Bibliographie sélective OHADA

La jurisprudence contribue à l’essor du droit OHADA, à travers l’éclairage ou la création des concepts, et l’application des dispositions des Actes uniformes. L’application des dispositions de droit OHADA se fait en amont par les juridictions nationales, et en aval par la Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage (CCJA) suivant les modes juridictionnel et arbitral. En droit OHADA, la jurisprudence de la CCJA est appréciée à travers la pertinence de ses avis consultatifs ayant valeur délibérante, ainsi que par rapport au contentieux et l’arbitrage. À la suite des juridictions inférieures des États parties, la CCJA connait des pourvois en cassation contre les décisions des juridictions internes traitant des questions relatives à l’interprétation des Actes uniformes. Elle est aussi compétente pour connaitre des questions d’arbitrage. Dans tous les cas, les décisions rendues par la CCJA s’imposent aux juridictions des États parties.

Milletlerarası ticarette, acenteler aracılığıyla yapılan ticarî işlemlerin önemli bir yeri vardır. Acenteler, tacirler ad ve hesabına sözleşme akdettikleri için, doğrudan temsil hükümleri doğmaktadır. Milletlerarası unsurlu acente ilişkisine uygulanacak hukuk ve bu statünün uygulama alanına giren meselelerin tespiti, kanunlar ihtilâfı hukukunda tartışmalı konulardan biridir. Bu çerçevede, acente ilişkisine uygulanacak hukuk, acente iç ve dış ilişkisi dikkate alınarak tespit edilmektedir. Acente iç ilişkisine uygulanacak hukuk, karşılaştırmalı hukukta ve Türk hukukunda akit statüsüne tâbi tutulmaktadır. Buna göre, acente ve temsil olunan, iç ilişkiye uygulanacak hukuku açıkça ya da zımnen serbestçe seçebilirler. Hukuk seçimi anlaşmasının yokluğunda ise, sözleşmeyle sıkı ilişkili hukuk esas alınır. Sözleşmeyle sıkı ilişkili hukukun tespitinde ise genellikle acentenin işyeri tercih edilmektedir.Acente dış ilişkisine uygulanacak hukuk ise, temsil statüsü olarak anılmaktadır. Buna göre, acente ilişkisinde temsil yetkisine uygulanacak hukuk bakımından, karşılaştırmalı hukukta ve Türk hukukunda, irade muhtariyeti reddedilmektedir. Ancak Avusturya hukuku, İspanyol hukuku ve La Haye Temsil Konvansiyonu'nda sınırlı hukuk seçimine imkân tanıyan düzenlemeler vardır. Milletlerarası acente ilişkisinin gereklerine uygun olarak, temsil olunanın seçtiği hukukun üçüncü kişi tarafından açıkça kabulü şartıyla böyle bir hukuk seçimi geçerli kabul edilebilmelidir. Acente dış ilişkisine uygulanacak hukukun, objektif kriterlere göre tespitinde ise, genellikle acentenin işyeri hukuku tercih edilmektedir. Ancak acentenin işyerinin olmaması ya da üçüncü kişinin bu işyerini bilmemesi hâllerinde, acentenin işyeri hukuku yerine temsil yetkisinin kullanıldığı yer hukukunun bu çerçevede ortaya çıkan ihtilâflara uygulanması kabul edilmektedir. The business transactions are made through agents have important role in the international trade. The direct agency relationship occurs through the agent. Because the agent serves with continuing authority to conclude contract on behalf of and in the name of its? principal. The law applicable to agency relationship with foreign element and finding of it?s application area?s topics are controversial in conflict of laws. In this context, the law applicable to agency relationship is determined according to internal side and external side of this relationship. The internal agency relationship is normally founded on the agency contract and, as such, is governed by the general principles of private international law applying to the contracts in comparative law and Turkish law. According to this, principal and agent may choose expressly or impliedly the law applicable to the internal agency relationship between them. If principal and agent have failed to indicate the law governing, it becomes necessary to determine the law with which the agency contract is most closely connected. In general, this maybe the law of the country in which the agent has his place of business.The law applicable to external agency relationship is known as the agency statute. According to this, the party autonomy has not been adopted as regards the agency statute in comparative law and Turkish law. But there are some exceptional regulations which adopt the resticted party autonomy. For example, Austrian law, Spanish law and, The 1978 Hague Convention on The Law Applicable to Agency allow party autonomy which is resticted. So, the law applicable to external agency relationship may be chosen in accordance with international agency relationship as long as third party expressly adoptes the law principal choices. While the law applicable to external agency relationship is determined in respect of objective criterias, in general, the agent?s place of business is prefered in comparative law like Turkish law. Nonetheless if there is no agent?s place of business or, the third party couldn?t know this place, this matter is governed by the law of place in which the agent act.

