi absolue. Le souci étant de faciliter aux entrepreneurs africains la création d’une société plus flexible, adaptée à leur statut. L’objectif de la recherche vise à permettre aux entrepreneurs de connaitre la physionomie de la SAS et de démontrer qu’à travers cette société, le législateur OHADA assouplit les principes de gouvernance sociétaire en consolidant conjointement les droits des associés. Ainsi, la SAS se caractérise par une spécification statutaire extensible et une personnalisation spécifiée. Dans cette dynamique il faut cependant, signaler qu’en dépit des avantages qu’elle présente, la société par actions simplifiée de l’OHADA reste encore pratiquement méconnue et non adoptée par la plupart des entrepreneurs africains et particulièrement sénégalais.

تهدف دراسة موضوع انسحاب الشريك في القانون الجزائري والقانون المقارن إلى تحديد التنظيم القانوني لعملية انسحاب الشريك من الشركة، والوقوف على أسباب ومبررات عملية الانسحاب، وأهم الوسائل المتاحة لتحقيقه، خاصة وأنّ آثار الانسحاب تنصرف أساسا إلى الشريك المنسحب، كما تمتدإلى الشركة والشركاء والغير الذي تعامل مع الشركة. وقد أثبتت الدراسة المقارنة في القانونين الجزائري والفرنسي، مدى تأثر القانون الجزائري بالقانون الفرنسي، بسبب غياب تنظيم قانوني خاص في التشريع الجزائري لمسالة انسحاب الشريك من الشركة. ونتيجة لهذا الفراغ القانوني، استوجب الرجوع إلى القواعد العامة في القانون المدني، الذي ينظم عقد الشركة بصفة عامة، مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار خصوصية الشركات التجارية والأحكام الخاصة المنظمة لها. إنّ انسحاب الشريك، قد يكون إراديًا في حالة قيامه بالتخلّي عن حقوقه الاجتماعية في الشركة، وقد يكون الانسحاب لا إراديا، عندما يكون عن طريق حكم قضائي، بحيث يتم في هذه الحالة إنهاء مهام الشريك من دون إرادته. وكقاعدة عامة، فإن انسحاب الشريك يِؤدي حتما إلى انقضاء الشركة، لاسيما إذا تعلق الأمر بشركات الأشخاص، إلا إذا كانت القوانين الأساسية للشركة والشركاء الباقون، قد قرروا خلاف ذلك، بمعنى استمرار الشركة. L’étude du retrait de l’associé en droit algérien et droit comparé a pour but de déterminer la réglementation juridique du mécanisme du retrait de l’associé de la société, afin de mettre l’accent sur les motifs du retrait, les moyens et techniques juridiques pour y parvenir, mais surtout ses effets, car le retrait touche principalement les droits de l’associé, les partenaires associés, et enfin les tiers. L’étude comparative du droit algérien et français, réaffirme l’influence du droit algérien par le droit français en raison de l’absence d’une règlementation spécifique relative au droit de retrait de l’associé. En raison de ce vide juridique, il est nécessaire de se référer aux règles générales du droit civil qui régissent le contrat de société, tout en tenant compte des spécificités des différents types de sociétés commerciales et des textes qui les régissent. Il est à préciser, que le retrait de l’associé peut être volontaire suite à sa renonciation à ses droits sociaux, mais il peut être involontaire dans le cas du retrait judicaire, quand il s’agit de mettre fin de manière unilatérale aux fonctions de l’associé. En règle générale, le retrait de l’associé entraine obligatoirement la dissolution de la société, notamment dans le cas des sociétés de personnes, sauf si les statuts de la société ou les associés ont convenus autrement, c’est à dire de la continuité de la société.

