Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Anonim şirketlerde yönetim veya temsil yetkisi kural olarak yönetim kurulu tarafından kullanılmakla birlikte, özellikle halka açık veya büyük ölçekli ortaklıklarda söz konusu yetkilerin tamamının yönetim kurulu tarafından bizzat yerine getirilmesi uygulamada sık rastlanan bir durum değildir. Bu nedenle kanunda, yönetim kuruluna, yönetim veya temsil yetkisinin 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu' nun 367/I ve 370/II hükümlerinde yer alan şartlara uygun olarak, mevcut yönetim kurulu üyelerinden bir veya birkaçına yahut üçüncü kişilere devretmek suretiyle, şirketin yönetim teşkilatını belirleme yetkisi tanınmıştır. Şirket yönetimi konusunda uzmanlaşmış ve yeterli mesleki tecrübeye sahip olan kişilere yetkilerin devredilmesi, bir yandan şirkette profesyonelleşmeyi sağlamakta, diğer yandan kural olarak, devredilen yetkilerle birlikte bu kapsamda ortaya çıkabilecek hukuki sorumluluk da devredilmiş sayılacağından, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğunu sınırlandırmaktadır. Yönetim veya temsil yetkilerinin geçerli bir şekilde devredilmesi halinde, devredilen yetkilerle ilgili olarak yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğu; murahhasların seçiminde, onlara verilecek talimatlarda ve murahhasların üst gözetiminde göstermeleri gereken makul derecede özen yükümlülüğü ile sınırlı olarak devam eder. Çalışmamızda, geçerli ve geçersiz yetki devri hallerinde, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hukuki sorumluluğunun ne şekilde ortaya çıkacağı meselesi, mehaz İsviçre hukukundaki görüş ve yargı kararlarına yer verilmek suretiyle, detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Although the management or representation authority in joint stock companies is used by the board of directors as a rule, it is not common in practice that all of the said authorities are personally exercised by the board of directors, especially in publicly held or large-scale partnerships. For this reason, in the law, the board of directors is authorized to determine the management organization of the company by delegating the management or representation authority to one or more of the existing board members or to third parties in accordance with the provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code numbered 6102, 367/I and 370/II has been recognized. Delegation of powers to people who are specialized in company management and have sufficient professional experience, on the one hand, ensures professionalization in the company, and on the other hand, as a rule, legal responsibility that may arise in this context together with the delegated powers will be deemed to have been transferred, thus limiting the legal liability of the members of the board of directors. In case of a valid transfer of management or representation powers, the legal responsibility of the members of the board of directors regarding the delegated powers; limited to the reasonable care obligation that they must show in the selection of the executive directors, in the instructions to be given to them and under the supervision of the executive directors. In our study, the issue of how the legal responsibility of the members of the board of directors will arise in cases of valid and invalid delegation of authority has been examined in detail by including the opinions and judicial decisions in the Swiss law.

This research study seeks to understand interested parties’ perspectives on Cameroon's existing land tenure systems, the 1974 land law, and ongoing efforts to reform this land law. It identifies both concerns and specific recommendations from these parties on the formulation and implementation of future reforms. In the decades following the achievement of independence from European colonizers, most governments in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have adopted new national land tenure policies to meet their countries’ needs and aspirations. In some parts of SSA, however, this process of land tenure formalization has negatively impacted the land rights of people observing customary land tenure. This has been a result of government interventions such as compulsory land acquisitions, which while technically legal, are ethically questionable. In the face of this challenge, efforts to reform post-colonial land laws have become a matter of urgency. A national land reform process for Cameroon, announced in 2011 has adopted a multistakeholder approach. My study seeks to understand interested parties’ perspectives on Cameroon’s existing land tenure systems, the 1974 land law, and ongoing efforts to reform the land law. This study applied a case study methodological approach and a convergent mixed-method design. Evidence from this study shows that interested parties in Cameroon are in agreement on 1) the reform of the 1974 land law, 2) the recognition of customary land tenure, 3) the continued use of multistakeholder participation in land law reform, and 4) the promulgation of the new land law through mass sensitization and information dissemination.