Countries enter into double tax agreements with the economic objective of preventing double taxation of cross-border transactions. To achieve this objective, the contracting states agree reciprocally to restrict their substantive tax law. That is, a major policy of double tax agreements is to reduce double taxation of residents of states that are parties to the agreement. Residents of third states sometimes contrive to obtain treaty benefits typically by interposing a person or a conduit entity in one of the contracting states. In order to ensure that a resident of a contracting state who claims treaty benefits is entitled to them in substance, double tax agreements should be interpreted according to their substantive economic effect. Generally, double tax agreements follow the pattern of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The OECD Model Convention addresses the double taxation of dividends, interest and royalties, commonly collectively known as "passive income", in Articles 10, 11 and 12 respectively. These provisions usually operate by reducing withholding tax imposed by a source state on passive income that flows from the source state to a resident state. In order to prevent a resident of a third state from obtaining a source state withholding tax reduction by interposing a person or a conduit entity in the resident state, the OECD Model Convention requires the immediate recipient of passive income to be the "beneficial owner" of that income. That is, the OECD Model Convention requires the immediate recipient to be an owner in a substantive economic sense. Courts and commentators have difficulty in interpreting and applying the concept of beneficial ownership to conduit entities that are corporations, commonly referred to as "conduit companies". They have attributed the cause of the difficulty to the absence of a definition of the term "beneficial owner" in the OECD Model Convention. This thesis argues that the difficulty in applying the beneficial ownership concept to conduit companies has arisen not because of the absence of the meaning of the concept, but because logically and from an economic perspective the concept cannot be applied to companies in general, not to conduit companies in particular. The beneficial ownership test was meant to be a test of economic substance. From an economic perspective, the benefit or the burden of a contract entered by a company is economically enjoyed or borne by its shareholders. That is, in substance a company cannot be considered as owning income beneficially. From this consideration, it follows that conduit companies can never be considered entitled to treaty benefits. Nevertheless, the OECD Model Convention applies the beneficial ownership test to conduit companies pursuant to an assumption that at least in some cases conduit companies can be the beneficial owners of passive income. The Model Convention's assumption is based on the legal perspective that courts conventionally adopt. According to this legal perspective, companies hold income beneficially because they exist as separate legal entities from their shareholders. Courts find themselves battling these opposing perspectives when applying the beneficial ownership test to conduit companies. In order to make income tax law work efficiently, courts that are obliged to determine whether to honour claims to treaty benefits made by conduit companies have preferred to employ the legal perspective. Courts have justified this approach by adopting surrogate tests for the actual beneficial ownership test. Most of the surrogate tests do not relate to the concept of ownership at all. This thesis categorises the surrogate tests as "substantive business activity" and "dominion". By analysing reported cases, the thesis identifies deficiencies in these tests. One of the proposed outcomes of the thesis is to suggest an alternative approach for deciding conduit company cases. The thesis suggests that courts should consider an arrangement as a whole and investigate reasons for the existence of an immediate recipient of passive income in the specific corporate structure. The thesis also recommends amendments in the official commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model convention in order to address the conceptual shortcomings inherent in those Articles.

Trabajo fin Curso de Experto. Tutora: María Belén González Fernández. Este trabajo plantea la necesidad de que la Ley 22/2003, Concursal, incluya en el privilegio general de su artículo 91 los créditos reconocidos en resolución judicial firme y en el privilegio especial del artículo 90, al embargo anotado en un registro público. Nuestra legislación civil y la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo han construido un sólido edificio jurídico, protector del crédito y de la afección real, franqueable solo a través de la tercería y a salvo de la preferencia temporal, que la Ley Concursal ha venido a derruir, negando la tutela que por su naturaleza corresponde al crédito reconocido en una resolución judicial, y al embargo anotado en el registro en su ejecución. En consecuencia los jueces mercantiles, presionados además por la enorme afluencia de procesos concursales y la necesidad de allegar recursos, han cancelado las cargas anteriores y reintegrado los bienes a la masa activa en perjuicio del titular de la afección. Desde un punto de vista material, la situación creada atenta contra los derechos a la seguridad jurídica y a la tutela judicial efectiva recogidos en los artículos 9.3, 24.1 y 118 de la Constitución, y vacía de contenido los institutos de la afección y la firmeza. El Legislativo contribuyó al caos incumpliendo el mandato de la Disposición Final Trigésimo Tercera de la Ley Concursal, de tramitar con carácter urgente la Ley sobre Concurrencia y Prelación de Créditos, dejando sin resolver la falta de concordancia entre la Ley Concursal y su marco Civil. La reforma operada por la Ley 38/2011 no ha hecho más que agravar la situación, pues la nueva redacción del artículo 55.3 permite la cancelación de cargas anteriores en cualquier momento del proceso, en perjuicio del acreedor y a mayor gloria de la Administración, cuyas cargas no pueden cancelarse y del concursado, que siendo el principal responsable de la insolvencia, ve más cercano el convenio y más lejana la exigencia de las responsabilidades derivadas de una calificación culpable del concurso.

