Bibliographie sélective OHADA

The Court of Appeals was presented with a dispute concerning the recovery of shares sold. The shareholder of a simplified joint-stock company had invoked the right of preemption, which is established by the Civil Code. The Court decided (on 1/10/2017, Appeals Nos. 1704, 1783/2017, Commercial, Civil, Governmental, Unpublished) that the shareholder could return the sold shares in accordance with his right of preemption. It considered that Company Law did not regulate the restitution of shares in the joint-stock company and that it was, therefore, necessary to refer to the provisions of the Civil Code. We think the decision of the Court of Appeals is subject to criticism. Firstly, even though the legislator does not regulate the restitution of the shares of the holding company, he refers to the regime applicable to the company from which the holding company takes its form. In this case, the holding company took the form of a joint-stock company, whose legislator had organized the shareholder's right to recover the shares offered for sale. Secondly, the Court did not follow the order of the official sources of the legal rule governing companies, namely company law, commercial law and commercial customs. Thirdly, the subject matter of the right of preemption is a real and undivided right, which is not the case for the share, since it is a personal right.

La Directive du 14 décembre 2022 concernant la publication d’informations en matière de durabilité pousse les grandes entreprises européennes à identifier, et par-là espère-t-on à prévenir ou limiter, les risques écologiques et sociaux de leurs activités. Sont concernées non seulement les atteintes à l’environnement et aux droits humains qui pourraient menacer la solidité financière des entreprises concernées, mais aussi celles qui exposent les droits de l’homme et l’environnement à des risques intrinsèquement significatifs, indépendamment de leurs ramifications financières éventuelles. La finalité prêtée à cette transparence imposée est de rendre le tissu productif européen plus soutenable. Les commentateurs insistent généralement sur le rôle des parties prenantes dans ce gain de soutenabilité : la mise en transparence des pratiques des entreprises est supposée renforcer le pouvoir de pression et de négociation des syndicats et associations. Toutefois, l’enjeu du reporting institué par la Directive du 14 décembre 2022 n’est pas seulement d’informer les tiers, ou d’infuser dans l’entreprise la crainte de pressions externes, mais aussi de pousser les dirigeants d’entreprise à réfléchir plus avant au modèle d’affaires choisi et à la configuration de la chaîne de valeur associée. En d’autres termes, le modèle de gouvernance qui inspire la fabrique du droit européen du reporting sur la durabilité n’est pas seulement celui du Panoptique benthamien, mais aussi le précepte gestionnaire qui veut que l’« on (ne) gère (que) ce que l’on mesure ». Deux logiques distinctes sous-tendent ainsi la régulation par l’information à l’œuvre : l’amélioration des pratiques des entreprises est réputée procéder tantôt de pressions externes ou du risque de telles pressions (gouvernance par les parties prenantes ou par la seule transparence), tantôt de la réflexion interne (gouvernance réflexive). Bien que ces deux ressorts de la régulation par l’information soient théoriquement compatibles, leur articulation pratique pose des problèmes. Ainsi, une réglementation minutieuse du mode de fabrication des informations pourrait à la fois favoriser la comparabilité des données dont se nourrissent les pressions externes, et alimenter une mise en conformité de pure forme, au détriment d’une réelle réflexion sur la stratégie de l’entreprise et son modèle d’affaire. Si les entreprises conservent une réelle marge de manœuvre dans la fabrique de l’information sur la durabilité, c’est ainsi afin d’éviter de sacrifier la gouvernance réflexive sur l’autel de la gouvernance par les parties prenantes. L’espoir placé dans une telle régulation par l’information pourra sembler, à certains, comme un vœu pieu. Plutôt que de supplier les grandes entreprises multinationales de réinterroger leurs pratiques et leurs modèles d’affaire, pourquoi ne pas les contraindre à le faire ? La régulation par l’information n’est assurément pas une panacée, mais elle est peut-être l’une des rares options effectivement disponibles aujourd’hui pour rendre les pratiques des grandes entreprises plus compatibles avec les objectifs écologiques collectifs (à côté des subventions publiques et de la commande publique). Dans cette perspective, et compte tenu des débats persistants sur ce en quoi consiste une production durable, l’écueil fondamental de la Directive n’est peut-être pas d’avoir conservé l’orientation réflexive des textes qui l’avaient précédée, mais de l’avoir insuffisamment « outillée ». En effet, le texte ne garantit pas que les dirigeants des grandes entreprises réfléchissent vraiment au modèle d’affaire des entreprises qu’ils dirigent, et à sa compatibilité avec les limites des écosystèmes. Cet article propose plusieurs pistes afin d’y remédier et, ce faisant, d’amplifier la réflexivité environnementale des grands groupes.