المبدأ العام في الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودة هو تقييد التنازل عن الحصص، إذ لا يجوز التنازل عن الحصص إلى الغير إلا بموافقة أغلبية الشركاء الحائزين لثلاثة أرباع رأس المال. وهو ما نصت علية المادة571 من القانون التجاري. والاستثناء حرية التنازل عن الحصص إلى الأصول والفروع والأزواج مالم ينص القانون الأساسي على تقييد التنازل. كما يخضع فيها التنازل عن الحصص للاسترداد وهو حق مقرر لمصلحة الشركاء والشركة لشراء الحصص المرغوب في التنازل عنها في حالة رفض الموافقة على المتنازل إليه. وإذا كان الأصل العام في الشركة ذات المسؤولية المحدودة هو تقييد التنازل عن الحصص، فإن الحصص في هذه الشركة تنتقل بكل حرية إلى ورثة الشريك، بشرط أن لا يترتب على ذلك زيادة عدد الشركاء عن الحد الأقصى المقرر قانونا والذي هو 50 شريكا. ومع ذلك يمكن للشركاء تقييد انتقال الحصص إلى الورثة بشرط أن يتم إدراج هذا الشرط في القانون الأساسي للشركة. The general principle in a limited liability company is to restrict the assignment/ abdication of shares, as it is not permissible to assign shares to third parties except with the share-holders majority’s approval who possess three-quarters of the capital. This is what is stipulated in Article 571 of the Commercial Law. The exception is the freedom to assign/transfer shares to ascendants, descendants, and spouses, unless the Basic Law stipulates a restriction of abdication. In addition, the assignment of shares is subject to recovery, which is a right established in the interest of the partners and the company to purchase the desired shares to be assigned in the event of refusal to approve the assignee. Therefore if the general principle in the limited liability company is to restrict the abdication from shares, then the shares in this company are transferred freely to the partner’s heirs, provided that this does not result in an increase in the number of partners beyond the legally prescribed maximum, which are 50 partners. However, the partners can restrict the transfer of shares to the heirs, provided that this condition is included in the articles of association of the company.

Susceptible d'être lésés dans leurs droits représentés par les actions dont ils disposent, les minoritaires dans une société anonyme, ont besoin d'être protégés « non parce qu'ils sont minoritaires, mais parce que leurs intérêts apparaissent comme dignes de protection ». Il n'est pas rare dans le cadre du fonctionnement de la société anonyme d'assister à la prise de décisions contraires, non seulement à l'intérêt des minoritaires, mais également à l'intérêt social, par les actionnaires majoritaires dans l'unique dessein de satisfaire les membres de la majorité au détriment des autres actionnaires. Cette tendance à l'écrasement des minoritaires entraîne des conflits, sinon des oppositions entre actionnaires conduisant à la constitution de blocs antagonistes dont l'attitude peut provoquer une crise au sein de la société. L'étude réside dans l'analyse des garanties et dans la recherche constante d'une protection efficace qu'offrent le législateur et l'autorité du marché financier aux investisseurs minoritaires dans l'espace OHADA. Cette étude étendue en droit français existe aussi en droit OHADA.

The Court of Appeals was presented with a dispute concerning the recovery of shares sold. The shareholder of a simplified joint-stock company had invoked the right of preemption, which is established by the Civil Code. The Court decided (on 1/10/2017, Appeals Nos. 1704, 1783/2017, Commercial, Civil, Governmental, Unpublished) that the shareholder could return the sold shares in accordance with his right of preemption. It considered that Company Law did not regulate the restitution of shares in the joint-stock company and that it was, therefore, necessary to refer to the provisions of the Civil Code. We think the decision of the Court of Appeals is subject to criticism. Firstly, even though the legislator does not regulate the restitution of the shares of the holding company, he refers to the regime applicable to the company from which the holding company takes its form. In this case, the holding company took the form of a joint-stock company, whose legislator had organized the shareholder's right to recover the shares offered for sale. Secondly, the Court did not follow the order of the official sources of the legal rule governing companies, namely company law, commercial law and commercial customs. Thirdly, the subject matter of the right of preemption is a real and undivided right, which is not the case for the share, since it is a personal right.