En matière d’information dans les sûretés personnelles, le droit français connaît une très grande disparité entre le cautionnement, la garantie autonome et la lettre d’intention. Pour ce qui est du cautionnement, son souscripteur, lorsqu’il s’agit d’une personne physique, bénéficie de multiples obligations d’information, qu’il s’agisse du moment de la formation du contrat ou de celui de son exécution. Ces obligations d’information, procédant à la fois du législateur et de la jurisprudence, ont été inspirées par les caractéristiques accessoire et dangereuse du cautionnement. En effet, la caution, à partir du moment où elle prend le risque de se substituer à la défaillance éventuelle du débiteur cautionné, on s’aperçoit très aisément de l’intérêt pour elle d’être informée de la situation financière de celui-ci, ainsi que de l’évolution de la dette garantie, c'est-à-dire sa propre dette. S’agissant en revanche de la garantie autonome et de la lettre d’intention, aucune obligation d’information ne s’impose, quand bien même le signataire de tels documents serait une personne physique. Il est vrai qu’à la différence d’une caution, un garant autonome s’engage à payer une dette qui est déterminée indépendamment de l’obligation garantie. Du fait de l’indépendance de son engagement, le garant autonome n’a alors aucun intérêt à être informé de l’évolution de l’obligation de base. Pour des raisons différentes, le souscripteur d’une lettre d’intention n’a, lui non plus, aucun intérêt à être informé de l’évolution de la dette garantie. En effet, à la différence d’une caution ou d’un garant autonome, l’émetteur de la lettre d’intention n’a a priori aucune obligation de payer. Son engagement est de faire ou de ne pas faire. Pourtant, l’on ne peut ignorer que la garantie autonome et la lettre d’intention peuvent par hypothèses s’avérer plus dangereuses que le cautionnement. Aussi, la question n’a pu être éludée quant à la possible extension à leurs souscripteurs des obligations d’information données au profit de la caution. Il est certainement difficile de répondre à une telle interrogation. En effet, si l’argument a fortiori, reposant sur l’idée de danger, permettrait l’alignement de l’information du garant autonome et de l’auteur de la lettre d’intention sur le même régime que la caution, l’exigence d’interprétation restrictive des exceptions permet néanmoins de récuser un tel alignement. Á ce sujet, il est à noter que les textes relatifs à l’information de la caution visent exclusivement celle-ci. De surcroît, un tel alignement signifierait, sans conteste, la mort de la garantie autonome et de la lettre d’intention qui, on le sait, relevant principalement de la liberté contractuelle, s’adaptent difficilement à la rigueur qui accompagne les obligations d’information de la caution. In french legal system, the obligation to inform the guarantor depends on whether the guarantee involved is a surety bond, a standby letter of credit or a comfort letter. As to surety bond, the issuer, when it is a natural person, is due to be informed at any time of the contract. Since surety bond is a collateral and dangerous contract, the need for its issuer to be informed could easily be explained. On that subject, it should be borne in mind that standing surety for a debtor means paying his debts when he failed to do so. In others words, being surety means taking the risks to pay someone’s debts. Therefore one can easily figure out the need for a surety to be informed about the financial problems of the debtor and the evolution of the guaranteed debt. Unlike the surety, french laws makers require no legal information concerning the issuer of standby letter of credit or comfort letter, should the issuer be a natural person. The reasons relied up on the fact that, contrary to surety bond, standby letter of credit is not collateral contract. The issuer of such a letter agrees to pay a sum which is wholly different from the one relying on the main debtor. Because he is not paying the same thing as the main debtor, the issuer of standby letter of credit has no need to be informed about the evolution of the main debt. For different reasons the signatory of comfort letter has, either, no need being informed about the evolution of the guaranteed debt. On that subject, it should be noted that contrary to surety and issuer of standby letter of credit, subscriber of comfort letter has no payment obligation in principle. It is an obligation to do or not to do which is different from the obligation of payment. However we can not ignore that in some cases standby letter of credit or comfort letter could be more dangerous than surety. Thereupon the question has been asked to extend the scope of surety’s legal information so that it includes the others guarantors. This question is very difficult to answer. Though the even more so reasoning, relying on the idea of risk, permits the extension of surety’s informative measures to the others guarantors, the doctrine of strict interpretation of exceptions can be used as an opposing argument. On that subject, it should be noted that all the surety’s informative measures are drawn from legal texts that aim only surety. Furthermore, extending surety’s informative measures will simply be a death sentence to the others personal guarantees which rely mainly on the doctrine of free will of parties to a contract.

The capital markets are expected to play a pivotal role in the attainment of Kenya's development blueprint 'vision 2030.' It is, therefore, essential that obstacles to the attainment of a fair and efficient market are examined and rooted out. This study investigates the limitations of the Capital Markets Act in combating insider trading. It also examines whether reforms would promote a fair and efficient capital market. The study makes use of existing literature as well as decided cases to investigate the inadequacies in the formulation of and provisions for inside information, material pricesensitive information, publication of information, possession of information and disclosure of information in the Capital Markets Act. This literature draws out key learnings from other jurisdictions and analyses how legislation in developed economies treats challenges to the enforcement of insider trading laws. The doctrinal analysis is triangulated with results of a survey of practical experiences of legal practitioners in applying the Capital Markets Act. The findings affirm the existence of conceptual difficulties in determining the elements of the crime of insider trading. As a consequence, it is concluded that the present formulation of insider trading law is inadequate. The study, therefore, makes suggestions for reforms to the provisions on insider trading in the Capital Markets Act.