مسؤولية الشركات التجارية في الجانب الجنائي هي مفهوم قانوني يحدد امكانية مساءلة الشركات او المؤسسات التجارية جنائيا عن الجرائم التي ترتكب في اطار أنشطتها. تاريخيا كان يتم ملاحقة ومساءلة الأفراد جنائيا فقط عن افعالهم الاجرامية ومع طفرة قانون الأعمال وتزايد الوعي بضرورة مساءلة الشركات اصبحت مسؤولية الشركات التجارية جزائيا واقعا في العديد من البلدان. Corporate criminal liability is a legal concept that determines the possibility of holding corporations or commercial entities criminally accountable for crimes committed within the scope of their activities. Historically, only individuals were pursued and held criminally responsible for their criminal actions. However, with the evolution of business law and increased awareness of the need to hold corporations accountable, corporate criminal liability has become a reality in many countries Corporate criminal liability is based on the principle that a corporation can be considered an independent entity separate from its directors, employees, and shareholders. Therefore, if a criminal offense is committed within the company's operations, it can be prosecuted and tried independently of the individuals associated with it. The specific criminal offenses for which corporations can be held accountable vary according to national legislation, but they typically include acts such as fraud, bribery, money laundering, tax evasion, environmental violations, human rights abuses, forgery, unfair competition, and others. When a corporation is criminally prosecuted, it can face severe penalties, including hefty fines, asset seizure, dissolution of the

تحتل حماية الغير المتعامل مع الشركات التجارية مكانة مهمة في القانون التجاري حيث كرس لها المشرع العديد من الأحكام والمبادئ القانونية التي تساهم في إستقرار المعاملات التجارية للشركات التجارية من جهة، والتي تدعم الثقة في معاملات الشركة مع محيطها الخارجي من جهة أخرى، وذلك نظرا للدور الذي يؤديه الغير في تطوير و إزدهار الشركة وتشجيع المتعاملين للإستثمار في هذا القطاع الاقتصادي المهم. قام المشرع بخطوات مهمة جعل من خلالها الغير يتدخل في حياة الشركة ونشاطها وذلك تخفيفا لآثار إعتبار هذا الغير عضوا خارجيا لا علم له بما يجري داخل الشركة التجارية، لكن تبني المشرع لأنظمة قانونية من أجل الغير لا يعني بلوغ النصوص القانونية هدفها الذي قررت من أجله . The protection of third parties dealing with commercial companies occupies an important place in the commercial law, as the legislator devoted many legal provisions and principles to it that contribute to the stability of commercial transactions of commercial companies on the one hand, and that support confidence in the company’s transactions with its external environment on the other hand, due to the role it plays Others contribute to the development and prosperity of the company and encourage customers to invest in this important economic sector. The legislator took important steps through which he made third parties interfere in the life and activity of the company in order to mitigate the effects of considering this third party as an external member who has no knowledge of what is going on inside the commercial company, but the legislator’s adoption of legal systems for the sake of third parties does not mean that the legal texts have reached their goal for which they were decided

Groups of companies are a complex corporate structure, whose regulation can be problematic, especially when it comes to liability. Indeed, liability within corporate groups draws forth a series of issues principally due to the principles of separate corporate personality and limited liability. In the context of limited liability, which is based on the notion of separate legal personality, the main issue waxes the protection of the creditors, in particular the creditors of the subsidiaries. One can find three regulatory templates for handling corporate groups and their liability: policing via general company and/or civil law (such as the English model); policing via special group legislation (such as the German model); and policing via branches of law such as insolvency law, antitrust law, and contract law, among others (which is the case in numerous jurisdictions, either coupled with the first or the second model). Lifting the corporate veil has come as an answer to corporate separateness, by permitting to ignore the shareholders’ limited liability and hold them personally liable for the debts of their companies in specific circumstances. However, one can hardly find cases in which the corporate veil has been successfully lifted, due to many factors. Other important questions that are posed in the scope of corporate groups liability are the parent company’s liability for the payment of its daughter companies’ debts when insolvency strikes and other respects, besides the matter of group liability. Furthermore, liability is as well a key player in terms of tort law, and corporate social responsibility has therefore found a place in the sun in the present climate.