La Directive du 14 décembre 2022 concernant la publication d’informations en matière de durabilité pousse les grandes entreprises européennes à identifier, et par-là espère-t-on à prévenir ou limiter, les risques écologiques et sociaux de leurs activités. Sont concernées non seulement les atteintes à l’environnement et aux droits humains qui pourraient menacer la solidité financière des entreprises concernées, mais aussi celles qui exposent les droits de l’homme et l’environnement à des risques intrinsèquement significatifs, indépendamment de leurs ramifications financières éventuelles. La finalité prêtée à cette transparence imposée est de rendre le tissu productif européen plus soutenable. Les commentateurs insistent généralement sur le rôle des parties prenantes dans ce gain de soutenabilité : la mise en transparence des pratiques des entreprises est supposée renforcer le pouvoir de pression et de négociation des syndicats et associations. Toutefois, l’enjeu du reporting institué par la Directive du 14 décembre 2022 n’est pas seulement d’informer les tiers, ou d’infuser dans l’entreprise la crainte de pressions externes, mais aussi de pousser les dirigeants d’entreprise à réfléchir plus avant au modèle d’affaires choisi et à la configuration de la chaîne de valeur associée. En d’autres termes, le modèle de gouvernance qui inspire la fabrique du droit européen du reporting sur la durabilité n’est pas seulement celui du Panoptique benthamien, mais aussi le précepte gestionnaire qui veut que l’« on (ne) gère (que) ce que l’on mesure ». Deux logiques distinctes sous-tendent ainsi la régulation par l’information à l’œuvre : l’amélioration des pratiques des entreprises est réputée procéder tantôt de pressions externes ou du risque de telles pressions (gouvernance par les parties prenantes ou par la seule transparence), tantôt de la réflexion interne (gouvernance réflexive). Bien que ces deux ressorts de la régulation par l’information soient théoriquement compatibles, leur articulation pratique pose des problèmes. Ainsi, une réglementation minutieuse du mode de fabrication des informations pourrait à la fois favoriser la comparabilité des données dont se nourrissent les pressions externes, et alimenter une mise en conformité de pure forme, au détriment d’une réelle réflexion sur la stratégie de l’entreprise et son modèle d’affaire. Si les entreprises conservent une réelle marge de manœuvre dans la fabrique de l’information sur la durabilité, c’est ainsi afin d’éviter de sacrifier la gouvernance réflexive sur l’autel de la gouvernance par les parties prenantes. L’espoir placé dans une telle régulation par l’information pourra sembler, à certains, comme un vœu pieu. Plutôt que de supplier les grandes entreprises multinationales de réinterroger leurs pratiques et leurs modèles d’affaire, pourquoi ne pas les contraindre à le faire ? La régulation par l’information n’est assurément pas une panacée, mais elle est peut-être l’une des rares options effectivement disponibles aujourd’hui pour rendre les pratiques des grandes entreprises plus compatibles avec les objectifs écologiques collectifs (à côté des subventions publiques et de la commande publique). Dans cette perspective, et compte tenu des débats persistants sur ce en quoi consiste une production durable, l’écueil fondamental de la Directive n’est peut-être pas d’avoir conservé l’orientation réflexive des textes qui l’avaient précédée, mais de l’avoir insuffisamment « outillée ». En effet, le texte ne garantit pas que les dirigeants des grandes entreprises réfléchissent vraiment au modèle d’affaire des entreprises qu’ils dirigent, et à sa compatibilité avec les limites des écosystèmes. Cet article propose plusieurs pistes afin d’y remédier et, ce faisant, d’amplifier la réflexivité environnementale des grands groupes.

مسؤولية الشركات التجارية في الجانب الجنائي هي مفهوم قانوني يحدد امكانية مساءلة الشركات او المؤسسات التجارية جنائيا عن الجرائم التي ترتكب في اطار أنشطتها. تاريخيا كان يتم ملاحقة ومساءلة الأفراد جنائيا فقط عن افعالهم الاجرامية ومع طفرة قانون الأعمال وتزايد الوعي بضرورة مساءلة الشركات اصبحت مسؤولية الشركات التجارية جزائيا واقعا في العديد من البلدان. Corporate criminal liability is a legal concept that determines the possibility of holding corporations or commercial entities criminally accountable for crimes committed within the scope of their activities. Historically, only individuals were pursued and held criminally responsible for their criminal actions. However, with the evolution of business law and increased awareness of the need to hold corporations accountable, corporate criminal liability has become a reality in many countries Corporate criminal liability is based on the principle that a corporation can be considered an independent entity separate from its directors, employees, and shareholders. Therefore, if a criminal offense is committed within the company's operations, it can be prosecuted and tried independently of the individuals associated with it. The specific criminal offenses for which corporations can be held accountable vary according to national legislation, but they typically include acts such as fraud, bribery, money laundering, tax evasion, environmental violations, human rights abuses, forgery, unfair competition, and others. When a corporation is criminally prosecuted, it can face severe penalties, including hefty fines, asset seizure, dissolution of the