It is nowadays generally accepted that international commercial arbitration is the most popular method of resolving international disputes between commercial parties. This popularity is the cumulative result of many advantages that international commercial arbitration offers to the parties. It is suggested in the literature that one of these advantages is the freedom of parties and the resulting procedural flexibility. In virtue of this principle, the parties have the opportunity to establish a specific method of adjudication adapted to the nature of their dispute. This opportunity is provided by the fact that the arbitration regulations do not include detailed rules on the collection of evidence, thus leaving the parties and the arbitrators' range of motion. Therefore, we consider that this procedural flexibility has emerged as a possibility obtained at the expense of certainty in international commercial arbitration proceedings. This uncertainty is to such an extent that it also warrants the question as to whether there is an applicable law to take evidence in international commercial arbitration proceedings. Such procedural flexibility afforded to the parties, however, comes at a price of uncertainty with respect to arbitral procedure. International commercial arbitration developed as a reaction to the failings of proceedings in domestic courts, which were subject to detailed rules of evidence. Thus, the consensus in the arbitration community is that party freedom and the procedural flexibility that comes with it are fundamental attributes of arbitration. Although this presumption is theoretically correct; in other words, the parties are indeed able to craft such a procedure that would perfectly fit for adjudication of their disputes, mostly it does not reflect the practical reality. In practice, when parties are negotiating the terms of an agreement to govern their business relationship, they generally tend to avoid discussions as to what will happen if things go wrong. As a matter of fact, according to our practice experiences, when one of the parties' legal counsel tries to address such hypothetical scenarios, the parties generally prefer to suppress such "negative thoughts" and refuse to make in-depth discussions as to how a possible dispute is to be handled. Hereby, this leaves open the question of the procedure to be followed in arbitration proceedings in case of potential disputes. As a result, the provisions on how to resolve disputes that may arise between the parties, in other words, the "dispute resolution" provisions, are left to the very end of the negotiations and passed over in a few sentences. When the relationship between the parties becomes truly strained and a dispute comes to an unavoidable stage, it becomes even less likely that the parties will agree on how to gather evidence on the dispute in question. In a such situation, any suggestions made by one party regarding the procedure for the taking of evidence will be viewed with suspicion by the other party. In an environment of suspicion and animosity, it is often unrealistic to expect productive negotiations to take place on procedural matters. As a result, although the parties have a wide range of motions to make agreements regarding the method of collecting evidence in arbitration proceedings, they are often unable to exercise this authority in practice. As the parties are not exercising their rule-making powers, this important task, which is decisive for the resolution of the dispute, shifts to the arbitrators. Therefore, in our opinion, it would not be a wrong assessment to say that the freedom of the parties has turned into the freedom of the arbitrator in practice. Once appointed, arbitrators have to decide on many issues with respect to the taking of evidence as rules applicable to arbitration are generally silent as to these matters. Although arbitrators have the opportunity to be guided by some non-binding rules, such as the IBA Rules and the Prague Rules, which are considered to be effective and instructive in the arbitration community, they are ultimately left to make their assessments and reach an award based on their judgment. The above-mentioned non-binding rules can undoubtedly assist arbitral tribunals to a certain extent with regard to the taking of evidence. However, it is not possible to say that these rules are enforceable guidelines that can be blindly followed by arbitral tribunals. A closer look at these rules reveals that they leave many issues to the discretion of the arbitral tribunals. Of course, any decision regarding the taking of evidence in international commercial arbitration is already within the discretion of the arbitral tribunals, even in the absence of these rules. Therefore, these provisions, which have been drafted to allow the arbitral tribunals to decide as they see fit, are no more than general guidance on how to exercise their discretion. For these reasons, even if the parties have agreed on the application of these non-binding rules, the fact remains that the collection and evaluation of evidence are still left to the discretion of the arbitral tribunals. This study takes an inductive approach by analyzing the normative and non-binding rules of law applicable to evidence in international commercial arbitration. Firstly, this study examines whether there is a body of rules that can be characterized as the law of evidence in international commercial arbitration. It is determined that there is a law of evidence in international commercial arbitration; however, its content is rather composed of general principles. After determining that these rules have normative value, it is examined how and to what extent these general principles are concretized in terms of the types of evidence used in international commercial arbitration. Although the degree of concretization of these principles varies according to the types of evidence, as a general characteristic, it is determined that arbitral tribunals are left with a very wide discretionary power. It is concluded that arbitral tribunals have a wide latitude of action with respect to the submission of documents, the presentation of witness testimony, the use of expert testimony, the use of discovery and the extent of the res judicata effect of a prior award. Subsequently, the rules on the admissibility and evaluation of evidence are analyzed and it is concluded that the arbitral tribunals have wide discretion in international commercial arbitration, as in other matters relating to