This thesis investigates the relationship between cross-country mandatory environmental, social and governance (ESG) regulations and firm-level outcomes, such as ESG performance, corporate finance, and investment, for both developing and developed countries. ESG performance is initially examined to determine whether mandatory ESG regulations affect it and to what extent. Second, the study investigates the impact of mandatory ESG on corporate finance and investment. Lastly, the study explores whether mandatory ESG regulations affect firm-level outcomes based on countries' governance and economic systems, and industries. The study uses a large sample of 69,010 firm-years across 73 countries, over the period 2005 – 2020 to address the foregoing issues. In addressing the impact of mandatory ESG regulations on ESG performance, the study employs a difference-in-differences (DiD) design. The DiD technique can isolate the effect of regulatory shocks to firm-level outcomes. According to the DiD analysis conducted, cross-country mandatory ESG improves firm-level ESG performance in developed countries, but not in developing countries. The study also concludes that mandatory ESG regulations have a positive impact only on ESG components in developed countries and have a more dominant impact on environmental (E) component. The findings are robust to a range of checks and test cases, including a triple DiD design set-up and propensity score-matched sample. The study employs an investment Euler equation framework and generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators to explore how mandatory ESG impacts corporate finance and investment. Euler frameworks account for the dynamic nature of investment, whereas GMMs account for endogenous dynamics in dynamic models. The study demonstrates that mandatory ESG increases corporate investment by increasing firms' access to external funds. The findings are robust to a battery of tests, including a triple DiD design set-up, propensity score-matched sample and the parallel trends assumption. Using an investment Euler equation framework and the GMM estimators, the study explores whether the impact of mandatory ESG on corporate finance and investment is dependent on a country's governance and economic system. When mandatory ESG is affected by country factors such as governance systems and economic well-being, the effect of mandatory ESG on investment via internal finance channel persists, according to the study. However, while consistent results are found in developed countries, inconsistent results are found in developing countries. According to the study, oil, gas, and mining firms are likely to respond effectively to mandatory ESG regulations because of increased scrutiny and pressure. Overall, the findings from the study imply that cross-country mandatory ESG has had a positive impact on corporate ESG performance, finance, and investment. For firms located in developed countries, these findings hold consistently, while for those located in developing countries, the opposite holds true. Also, the study reveals that firms in the oil, gas, and mining industries effectively respond to regulatory requirements. As a result, this study provides policy makers and accountants with an understanding of how mandatory ESG impacts firm ESG activities and performance, which is crucial for regulatory reforms.

Recent scandals have brought rankings to the forefront of the legal profession. Several of the most prestigious academic institutions have withdrawn from being ranked, citing the problematic nature of the rankings. However, rankings persist for both legal academics and practice, and there is substantial sentiment to improve the methodologies, with little detail as to how to improve. In this paper, we rank law firms on their clients’ IPO performance. We focus on the most relevant outcomes: litigation, first-day returns, disclosure, and legal fees. The focus on these measures provides benefits relative to other methodologies, which typically focus on inputs or size-related characteristics. Namely, this ranking is less manipulable and more accurately captures performance metrics that matter most to clients’ shareholders. Our rankings control for observable and unobservable deal characteristics, which helps ensure we capture law firm quality, not client traits. With the rankings based on legal fees, potential clients can compare the benefits of a particular law firm (e.g., lower litigation or higher selling prices) against the additional cost of hiring a higher-quality law firm. Hence, our rankings allow for a value-for-the-money comparison of law firms for clients selling shares in an IPO.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have recently gained prominence in global markets and feature among the world’s most influential enterprises. The aim of this research project is to analyse the international norms in force regulating whether SOEs are considered state or non- state actors, and their conduct state or non-state conduct, the interpretation and application of these norms by adjudicators in different international regimes, and to provide alternative prisms through which these rules and decisions can be assessed and re-thought by political actors. I show that, in relation to SOEs, the concepts ‘state and ‘act of state’ have been ascribed diverse meanings by adjudicators and other international actors, who have employed legal standards with divergent wording and thresholds when dealing with similar questions. I argue that the fragmented meaning of these terms should be understood, in part, as a result of the inherent malleability of these terms and the different expert vocabularies employed across regimes. It is exhibited that adjudicators in the international trade and investment regimes are more inclined towards piercing the corporate veil of SOEs, potentially evidencing the existence of biases against SOEs, which are perceived as inherently economically inefficient and politically motivated actors in an indiscriminatory manner. In the last chapter, I introduce alternative lines of thought regarding the regulation of SOEs in international law. I suggest that, instead of engaging in theoretical discussions on the proper delineation between the public and the private sector, it is more useful to focus on the distributional impact of international rules on various actors, especially on developing and emerging economies where the presence of SOEs is very high. Such alternative prisms of analysis open paths for future research and practice, with the goal of designing an international economic order that incentivises institutional experimentation in the pursuit of economic development and distributional equity.