تحتل حماية الغير المتعامل مع الشركات التجارية مكانة مهمة في القانون التجاري حيث كرس لها المشرع العديد من الأحكام والمبادئ القانونية التي تساهم في إستقرار المعاملات التجارية للشركات التجارية من جهة، والتي تدعم الثقة في معاملات الشركة مع محيطها الخارجي من جهة أخرى، وذلك نظرا للدور الذي يؤديه الغير في تطوير و إزدهار الشركة وتشجيع المتعاملين للإستثمار في هذا القطاع الاقتصادي المهم. قام المشرع بخطوات مهمة جعل من خلالها الغير يتدخل في حياة الشركة ونشاطها وذلك تخفيفا لآثار إعتبار هذا الغير عضوا خارجيا لا علم له بما يجري داخل الشركة التجارية، لكن تبني المشرع لأنظمة قانونية من أجل الغير لا يعني بلوغ النصوص القانونية هدفها الذي قررت من أجله . The protection of third parties dealing with commercial companies occupies an important place in the commercial law, as the legislator devoted many legal provisions and principles to it that contribute to the stability of commercial transactions of commercial companies on the one hand, and that support confidence in the company’s transactions with its external environment on the other hand, due to the role it plays Others contribute to the development and prosperity of the company and encourage customers to invest in this important economic sector. The legislator took important steps through which he made third parties interfere in the life and activity of the company in order to mitigate the effects of considering this third party as an external member who has no knowledge of what is going on inside the commercial company, but the legislator’s adoption of legal systems for the sake of third parties does not mean that the legal texts have reached their goal for which they were decided

Groups of companies are a complex corporate structure, whose regulation can be problematic, especially when it comes to liability. Indeed, liability within corporate groups draws forth a series of issues principally due to the principles of separate corporate personality and limited liability. In the context of limited liability, which is based on the notion of separate legal personality, the main issue waxes the protection of the creditors, in particular the creditors of the subsidiaries. One can find three regulatory templates for handling corporate groups and their liability: policing via general company and/or civil law (such as the English model); policing via special group legislation (such as the German model); and policing via branches of law such as insolvency law, antitrust law, and contract law, among others (which is the case in numerous jurisdictions, either coupled with the first or the second model). Lifting the corporate veil has come as an answer to corporate separateness, by permitting to ignore the shareholders’ limited liability and hold them personally liable for the debts of their companies in specific circumstances. However, one can hardly find cases in which the corporate veil has been successfully lifted, due to many factors. Other important questions that are posed in the scope of corporate groups liability are the parent company’s liability for the payment of its daughter companies’ debts when insolvency strikes and other respects, besides the matter of group liability. Furthermore, liability is as well a key player in terms of tort law, and corporate social responsibility has therefore found a place in the sun in the present climate.

Recent scandals have brought rankings to the forefront of the legal profession. Several of the most prestigious academic institutions have withdrawn from being ranked, citing the problematic nature of the rankings. However, rankings persist for both legal academics and practice, and there is substantial sentiment to improve the methodologies, with little detail as to how to improve. In this paper, we rank law firms on their clients’ IPO performance. We focus on the most relevant outcomes: litigation, first-day returns, disclosure, and legal fees. The focus on these measures provides benefits relative to other methodologies, which typically focus on inputs or size-related characteristics. Namely, this ranking is less manipulable and more accurately captures performance metrics that matter most to clients’ shareholders. Our rankings control for observable and unobservable deal characteristics, which helps ensure we capture law firm quality, not client traits. With the rankings based on legal fees, potential clients can compare the benefits of a particular law firm (e.g., lower litigation or higher selling prices) against the additional cost of hiring a higher-quality law firm. Hence, our rankings allow for a value-for-the-money comparison of law firms for clients selling shares in an IPO.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have recently gained prominence in global markets and feature among the world’s most influential enterprises. The aim of this research project is to analyse the international norms in force regulating whether SOEs are considered state or non- state actors, and their conduct state or non-state conduct, the interpretation and application of these norms by adjudicators in different international regimes, and to provide alternative prisms through which these rules and decisions can be assessed and re-thought by political actors. I show that, in relation to SOEs, the concepts ‘state and ‘act of state’ have been ascribed diverse meanings by adjudicators and other international actors, who have employed legal standards with divergent wording and thresholds when dealing with similar questions. I argue that the fragmented meaning of these terms should be understood, in part, as a result of the inherent malleability of these terms and the different expert vocabularies employed across regimes. It is exhibited that adjudicators in the international trade and investment regimes are more inclined towards piercing the corporate veil of SOEs, potentially evidencing the existence of biases against SOEs, which are perceived as inherently economically inefficient and politically motivated actors in an indiscriminatory manner. In the last chapter, I introduce alternative lines of thought regarding the regulation of SOEs in international law. I suggest that, instead of engaging in theoretical discussions on the proper delineation between the public and the private sector, it is more useful to focus on the distributional impact of international rules on various actors, especially on developing and emerging economies where the presence of SOEs is very high. Such alternative prisms of analysis open paths for future research and practice, with the goal of designing an international economic order that incentivises institutional experimentation in the pursuit of economic development and distributional equity.

