Bibliographie sélective OHADA

It has been over a decade since the Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced business rescue proceedings which provided for the rescue of financially distressed companies. This procedure replaced the then statutory procedure of judicial management under Companies Act 61 of 1973. The business rescue proceedings begin with the general moratorium or stay on legal proceedings against the company or its property. This has a consequence that any claims against the company may only be enforced with the consent of the business rescue practitioner or the leave of the court. However, the courts continue to grapple with the interpretation, effect, and application of the key elements of business rescue provisions while always striving to accord respect to the legislative intention of business rescue as set out in section 7(k) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. After a decade since its introduction, it is an opportune time to ascertain whether the business rescue proceedings is an effective corporate rescue procedure suitable to the modern-day demands of the South African economy. The research analyses the effect and the consequences of the moratorium on the rights of property owners. The moratorium has the effect that companies are given temporary immunity to actions brought by creditors which would have been due and enforceable. In this regard, the property leased by the property owner remains occupied by the company during business rescue proceedings as the property owner is barred by the moratorium to institute legal proceedings against the company. Further, when the repossession of the property is not possible and the rental due or installment is not payable by the company, the business rescue proceedings encroaches on the right of the property owners. The purpose of the research is to highlight the effect of the moratorium on the lease agreement between the company and property owners and the possible protection of the property owners’ rights. The study includes a critical analysis of judicial decisions on the moratorium, together with a discussion of the legal position in comparable foreign jurisdictions. In my conclusion, based on the findings, the business rescue is not free from imperfection. Therefore, I recommended that the legislature amend some parts of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.

The main rationale of prudential bank regulation and supervision of banks has traditionally been to ensure the safety and soundness of banks and protection of depositors. However, best practice standards in bank supervision acknowledge that it is impossible to completely prevent bank failures. Therefore, it is crucial to have regulatory measures in place to deal with banks that fail. Banks are core players in the financial system as the intermediaries between savers and users of capital. In addition, banks provide critical services to consumers, small and medium-sized businesses, large corporate entities and governments who rely on them to conduct their daily business, both at domestic and international level. Banks also fulfil a sui generis role that sets them apart from other financial institutions that are role players in the financial system because, inter alia, they hold “highly” liquid liabilities in the form of deposits that are repayable on demand; they extend long-term loans that may be difficult to sell or borrow against on short notice; they are the back-up source of liquidity to all other institutions (financial and non-financial); and, are also the transmission belt for monetary policy. Unlike other players in the financial system, banks are vulnerable to loss of public confidence and to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk being the risk that a bank will not have sufficient cash to meet short term obligations and the fact that a "run on the bank" by depositors can result in devastating liquidity drainage. Because banks play a special role in the economy and their failure may have a significant impact on financial stability, they need a special approach when they become insolvent or are likely to become insolvent. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) demonstrated the importance of special resolution regimes for banks; and the need to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and depositors, while promoting financial stability objectives. Given the critical role of banks in the economy the need is clear for a special resolution regime for banks that provides a legal framework for regulators that avails to them a suite of resolution tools which they can apply to resolve the bank in an orderly manner; to rescue those parts of the bank that may still be viable and to liquidate those parts that are not whilst avoiding a drain on public funds. In order to deal with bank failures in Zimbabwe, the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20] has provided for the mechanism of curatorship since 2000, as a rescue measure aimed at restoring failing banks to economic viability. Curatorship has over the years been applied with mixed success; consequently, Zimbabwe has undertaken a number of reforms which include the enactment of the Troubled Financial Institutions (Resolution) Act in 2005; and the introduction of the problem bank regime via the Banking Amendment Act of 2015. Throughout these reforms, Zimbabwe has elected to retain curatorship, which was once a standalone process in banking legislation to enable bank rescue; and assimilated it into a broader bank resolution framework. This study seeks to determine whether Zimbabwe’s resolution regime requires to be strengthened and if so, to recommend reforms that will align the resolution regime in Zimbabwe with international best practice. For such purpose it will draw upon the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regime as international best practice benchmark. It will further also consider guidance yielded by a comparative study of the resolution regimes in the United Kingdom and South Africa.