La protection juridique des associés minoritaires se justifie en droit des sociétés et en droit OHADA par l’absence directe de la gestion des sociétés commerciales par ces derniers. De ce fait, les deux ordres juridiques mettent en œuvre plusieurs mécanismes afin de protéger les intérêts des minoritaires. Ces mécanismes sont de plusieurs natures à savoir des règles juridiques favorisant un traitement égalitaire de tous les associés ou des droits exclusifs aux associés minoritaires favorisant un équilibre de pouvoirs dans la gestion de la société mais également la coexistence d’acteurs capables de réguler le bon fonctionnement de la société, notamment le juge, les associations de défenses d’intérêts des associés minoritaires.Dans les sociétés où les enjeux économiques sont très importants comme les sociétés faisant appel public à l’épargne, les législateurs français et OHADA, soucieux de protéger les associés minoritaires, ajoutent au droit commun, l’intervention du droit des marchés financiers qui vient renforcer la protection des minoritaires, notamment dans l’exercice de leur droit de cession. Ainsi, l’on remarque que le droit des sociétés français et le droit OHADA utilisent quasiment les mêmes fondements juridiques pour protéger les associés minoritaires. Il existe plus de similitudes que des différences dans les deux ordres juridiques puis que le législateurs OHADA a entrepris une réforme en 2014 afin de renforcer considérablement les compétences des associés minoritaires dans la gestion de la société. Cette réforme du droit OHADA s’est quasiment rapprochée du droit de société.Toutefois, malgré les efforts du droit des sociétés français et du droit OHADA de protéger les intérêts des associés minoritaires, subsiste une précarité du statut des minoritaires. La loi de la majorité fait obstacle à ce que l’on puisse objectiver que la protection apportée aux associés minoritaires est absolument efficace. Pour en arriver à une protection efficace certains droits devraient être généralisés pour contrôler sereinement la gestion sociale et leurs intérêts. The legal protection of minority shareholders is justified in company law and in OHADA law by the direct absence of management of commercial companies by the latter. As a result, both legal systems implement several mechanisms to protect the interests of minority shareholders. These mechanisms are of several kinds, i.e. legal rules favouring equal treatment of all partners or exclusive rights for minority partners favouring a balance of power in the management of the company, but also the coexistence of actors capable of regulating the proper functioning of the company, in particular the judge, and associations defending the interests of minority partners.In companies where the economic stakes are very high, such as companies making public offerings, the French and OHADA legislators, anxious to protect minority shareholders, add to common law the intervention of financial market law, which reinforces the protection of minority shareholders, particularly in the exercise of their right to sell. Thus, it can be seen that French company law and OHADA law use almost the same legal basis to protect minority shareholders. There are more similarities than differences in the two legal orders since the OHADA legislators undertook a reform in 2014 in order to considerably strengthen the powers of minority shareholders in the management of the company. This reform of OHADA law has almost come close to company law.However, despite the efforts of French company law and OHADA law to protect the interests of minority shareholders, the status of minority shareholders remains precarious. The law of the majority prevents the protection of minority shareholders from being absolutely effective. To achieve effective protection, certain rights should be generalised in order to control the management of the company and their interests.

Şirketler hukukunda azlık pay sahiplerini bilgilendirmeye ilişkin sorunlar önem kazanmakta ve bu konuda Türk hukukunda da Ohada üye ülkeler hukukunda da önemli yeni düzenlemeler yapıldığı görülmektedir. Türk hukuku açısından 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu (TTK) ve Ohada hukuku açısından da 2014 yılında yenilenmiş olan Acte Uniforme Relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement D'İntérêt Economique (AUSCGİE) ile getirilen önemli yeniliklerden biri anonim şirketlerde özel denetim isteme hakkıdır. Bu çalışmada önce TTK’da sonra AUSCGİE’de denetim isteme hakkı incelenmiştir. Sonrasında iki kanunun karşılaştırması yapılmış ve çalışmaya sonuç kısmıyla son verilmiştir. Buradan hareketle, TTK’da denetim isteme hakkını incelenirken önce bu hakkın talebinde kimler bulanacak incelemiştir. Hak sahipleri kişilerin inceledikten sonra talep için gereken şartları bakılmıştır. Şartlar da ikiye ayrılmıştır, genel kurulun talebi reddi üzerine mahkemeye başvurmak için gerekli şartlar ve genel kurulda özel denetim talebinin kabul edebilmesi için gereken şartlardır. TTK kısmında son olarak denetçinin mahkeme tarafından atanmasını açıklığa kavuşmuştur. AUSGİE’de mahkemeden özel denetim talebinde bulanabilecek kişiler ve aranan şartlar öngörülmektedir. Bu esastan AUSCGİE’ de kimler bu haktan yaranabilecek bakıp sonra mahkemeye başvurmak için gereken şartlara eğilmiştir. Sonrasından mahkeme denetçinin nasıl atacağını açıklanmıştır. Son olarak, iki kanunların getirdikleri yeni hakkın karşılaştırması kısmında ise, özel denetimin karşılaştırması farklı açılardan ele alınmıştır. İlk sırada hak sahibi kişilerin açısından bir karşılaştırma, ardından şartların, denetçin atanması ve denetim amaçın açısından karşılaştırma yapılmıştır.