La protection juridique des associés minoritaires se justifie en droit des sociétés et en droit OHADA par l’absence directe de la gestion des sociétés commerciales par ces derniers. De ce fait, les deux ordres juridiques mettent en œuvre plusieurs mécanismes afin de protéger les intérêts des minoritaires. Ces mécanismes sont de plusieurs natures à savoir des règles juridiques favorisant un traitement égalitaire de tous les associés ou des droits exclusifs aux associés minoritaires favorisant un équilibre de pouvoirs dans la gestion de la société mais également la coexistence d’acteurs capables de réguler le bon fonctionnement de la société, notamment le juge, les associations de défenses d’intérêts des associés minoritaires.Dans les sociétés où les enjeux économiques sont très importants comme les sociétés faisant appel public à l’épargne, les législateurs français et OHADA, soucieux de protéger les associés minoritaires, ajoutent au droit commun, l’intervention du droit des marchés financiers qui vient renforcer la protection des minoritaires, notamment dans l’exercice de leur droit de cession. Ainsi, l’on remarque que le droit des sociétés français et le droit OHADA utilisent quasiment les mêmes fondements juridiques pour protéger les associés minoritaires. Il existe plus de similitudes que des différences dans les deux ordres juridiques puis que le législateurs OHADA a entrepris une réforme en 2014 afin de renforcer considérablement les compétences des associés minoritaires dans la gestion de la société. Cette réforme du droit OHADA s’est quasiment rapprochée du droit de société.Toutefois, malgré les efforts du droit des sociétés français et du droit OHADA de protéger les intérêts des associés minoritaires, subsiste une précarité du statut des minoritaires. La loi de la majorité fait obstacle à ce que l’on puisse objectiver que la protection apportée aux associés minoritaires est absolument efficace. Pour en arriver à une protection efficace certains droits devraient être généralisés pour contrôler sereinement la gestion sociale et leurs intérêts.

Şirketler hukukunda azlık pay sahiplerini bilgilendirmeye ilişkin sorunlar önem kazanmakta ve bu konuda Türk hukukunda da Ohada üye ülkeler hukukunda da önemli yeni düzenlemeler yapıldığı görülmektedir. Türk hukuku açısından 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu (TTK) ve Ohada hukuku açısından da 2014 yılında yenilenmiş olan Acte Uniforme Relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement D'İntérêt Economique (AUSCGİE) ile getirilen önemli yeniliklerden biri anonim şirketlerde özel denetim isteme hakkıdır. Bu çalışmada önce TTK’da sonra AUSCGİE’de denetim isteme hakkı incelenmiştir. Sonrasında iki kanunun karşılaştırması yapılmış ve çalışmaya sonuç kısmıyla son verilmiştir. Buradan hareketle, TTK’da denetim isteme hakkını incelenirken önce bu hakkın talebinde kimler bulanacak incelemiştir. Hak sahipleri kişilerin inceledikten sonra talep için gereken şartları bakılmıştır. Şartlar da ikiye ayrılmıştır, genel kurulun talebi reddi üzerine mahkemeye başvurmak için gerekli şartlar ve genel kurulda özel denetim talebinin kabul edebilmesi için gereken şartlardır. TTK kısmında son olarak denetçinin mahkeme tarafından atanmasını açıklığa kavuşmuştur. AUSGİE’de mahkemeden özel denetim talebinde bulanabilecek kişiler ve aranan şartlar öngörülmektedir. Bu esastan AUSCGİE’ de kimler bu haktan yaranabilecek bakıp sonra mahkemeye başvurmak için gereken şartlara eğilmiştir. Sonrasından mahkeme denetçinin nasıl atacağını açıklanmıştır. Son olarak, iki kanunların getirdikleri yeni hakkın karşılaştırması kısmında ise, özel denetimin karşılaştırması farklı açılardan ele alınmıştır. İlk sırada hak sahibi kişilerin açısından bir karşılaştırma, ardından şartların, denetçin atanması ve denetim amaçın açısından karşılaştırma yapılmıştır.