evidence and even the discretion regarding the evaluation of evidence is relatively wider. Since it is difficult to review the discretionary power exercised in these matters, it is observed that the arbitral tribunals' decisions on evidentiary issues fall outside the scope of judicial review. This leads to a further blurring of the already grey evidentiary issues in international commercial arbitration proceedings. This is because it is not possible to determine the extent to which the arbitral tribunal has relied on evidence that ostensibly played a role during the proceedings. In the last instance, although the arbitrators' discretionary powers are limited by general principles such as due process and opportunity to be heard, the limits of such discretionary powers are, generally speaking, somewhat blurred as these are general principles. Another issue is that arbitral tribunals are often subject to pressure from the parties when making their decisions on the taking of evidence during the arbitral proceedings. The parties are more interested in being the winner of the concrete proceedings than in the proper conduct of the proceedings in accordance with the law, procedure and rules. In this sense, a party whose request for evidence is likely to be rejected will often argue that the arbitral tribunal's decision violates the principle of a fair trial, even if this is not the case. It is in these circumstances that arbitral tribunals must strike a balance between a fair trial and an efficient trial and make appropriate decisions on evidentiary issues. If arbitral tribunals emphasize procedural efficiency and defer to the parties' presentation of their claims and defences, this may not in itself constitute an obstacle to legally correct decisions. However, this would violate the fundamental procedural safeguards of the participants in the proceedings and may even lead to arbitration proceedings becoming a mechanism for arbitrary and haphazard decision-making. If the opposite approach is taken, in other words, if the priority is to uncover the material truth at all costs and the procedural economy is put on the back burner, this will result in costly and protracted proceedings that will far exceed the limits of reasonableness. Given the limited scope of the guidelines available to arbitrators on the collection and evaluation of evidence, striking this balance is not an easy task. Therefore, it is quite understandable that arbitral tribunals, when deciding on evidentiary issues, may prefer the safer route and give precedence to claims of breach of the principle of a fair trial, even at the expense of the efficiency of the proceedings. Additionally, the confidential nature of the international commercial arbitral proceedings also amplifies the problem. As a result of this principle, the available knowledge as to the practice of arbitration becomes limited to anecdotal stories as to what has happened in certain individual international commercial arbitration proceedings. The arbitrators do not have sufficient opportunity to know about how their colleagues have dealt with certain issues that may have similarities with the issues that they have been trying to solve. In conclusion, in light of the foregoing, since the arbitral tribunals are the rule-makers of arbitration proceedings, the extent to which arbitration proceedings will function correctly and efficiently depends on the experience of the arbitral tribunals and their knowledge of the law, procedure and rules. Basing a correct and efficient arbitration procedure solely on the initiative of experienced arbitrators reduces the 'certainty' of the arbitral procedure. In the face of this situation, it may be tempting to argue that it is inappropriate for arbitrators to have so much freedom and that the rules applicable to arbitral proceedings should be revised to be more detailed. Indeed, there are those who argue that such a change should take place. In the final analysis, a good system should be able to function well regardless of how qualified (or unqualified) its participants are. It is obvious that an argument that sees detailed procedural rules as a remedy for this would contradict the historical development of arbitration and therefore would not be accepted by the international arbitration community. Likewise, from the other side of the coin, it could be argued that detailed procedural rules that are not appropriate to the nature of the individual dispute would prevent qualified and experienced arbitral tribunals from formulating rules that are appropriate to the resolution of the dispute in question, and that the hands of arbitral tribunals may be tied in this way. Although it may be argued that these counter-arguments are equally justified, they do not negate the fact that certainty should be ensured in international commercial arbitration proceedings. Therefore, this suggests that it may be appropriate to resort to alternative methods to ensure certainty. Indeed, it would be a mistake to assume that the only way to achieve certainty is through a detailed set of rules, as we, as legal practitioners in the Continental European legal system, are accustomed to. In the countries subject to the Common Law system, many branches of law do not have such a detailed set of rules and therefore it is not possible to claim that these legal systems lack certainty. Especially in the common law, certainty is provided by case law. If the same logic were to be applied to international commercial arbitration proceedings, it would mean that making information on arbitration proceedings more accessible could help to achieve the goal of certainty. In recent years, there have been some initiatives recognizing the benefits of this approach. While arbitral tribunals are under no obligation to follow the decisions of other arbitral tribunals, having the opportunity to see that there is a consistent pattern of decisions on a particular issue would undoubtedly provide valuable guidance for arbitral tribunals. As the pool of information available to arbitral tribunals and the parties expands, it is obvious that the grey areas regarding evidence in international commercial arbitration will diminish over time. In this way, it will be possible to achieve greater certainty without undermining the fundamental values of the arbitral procedure. Reducing the uncertainty caused by procedural flexibility on procedural certainty in this way will contribute significantly to the development of international commercial arbitration.