Le thème portant sur le statut juridique de la petite entreprise en droit OHADA est d’un grand intérêt pour les pays membres de l’espace OHADA confrontés aux défis du développement économique. L’apport significatif des petites entreprises aux économies nationales a conduit le législateur sous la pression des partenaires au développement à formaliser ces activités du secteur informel (occupant environ 70% de la population active et contribuant à hauteur de 60% au PIB) pour garantir aux investisseurs locaux la sécurité juridique et judiciaire. Pour ce faire, il a entrepris de réformer son droit des affaires en révisant les Actes uniformes pour intégrer la dimension de la petite entreprise (portant droit commercial général du 15 décembre 2010, droit des sociétés coopératives du 15 décembre 2010, droit des sociétés commerciales et groupement d’intérêt économique du 30 janvier 2014, droit comptable et information financière du 26 janvier 2017 et organisation des procédures collectives d’apurement du passif du 10 septembre 2015). Par ces réformes, il a institué le statut juridique des petites entreprises, en établissant des règles allégées qui régissent la constitution et le fonctionnement des entreprises " in boni ". Pour ce qui est de l’allégement de leurs régimes fiscal et social, il renvoie aux lois supplétives nationales visant à atténuer les contraintes qui pèsent sur elles. Ce souci constant d’allégement se retrouve également en matière de traitement des difficultés des petites entreprises, lorsqu’il apporte des innovations aux règles de fond et de procédures pour satisfaire les créanciers et sauver les petites entreprises du naufrage économique et les pérenniser voire les rentabiliser.

Phoenix activity involves conduct whereby a failing company (the old company) is replaced by a second company (the new company) in the operation of the same or a similar business and that involves the same or similar company controllers. Transactions of this nature can be legal and even be beneficial to society, since entrepreneurs who pursue a viable business may, if the new company succeeds, benefit the economy and many other stakeholders. These transactions are referred to as legal phoenix activity. Problems arise however when phoenix activity is engaged in with the goal of evading the debt of the old company, known as illegal phoenix activity. In other cases, even well-intentioned company controllers can cause significant harm by resurrecting a fundamentally flawed business. This conduct, although not illegal, is unduly prejudicial to stakeholders and is known as problematic phoenix activity. While this thesis focuses on illegal phoenix activity, several measures identified should also curb problematic phoenix activity. This study identifies the elements and common characteristics of illegal phoenix activity. It then analyses regulation pertaining to those elements and common characteristics with the aim of finding effective solutions to the problem. This includes evaluating measures that reverse prejudicial transactions that occur during illegal phoenix activity as well as holding complicit parties, such as company controllers and the new company, accountable for their actions. Regulation aimed at preventing and investigating illegal phoenix activity is also considered. This thesis uses the comparative legal approach to analyse regulatory responses to illegal phoenix activity. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are examined. Several reported cases in South Africa involving what appear to be illegal phoenix activity are explored, along with the existing measures that are applicable to illegal phoenix activity in South Africa. A single anti-phoenix provision is undesirable as it has the potential to unjustifiably infringe on legal phoenix activity. This thesis proposes a multi-pronged approach, which involves a combination of better enforcement of existing laws and the introduction of smaller targeted amendments to legislation aimed at reducing the incidence illegal phoenix activity.

Anonim şirketler hukukunda alacaklılar, şirketlerin dış finansman kaynaklarının merkezini oluşturmakta ve bu nedenle de son derece önemli bir menfaat grubunu teşkil etmektedirler. Bu durum şirket alacaklılarının çıkarlarının etkin bir biçimde gözetilmesi ve korunmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Zira alacaklıların alacaklarına kavuşabilmeleri için müracaat edebilecekleri tek kaynak şirketin malvarlığıdır. Dolayısıyla anonim şirketin mali durumunun bozulması sonucu malvarlığının kayba uğraması veya uğrama tehlikesi altında olması, alacaklıların menfaatlerini zedeleyici niteliktedir. Bu durum mali durumu bozulan anonim şirketlerde, alacaklıların menfaatlerinin gözetilmesini ve özellikle de öncül (ex-ante) koruma imkânlarıyla bu risk gerçekleşmeden önce bu konuda tedbirler alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Kurumsal yönetim anlayışı, anonim şirketlerde menfaat grupları arasındaki çıkar çatışmalarının en iyi, en adil şekilde dengelenmesini hedeflemektedir. Bu itibarla bu tez çalışmasında söz konusu menfaat çatışmaları özelinde kurumsal yönetimin şeffaflık, adillik, hesap verilebilirlik ve sorumluluk ilkeleri çerçevesinde bir menfaat grubu olarak şirket alacaklılarının menfaatlerinin, mali durumu bozulan veya bozulma tehlikesi altında olan anonim şirketlerde nasıl gözetilmesi ve korunması gerektiği hususunda bir bakış açısı sunulması hedeflenmektedir. Bu bakış açısından hareketle sermaye kaybı yaşayan, borca batık hale gelen anonim şirketlerin mali durumlarının iyileştirilmesi maksadıyla sermayenin korunması esası benimsenerek öngörülen TTK m.376 hükmü ile bu hükmün uygulanmasına ilişkin Tebliğ kapsamında öngörülen düzenlemelerin, alacaklıların menfaatlerinin korunması bakımından etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca ilgili hükümlerin, şirketlerin mali yapılarının güçlendirilmesi bakımından yeterlilikleri ve yerindelikleri, karşılaştırmalı hukuk düzenlemeleri de göz önünde bulundurularak eleştirel bir bakış açıyla ayrıntılı şekilde incelenmektedir. Creditors are the key to external financing sources for companies under the statute of joint stock companies, and hence represent an important figure interest group. This situation needs the effective supervision and protection of the company's creditors' interests. This is because the company's assets are the only source to which creditors can turn to acquire receivables. Hence, the loss or threatened loss of the joint stock company's assets because of its worsening financial situation is detrimental to the creditors' interests. This circumstance necessitates that the interests of the creditors of companies with a worsening financial situation be considered and that steps be taken in this respect prior to the realization of this danger, particularly with ex-ante protection opportunities. The corporate governance method strives to achieve the most equitable resolution of conflicts of interest between interest groups in joint stock companies. This thesis aims to provide a perspective on how the interests of company creditors, as an interest group, should be observed and protected in joint stock companies whose financial situation deteriorates or is at risk of deterioration, within the framework of the principles of transparency, fairness, accountability, and responsibility of corporate governance. From this perspective, to improve the financial situation of companies that have capital loss and become over-indebted, the effects of the provisions of TCC art.376 and the Communiqué, which are envisioned based on the principle of capital maintenance, are discussed in terms of protecting the interests of creditors. In addition, the adequacy and suitability of the relevant rules in terms of strengthening the financial structures of corporations are analysed in depth from a critical standpoint, considering the norms of comparative law.