Le thème portant sur le statut juridique de la petite entreprise en droit OHADA est d’un grand intérêt pour les pays membres de l’espace OHADA confrontés aux défis du développement économique. L’apport significatif des petites entreprises aux économies nationales a conduit le législateur sous la pression des partenaires au développement à formaliser ces activités du secteur informel (occupant environ 70% de la population active et contribuant à hauteur de 60% au PIB) pour garantir aux investisseurs locaux la sécurité juridique et judiciaire. Pour ce faire, il a entrepris de réformer son droit des affaires en révisant les Actes uniformes pour intégrer la dimension de la petite entreprise (portant droit commercial général du 15 décembre 2010, droit des sociétés coopératives du 15 décembre 2010, droit des sociétés commerciales et groupement d’intérêt économique du 30 janvier 2014, droit comptable et information financière du 26 janvier 2017 et organisation des procédures collectives d’apurement du passif du 10 septembre 2015). Par ces réformes, il a institué le statut juridique des petites entreprises, en établissant des règles allégées qui régissent la constitution et le fonctionnement des entreprises " in boni ". Pour ce qui est de l’allégement de leurs régimes fiscal et social, il renvoie aux lois supplétives nationales visant à atténuer les contraintes qui pèsent sur elles. Ce souci constant d’allégement se retrouve également en matière de traitement des difficultés des petites entreprises, lorsqu’il apporte des innovations aux règles de fond et de procédures pour satisfaire les créanciers et sauver les petites entreprises du naufrage économique et les pérenniser voire les rentabiliser.

Phoenix activity involves conduct whereby a failing company (the old company) is replaced by a second company (the new company) in the operation of the same or a similar business and that involves the same or similar company controllers. Transactions of this nature can be legal and even be beneficial to society, since entrepreneurs who pursue a viable business may, if the new company succeeds, benefit the economy and many other stakeholders. These transactions are referred to as legal phoenix activity. Problems arise however when phoenix activity is engaged in with the goal of evading the debt of the old company, known as illegal phoenix activity. In other cases, even well-intentioned company controllers can cause significant harm by resurrecting a fundamentally flawed business. This conduct, although not illegal, is unduly prejudicial to stakeholders and is known as problematic phoenix activity. While this thesis focuses on illegal phoenix activity, several measures identified should also curb problematic phoenix activity. This study identifies the elements and common characteristics of illegal phoenix activity. It then analyses regulation pertaining to those elements and common characteristics with the aim of finding effective solutions to the problem. This includes evaluating measures that reverse prejudicial transactions that occur during illegal phoenix activity as well as holding complicit parties, such as company controllers and the new company, accountable for their actions. Regulation aimed at preventing and investigating illegal phoenix activity is also considered. This thesis uses the comparative legal approach to analyse regulatory responses to illegal phoenix activity. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are examined. Several reported cases in South Africa involving what appear to be illegal phoenix activity are explored, along with the existing measures that are applicable to illegal phoenix activity in South Africa. A single anti-phoenix provision is undesirable as it has the potential to unjustifiably infringe on legal phoenix activity. This thesis proposes a multi-pronged approach, which involves a combination of better enforcement of existing laws and the introduction of smaller targeted amendments to legislation aimed at reducing the incidence illegal phoenix activity.