Weltweit vereinheitlichte Musterverträge bestimmen die Vertragsgestaltung im grenzüberschreitenden Finanzverkehr. Diese Musterverträge werden von privaten Organisationen wie der International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), der Loan Market Association (LMA) und der International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) geschaffen. Torsten Kindt zeigt, dass auf Grundlage der Muster ein bereichsspezifisches transnationales Vertragsrecht entsteht, das jedoch auf vielfältige Weise mit dem staatlichen Recht verwoben bleibt. Er entwickelt Leitlinien für einen responsiven Umgang mit musterbasierten transnationalen Verträgen im staatlichen Kollisions-, Vertrags- und Internationalen Zivilverfahrensrecht, die auch über den Finanzbereich hinaus zu einem produktiven Zusammenwirken privater und staatlicher Ordnung beitragen können.

Qu’il soit de substance, issu des textes internationaux, le principe de précaution ne définit aucune règle d’incrimination précise en droit interne ; ce qui contraste avec le principe de légalité qui dispose qu’on ne peut être condamné pénalement qu’en vertu d’un texte pénal précis et clair. Ce qui rend, en principe, le principe de précaution inopérant sur le terrain de la responsabilité pénale. Cependant, le juge peut, dans une certaine mesure, insinuer le principe de précaution dans certaines incriminations afin d’accorder une meilleure protection aux victimes d’accidents, tel que celui de la médecine, suite à l’incertitude que contiennent les innovations de la science et de la technologie.

Quarante-six ans après la signature de l’Accord de Bangui portant création de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle sur les cendres de l’OAMPI, le droit de l’OAPI applicable dans l’ensemble des États membres, au nombre desquels on compte six pays d’Afrique centrale, a élargi son champ d’action pour intégrer progressivement la protection des savoirs traditionnels. Seulement, le domaine des savoirs traditionnels en général est très large et complexe (de façon lato sensu, il intègre les connaissances traditionnelles associées aux ressources génétiques, les expressions culturelles traditionnelles, le folklore). Malgré une prise de conscience et une volonté d’assurer une protection et une promotion de leurs savoirs traditionnels autochtones et de donner une place de choix à ces minorités, leur système classique de propriété intellectuelle composé aussi bien de la propriété industrielle que de la propriété littéraire et artistique reste incomplet, insuffisant, et parfois même inadéquat. Face à ces lacunes, même le recours à un système sui generis ne garantit pas une protection suffisante et efficace de ces savoirs traditionnels. Aujourd’hui, on s’accorde pour dire que cette protection est fragmentée et partielle, elle appelle à un concours de plusieurs instruments juridiques de portée internationale, régionale, sous-régionale et nationale dans les domaines de l’environnement, la culture et les droits de l’homme. À ce titre, leur adhésion à la CDB, au protocole de Nagoya et à la TIRPAA a conduit à la mise en place du mécanisme de l’APA. À cela s’ajoute la protection par des instruments culturels sous l’égide de l’UNESCO.