For a decade, pressure from stakeholders in the production of sustainable development reports has been unanimous within the scientific community. Moreover, driven by the maximization of added value, the shareholders' position remains pending. This is illustrated by the permanent confrontation between shareholder creation of value (dear to the Anglo-Saxon model) and partnership creation of value (advocated by the continental model). In this movement, the position of Africa has remained unknown within the literature. Thus, if accountability is inherent in the very principle of responsibility, then the problem raised by this article is that of evaluating the societal commitment of African shareholders through the study of the influence of the capital structure on the environmental communication practices of industrial companies in the OHADA area. To this end, a quantitative empirical study isconducted among a sample of 73 companies operating in the Cameroonian industrial sector. The results of ordinal logistic regression tests suggest that four variables of the model: institutional/ethical investors, family shareholding, capital extent and debt significantly influence environmental communication. All this influence is positive for institutional/ethical investors, and negative for family ownership and capital sprawl. As for the debt variable, the meaning of the relationship remains undetermined.

La réforme opérée en 2015 a affiné le droit des entreprises en difficulté en zone OHADA, notamment par l’apport de nouvelles précisions relatives au sort des tiers non intéressés ou non concernés par l’ouverture d’une procédure collective. Parmi ces tiers, on peut citer le conjoint in boni qui pourrait avoir tout intérêt à ce que ses biens ne soient pas engloutis par la procédure collective de son époux. Il est fréquent en Afrique que toute la famille s’implique dans le commerce du chef de famille. L’épouse, la plupart du temps et bien qu’elle ne soit pas officiellement inscrite au RCCM, participe énormément avec ou sans rémunération au développement de l’activité de son mari. Et on sait, par ailleurs que la plupart de ces femmes ignorent la notion de contrat de mariage ou même les implications du régime matrimonial pouvant régir leur relation (patrimonial notamment). Aussi n’est-il pas rare que l’épouse soit intéressée par la procédure collective de son mari en théorie et qu’elle subisse les conséquences de celle-ci. L’intérêt de cette étude paraît plus théorique que pratique. En effet, le législateur ayant consacré des dispositions spécifiques pour la sauvegarde des droits du conjoint, il serait intéressant d’aborder la question, éventuellement dans une approche comparative, afin de tenter de faire la lumière sur certains points. Et cela est d’autant plus nécessaire que les quelques articles prévus par l’acte Uniforme sont lacunaires. L’objet de la présente contribution est donc de porter un regard inquisiteur et critique sur les solutions légales préconisées par le législateur OHADA dans la sauvegarde des droits du conjoint in boni. Il s’agit plus particulièrement d’apprécier la portée des règles de protection prévues par le législateur à l’égard de l’épouse in bonis. A l’issue des analyses effectuées, notamment à travers le prisme de la comparaison, il nous a été donné de constater que le droit OHADA s’est bien enrichit lors de la réforme de 2015 mais que le législateur a tout de même omis de résoudre un certain nombre de difficultés. Et celles-ci, notamment la question de l’insaisissabilité de la résidence principale, pourrait bien induire une question prioritaire de constitutionalité eu égard au fait que le droit à la protection de la famille a été sacré par l’article 18 de la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples.