No abstract provided.

Although extreme poverty has decreased in the last decades, we are a long way from eradicating global poverty. Similarly, the world has seen a considerable decrease in global inequality due to recent developments in emerging economies, but overall inequality between nations has risen in the last decades. International tax law may have a relevant role in improving or worsening global inequality. Extensive research has shown that the present international tax system was designed in a way that tends to benefit high-income economies. However, there has been no significant discussion about whether and how international tax law rules should be changed to address global inequality. The main goal of this thesis is to analyze the existing legitimacy and distributive justice issues that limit the ability of lower-income countries to raise tax revenues and consider what can be done to make the current international tax regime more aligned with global justice principles.The thesis builds on the contemporary literature in international political economy and global distributive justice and puts forth a normative framework for allocating the international tax base among states. First, it analyzes some of the legitimacy deficits of the present international tax system. In contrast to prevailing views about improving legitimacy, it demonstrates the shortcomings of focusing solely on making international tax policymaking processes more inclusive and argues for a greater focus on global distributive justice. It then analyzes the main tax theories that have defined international tax relations to date and demonstrates some of their limitations. The final part of the thesis puts forth normative principles that integrate distributive justice and considers the practical implications of the proposed normative framework for some of the most recent issues discussed in international tax policy

The OPA. Notions of takeover bids. Recognising and distinguishing the various forms of control within a company. Type of takeover bid. Subsequent defence techniques. The US control market and details of M&A and tender offers. Bids and acquisitions in China. Comparative European case studies. Shaldeholders' agreements. Regulatory sources and definition of covenants. Concerted action. Takeover obligations arising from concerted action. Cases. The Fondiaria-Sai case. Unipol-BNL. Other case of exemption.

OHADA bölgesindeki yabancı yatırımların yasal korunması bahassederken yasal mekanizmaların varlığı fikrine atıfta bulunur. Yabancı yatırımlarının korunmasının sağlanması Bu Örgüte üye olmayan ülkelerin vatandaşları. Mukayese arama sürecinde Türk hukuku ile anlayışlı olmalıdır. Bu yatırımlar için optimal yasal güvenlik modeli olmalidir çünkü OHADA yasa nispeten yeni ve yapım aşamasındadır. Talking about the legal protection of foreign investments in the OHADA zone inevitably refers to the idea of the existence of legal mechanisms capable of ensuring the protection of investments of economic operators who are nationals of non-member countries of this Organization. The comparison with Turkish law must to be understanding in the process of seeking the model of optimal legal security for these investments, because the OHADA law remains relatively new and under construction.

In recent years, investment arbitration tribunals are increasingly confronted with allegations of corruption, mostly invoked by host States as a defense to investors’ claims. After an affirmative finding of an alleged corrupt act between the investor and a public official of the host State in the establishment or conduct of the investment, tribunals have adopted a binary approach to the issue – if they uphold allegations of corruption, they completely dismiss the investor’s submissions. This binary approach has resulted in an asymmetry of liability for the two parties to a corrupt act (i.e., investors and host States/host State officials), failing to take into account the inherent bilateralism of corruption and the fact that domestic laws and international norms have outlawed both the act of offering and of accepting bribes. In particular, public officials’ free participation in a corrupt act to advance investments is attributable to the host State and requires State responsibility under international law. Moreover, the increasingly prevalent practice of inserting anti-corruption provisions in investment treaties has reinforced this lop-sided feature, as well as offering only weak effectiveness in terms of deterring corruption. After a careful examination of the treatment of corruption issues in investment arbitration and investment treaties, this thesis proposes a paradigm shift from the current asymmetric approach to a more balanced approach. It calls on investment tribunals to take a dual-track approach that investigates both corruption and investors’ claims, and ensures that each party assumes responsibility for its own misconduct. It also proposes that treaty drafters include anti-corruption provisions that impose strong obligations of anti-corruption on both sides of corruption (i.e., investors and host States) rather than merely on a single party to it