Anonim şirketler hukukunda alacaklılar, şirketlerin dış finansman kaynaklarının merkezini oluşturmakta ve bu nedenle de son derece önemli bir menfaat grubunu teşkil etmektedirler. Bu durum şirket alacaklılarının çıkarlarının etkin bir biçimde gözetilmesi ve korunmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Zira alacaklıların alacaklarına kavuşabilmeleri için müracaat edebilecekleri tek kaynak şirketin malvarlığıdır. Dolayısıyla anonim şirketin mali durumunun bozulması sonucu malvarlığının kayba uğraması veya uğrama tehlikesi altında olması, alacaklıların menfaatlerini zedeleyici niteliktedir. Bu durum mali durumu bozulan anonim şirketlerde, alacaklıların menfaatlerinin gözetilmesini ve özellikle de öncül (ex-ante) koruma imkânlarıyla bu risk gerçekleşmeden önce bu konuda tedbirler alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Kurumsal yönetim anlayışı, anonim şirketlerde menfaat grupları arasındaki çıkar çatışmalarının en iyi, en adil şekilde dengelenmesini hedeflemektedir. Bu itibarla bu tez çalışmasında söz konusu menfaat çatışmaları özelinde kurumsal yönetimin şeffaflık, adillik, hesap verilebilirlik ve sorumluluk ilkeleri çerçevesinde bir menfaat grubu olarak şirket alacaklılarının menfaatlerinin, mali durumu bozulan veya bozulma tehlikesi altında olan anonim şirketlerde nasıl gözetilmesi ve korunması gerektiği hususunda bir bakış açısı sunulması hedeflenmektedir. Bu bakış açısından hareketle sermaye kaybı yaşayan, borca batık hale gelen anonim şirketlerin mali durumlarının iyileştirilmesi maksadıyla sermayenin korunması esası benimsenerek öngörülen TTK m.376 hükmü ile bu hükmün uygulanmasına ilişkin Tebliğ kapsamında öngörülen düzenlemelerin, alacaklıların menfaatlerinin korunması bakımından etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca ilgili hükümlerin, şirketlerin mali yapılarının güçlendirilmesi bakımından yeterlilikleri ve yerindelikleri, karşılaştırmalı hukuk düzenlemeleri de göz önünde bulundurularak eleştirel bir bakış açıyla ayrıntılı şekilde incelenmektedir. Creditors are the key to external financing sources for companies under the statute of joint stock companies, and hence represent an important figure interest group. This situation needs the effective supervision and protection of the company's creditors' interests. This is because the company's assets are the only source to which creditors can turn to acquire receivables. Hence, the loss or threatened loss of the joint stock company's assets because of its worsening financial situation is detrimental to the creditors' interests. This circumstance necessitates that the interests of the creditors of companies with a worsening financial situation be considered and that steps be taken in this respect prior to the realization of this danger, particularly with ex-ante protection opportunities. The corporate governance method strives to achieve the most equitable resolution of conflicts of interest between interest groups in joint stock companies. This thesis aims to provide a perspective on how the interests of company creditors, as an interest group, should be observed and protected in joint stock companies whose financial situation deteriorates or is at risk of deterioration, within the framework of the principles of transparency, fairness, accountability, and responsibility of corporate governance. From this perspective, to improve the financial situation of companies that have capital loss and become over-indebted, the effects of the provisions of TCC art.376 and the Communiqué, which are envisioned based on the principle of capital maintenance, are discussed in terms of protecting the interests of creditors. In addition, the adequacy and suitability of the relevant rules in terms of strengthening the financial structures of corporations are analysed in depth from a critical standpoint, considering the norms of comparative law.

For a decade, pressure from stakeholders in the production of sustainable development reports has been unanimous within the scientific community. Moreover, driven by the maximization of added value, the shareholders' position remains pending. This is illustrated by the permanent confrontation between shareholder creation of value (dear to the Anglo-Saxon model) and partnership creation of value (advocated by the continental model). In this movement, the position of Africa has remained unknown within the literature. Thus, if accountability is inherent in the very principle of responsibility, then the problem raised by this article is that of evaluating the societal commitment of African shareholders through the study of the influence of the capital structure on the environmental communication practices of industrial companies in the OHADA area. To this end, a quantitative empirical study isconducted among a sample of 73 companies operating in the Cameroonian industrial sector. The results of ordinal logistic regression tests suggest that four variables of the model: institutional/ethical investors, family shareholding, capital extent and debt significantly influence environmental communication. All this influence is positive for institutional/ethical investors, and negative for family ownership and capital sprawl. As for the debt variable, the meaning of the relationship remains undetermined.