6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu (TTK) ile Türk Ticaret Hukuku'nda özellikle anonim şirketler hukukunda yapılan değişiklikler arasında imtiyazlı paylarla ilgili düzenlemeler de bulunmaktadır. Mülga 6762 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunundaki (eTK) hükümlere benzerlik gösteren yönleri olsa da imtiyazlı paylarla ilgili daha ayrıntılı, yenilikler getiren ve önceki Kanun döneminde karşılaşılan sorunları gidermeye çalışan düzenlemelerin yapıldığı görülmektedir. TTK'daki imtiyazlı paylarla ilgili düzenlemelerin eTK döneminde ortaya çıkan sorunları giderip gidermediğinin ya da yeni sorunlara, belirsizliklere ve tartışmalara yol açıp açmadığının tespit edilerek değerlendirilmesi amacı bu tezin yazılmasına sebep oluşturmaktadır. Birinci bölümde önce genel olarak pay kavramı, imtiyazlı payın tanınması koşulları, imtiyaz kavramının terminolojik yönü ve mevzuatımızda konuyla ilgili düzenlemelerle hukuk sistemimize esin kaynağı olan yabancı hukuk sistemlerindeki düzenlemeler incelenmiştir. Ardından, imtiyaz tanınan hakların, eşitlik ilkesi, müktesep hak ve vazgeçilmez hak ile olan ilişkilerine değinilmiş ve imtiyazlı pay kavramının nasıl tanımlanması gerektiği üzerinde durulmuştur. Tezin asıl omurgasını oluşturan ikinci bölümde, imtiyaza konu haklar, malvarlığı hakları ve yönetim hakları olarak iki asıl eksen üzerinde incelenmiştir. İkinci bölüm için en fazla tartışılmış bulunan konu, yönetim haklarında imtiyaza ilişkindir. Yönetim haklarında imtiyazı oluşturan iki alt başlık, oy hakkında imtiyaz ve yönetim kurulunda temsilde imtiyaz ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenmeye çalışılmış, imtiyazın kanundan kaynaklanan nedenlerle engellenmesinden bahsedilmiş ve diğer haklarda imtiyaza değinilmiştir. Tezin üçüncü bölümü imtiyazların korunması konusuna ayrılmıştır. Bu bölümde imtiyazlı pay sahipleri özel kurulunun (İPSÖK) yapısı, niteliği ve toplanması ile özel kurulun onayına bağlı kararlar halka açık olan ve olmayan şirketler dikkate alınarak açıklanmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ayrıca İPSÖK kararlarına karşı açılacak iptal davalarıyla ilgili değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır. It is observed that although there are some similarities with the previous one, the new Turkish Commercial Code, Law No: 6102, introduces more detailed and innovative arrangements which is intended to provide an answer to the problems experienced during the abrogated code was in force in relation to preference shares. It is easily can be said that, by and large, the topic "preference shares" is the one of the most radically altered topic in the new code. The main purpose of this thesis is to shed light whether these innovative arrangements in the new code actually solving the problems that is intended to solve or, rather opposite, causing new problems and ambiguities. For this purpose, the first section of this thesis is allocated to analyse the concept of "share" in general and under which conditions the preference shares are granted first and then the meaning of the concept of "preference" is investigated. It is followed by subsections devised to identify the current domestic law, and comprative law that inspried the law makers in this area. In the following subsections it is attempted to explain where preference shares stand with respect to principle of equality, vested interests and inalienable rights, and how the concept of preference shares should be defined. In the second section, which constitutes the backbone of this thesis, the rights that are being subject of the preference shares are examined on the axis of the assest rights and the administrative rights. The topic of the administrative rights attached to preference shares is the most debated topic in this section. In this context under the head of the administrative rights, the issues related to priveleges in votes and the representation on the executive board are examined seperately in two separate subsections. Also in this subsection the issues of statutory basis of the prevention of preferences and the preferences in relation to other rights are grappled. The third section of the thesis is completely devised to the issues related to the protection of the preference shares. In this section the structure, qualifications, gathering of the board of preference shares owners and the decisions subject to approval of this board are explained in the context of private and public companies. In this section the suits that could be brought for the annulment of this board decision is evaluated briefly.

Este artigo objetiva lançar luz sobre a reprodução irrefletida nos clausulados de apólices de seguro de responsabilidade civil de administradores, o chamado seguro D&O, de dispositivo em que se exclui de cobertura atos cometidos pelos segurados com culpa grave. Para tanto, se esmiuça o tratamento da responsabilização civil de administradores e os deveres dos administradores de sociedades anônimas no ordenamento jurídico nacional, dedicando-se especialmente aos deveres de diligência, de lealdade, de evitar conflito de interesses e de informar. Passa-se ao exame do seguro D&O como mecanismo apto à alocação e gerenciamento de parte dos riscos das atividades do administrador e, apenas então, adentrar-se no estudo da culpa grave nos atos de gestão. Após um breve giro histórico sobre a gradação da culpa e a percepção do dolo e da culpa grave no âmbito do Direito Civil e Securitário brasileiros, reflete-se sobre a aplicação do conceito de culpa grave às apólices de seguro D&O.