La cessation des paiements est une des institutions les plus importantes du droit des entreprises en difficulté. Elle signifie le dépôt du bilan par le débiteur ; elle se traduit par l’impossibilité pour tout débiteur de faire face à son passif exigible avec son actif disponible sauf si les réserves de crédit ou les délais de paiement dont il bénéficie de la part de ses créanciers lui permettent de faire face à ce passif exigible. En l’état actuel de la législation OHADA, l’avènement de cet état de cessation des paiements ferme automatiquement la voie à toute négociation amiable des difficultés de l’entreprise qui doit demander l’ouverture d’une procédure collective (judiciaire). Or toute procédure collective porte atteinte à l’image de l’entreprise en plus d’être lourde, longue et coûteuse. Si cette rigidité législative peut se justifier par la sécurisation des relations d’affaires, il n’en demeure pas moins vrai cependant qu’elle peut présenter une entrave à la sauvegarde des entreprises pour deux raisons. La première tient à l’effet couperet de la mesure combiné à l’appréciation mécanique qui en est souvent faite. En effet, un débiteur en cessation des paiements peut être solvable, alors que le débiteur insolvable a dépassé le stade de la cessation des paiements comme pour dire qu’un débiteur peut avoir un actif nettement supérieur à son passif (solvabilité) et ne pas pouvoir payer en même temps son passif exigible, faute de patrimoine liquide (cessation des paiements). La seconde tient au fait que la mesure semble inadaptée au contexte africain eu égard aux contingences économiques, ainsi qu’à l’immaturité juridique des chefs d’entreprise. Une souplesse de la règle renforcerait sensiblement les chances de redressement des entreprises en difficulté.

La notion de responsabilité, une idée fondamentale en droit. Comprendre les différents types de responsabilités (civile, juridique, comportementale, religieuse, morale) permet de mieux appréhender les obligations et les libertés des individus, ainsi que les conséquences de leurs actions.

La relation entre l’entrepreneur et l’investisseur est souvent abordée sous un cadre conflictuel basé sur l’asymétrie informationnelle et sur l’opportunisme potentiel des acteurs. Cependant, la pratique de financement par le capital-risque renferme des liens mitigés entre les capital-risqueurs et les entrepreneurs. Dans cette relation, les capital-risqueurs cherchent à orienter les projets financés vers des perspectives de réussite, tout en sécurisant leur fonds d’investissement par la négociation d’un ensemble de dispositions juridiques. De leur côté, les entrepreneurs s’efforcent de disposer d’une marge de manoeuvre, tout en gardant une certaine confidentialité. Notre question de recherche porte sur les différents mécanismes de gouvernance qui peuvent encadrer la relation entre les capital-risqueurs et les entrepreneurs. Notre cadre théorique échafaude une double grille de lecture théorique en analysant cette relation selon les approches juridico-financière et cognitive de la gouvernance. Nos résultats montrent que les capital-risqueurs n’ont pas uniquement des impacts financiers, mais également des incidences organisationnelles et cognitives qui peuvent gouverner l’organisation interne de la société bénéficiaire. Le mode de gouvernance employé peut être influencé en grande partie par les caractéristiques individuelles, organisationnelles, institutionnelles et économiques des capital-risqueurs. De leur côté, les dirigeants des entreprises financées par le capital-risque peuvent avoir un comportement qui dépasse l’angle traditionnel de l’opportunisme dans lequel ils dissimulent leurs intérêts personnels pour qu’il soit générateur de ressources cognitives et contributeur à la création de valeur.