Anonim şirketlerde yönetim veya temsil yetkisi kural olarak yönetim kurulu tarafından kullanılmakla birlikte, özellikle halka açık veya büyük ölçekli ortaklıklarda söz konusu yetkilerin tamamının yönetim kurulu tarafından bizzat yerine getirilmesi uygulamada sık rastlanan bir durum değildir. Bu nedenle kanunda, yönetim kuruluna, yönetim veya temsil yetkisinin 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu' nun 367/I ve 370/II hükümlerinde yer alan şartlara uygun olarak, mevcut yönetim kurulu üyelerinden bir veya birkaçına yahut üçüncü kişilere devretmek suretiyle, şirketin yönetim teşkilatını belirleme yetkisi tanınmıştır. Şirket yönetimi konusunda uzmanlaşmış ve yeterli mesleki tecrübeye sahip olan kişilere yetkilerin devredilmesi, bir yandan şirkette profesyonelleşmeyi sağlamakta, diğer yandan kural olarak, devredilen yetkilerle birlikte bu kapsamda ortaya çıkabilecek hukuki sorumluluk da devredilmiş sayılacağından, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğunu sınırlandırmaktadır. Yönetim veya temsil yetkilerinin geçerli bir şekilde devredilmesi halinde, devredilen yetkilerle ilgili olarak yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğu; murahhasların seçiminde, onlara verilecek talimatlarda ve murahhasların üst gözetiminde göstermeleri gereken makul derecede özen yükümlülüğü ile sınırlı olarak devam eder. Çalışmamızda, geçerli ve geçersiz yetki devri hallerinde, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğunun ne şekilde ortaya çıkacağı meselesi, mehaz İsviçre hukukundaki görüş ve yargı kararlarına yer verilmek suretiyle, detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Although the management or representation authority in joint stock companies is used by the board of directors as a rule, it is not common in practice that all of the said authorities are personally exercised by the board of directors, especially in publicly held or large-scale partnerships. For this reason, in the law, the board of directors is authorized to determine the management organization of the company by delegating the management or representation authority to one or more of the existing board members or to third parties in accordance with the provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code numbered 6102, 367/I and 370/II has been recognized. Delegation of powers to people who are specialized in company management and have sufficient professional experience, on the one hand, ensures professionalization in the company, and on the other hand, as a rule, legal responsibility that may arise in this context together with the delegated powers will be deemed to have been transferred, thus limiting the legal liability of the members of the board of directors. In case of a valid transfer of management or representation powers, the legal responsibility of the members of the board of directors regarding the delegated powers; limited to the reasonable care obligation that they must show in the selection of the executive directors, in the instructions to be given to them and under the supervision of the executive directors. In our study, the issue of how the legal responsibility of the members of the board of directors will arise in cases of valid and invalid delegation of authority has been examined in detail by including the opinions and judicial decisions in the Swiss law.

La relation entre l’entrepreneur et l’investisseur est souvent abordée sous un cadre conflictuel basé sur l’asymétrie informationnelle et sur l’opportunisme potentiel des acteurs. Cependant, la pratique de financement par le capital-risque renferme des liens mitigés entre les capital-risqueurs et les entrepreneurs. Dans cette relation, les capital-risqueurs cherchent à orienter les projets financés vers des perspectives de réussite, tout en sécurisant leur fonds d’investissement par la négociation d’un ensemble de dispositions juridiques. De leur côté, les entrepreneurs s’efforcent de disposer d’une marge de manoeuvre, tout en gardant une certaine confidentialité. Notre question de recherche porte sur les différents mécanismes de gouvernance qui peuvent encadrer la relation entre les capital-risqueurs et les entrepreneurs. Notre cadre théorique échafaude une double grille de lecture théorique en analysant cette relation selon les approches juridico-financière et cognitive de la gouvernance. Nos résultats montrent que les capital-risqueurs n’ont pas uniquement des impacts financiers, mais également des incidences organisationnelles et cognitives qui peuvent gouverner l’organisation interne de la société bénéficiaire. Le mode de gouvernance employé peut être influencé en grande partie par les caractéristiques individuelles, organisationnelles, institutionnelles et économiques des capital-risqueurs. De leur côté, les dirigeants des entreprises financées par le capital-risque peuvent avoir un comportement qui dépasse l’angle traditionnel de l’opportunisme dans lequel ils dissimulent leurs intérêts personnels pour qu’il soit générateur de ressources cognitives et contributeur à la création de valeur.

La présente étude qui a porté sur l’annulation totale ou partielle de la rémunération d’un dirigeant social de société anonyme en droit OHADA s’articule autour de deux points. Le premier aborde les notions des administrateurs ou dirigeants sociaux des sociétés anonymes et leurs rémunérations, modalités de fixation et l’organe compétent (point I), tandis que le second porte sur les possibles violations et sanctions liées aux modalités de fixation de ces rémunérations (point II). Ainsi, il s’est révèle qu’il est possible d’annuler totalement ou partiellement la rémunération d’un dirigeant social, par le juge en droit de l’Ohada. Mais, cette nullité doit reposer sur la violation d’un texte, car l’Acte uniforme relatif au droit de sociétés commerciales et du groupement d’intérêt économique consacre en son article 244 le principe selon lequel, « pas de nullité sans texte ».