El texto completo del libro en que se incluye este capítulo puede descargarse de: https://www.colexopenaccess.com/libros/derecho-mercantil-pandemia-problemas-pasado-crisis-coyuntural-perspectivas-futuras-5016

Empresas em situação de crise encontram amparo no sistema de insolvência para negociarem diretamente com seus credores os meios para soerguimento de suas atividades. O interesse primordial dos envolvidos é o recebimento dos créditos através da manutenção das atividades empresariais, o que possibilita, inclusive, a concretização da função social da empresa. Entretanto, a maioria das recuperandas além de não atingirem as projeções apresentadas no plano de recuperação judicial, mantêm os resultados econômicos em patamar semelhante ao realizado no ano anterior ao pedido do benefício legal. Apesar do descumprimento frequente das obrigações acordadas, o agravamento da crise e o aprofundamento da deterioração dos ativos, diante da ínfima perspectiva de recebimento em caso de liquidação falimentar, os credores acabam por gerar uma extensiva controvérsia à eficácia econômica do direito de insolvência ao optarem pela permanência de empresas inviáveis no mercado. Neste cenário, o envolvimento ativo pelo administrador judicial, principalmente após as inovações trazidas pela Nova Lei de Recuperação Judicial, é primordial para que os envolvidos tenham maior ciência da situação econômico-financeira da devedora, bem como pela diminuição da assimetria de informações, seja pela apresentação mensal dos relatórios como através da conferência das informações apresentadas pelo devedor no plano de recuperação judicial.

La responsabilité civile pour la pollution causée par les navires-hydrocarbures fait l’objet de dispositions particulières prévues par la convention de Bruxelles de 1969. Contrairement aux règles générales sur la responsabilité pour les dommages causés par les navires, qui sont fondées sur la notion de faute, cette convention a reconnu l’applicabilité des règles de responsabilité objective pour de tels dommages. Civil liability for pollution caused by oil ships is subject to special provisions laid down in the 1969 Brussels Convention. Unlike the general rules on liability for damage caused by ships, which are based on the concept of fault, this Convention has recognized the applicability of the rules of strict liability for such damage.

Qu’il soit institutionnel ou adhoc, L’arbitrage est vu comme un mode de règlement des litiges qui a vocation à se dérouler, de la requête initiale à la sentence finale, sans l’intervention du juge étatique. Il arrive, cependant que, ce juge soit amené à intervenir dans le processus arbitral, pour une raison ou pour une autre. On a pu ainsi dire qu’il n’y a pas de bon arbitrage sans un bon juge. Bien que l’intervention du juge étatique doivent rester exceptionnelle en matière d’arbitrage, il importe que ledit juge soit identifié, d’autant qu’il n’est pas le mena selon la phase à laquelle il intervient et peut varier d’une organisation judiciaire à une autre.

La publicité comparative oscille entre protection de l’intérêt supérieur du consommateur, libre concurrence et protection des biens immatériels des sociétés, autant d’intérêts concurrents qui en font une pratique bien difficile à réglementer et à appréhender par les juridictions en cas de litige. Cet article vise à apporter des éléments de réflexion quant à son appréhension droit brésilien. Comparative advertising oscillates between the protection of the consumer’s best interests, free competition and the protection of companies’ intangible assets, all of which make it a difficult practice to regulate and to deal with by the courts in the event of a dispute. This article aims to provide some elements of reflection on its approach in Brazilian law.

L’Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires (OHADA) s’est depuis peu engagée sur la voie de l’uniformisation des règles de droit international privé de ses États membres. Une telle entreprise est sans précédent pour cette organisation. Pour la première fois en trois décennies d’existence, le domaine de l’uniformisation ne sera en effet pas celui de l’arbitrage ou du droit substantiel des affaires, mais celui du traitement des relations d’affaires ayant des éléments de rattachement avec plusieurs ordres juridiques. Ce projet d’acte uniforme est bienvenu à plus d’un titre. Il comblerait d’abord un déficit patent de règles de droit international privé dans un espace qui intègre pourtant 17 États, et qui est donc propice aux relations d’affaires internationales. En oeuvrant désormais à l’articulation des lois et des juridictions nationales de ses États membres, le droit OHADA prendrait de surcroît le contre-pied de son approche traditionnelle qui consistait jusqu’alors à les neutraliser. Plus qu’un nouvel acte uniforme, ce projet constitue donc un important changement d’orientation pour l’OHADA.