Bibliographie sélective OHADA

This article seeks to examine the extent to which users of e-banking services are protected in Cameroon. Over the past decades financial transactions have gradually emerged from traditional methods to modern forms of banking. The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has transformed the banking system into a digital arena. With e-banking, customers can access their bank accounts, transfer funds, pay bills, and check their accounts balances. Banks serve as the backbone of every modern economy and should be protected. The development of e-banking in the 1980s with the aid of ICT has rendered banks and their customers vulnerable to cybercrimes. As an effort to combat cybercrimes and ensure cyber security in Cameroon, the 2010 Cyber Law provides both substantive and procedural rules. It is rather unfortunate that, the measures put in place to ensure cyber security and protect bank customers against cybercrimes are to a greater extent ineffective. The main objective of this article is to determine the protection accorded to banks and their customers against cybercrimes. The method adopted in the course of this work is doctrinal wherein, both primary and secondary sources of data were collected. The findings reveal among others that, the measures put in place to combat cybercrimes within the banking sphere in Cameroon are not effective. There is lack of explicit definitions for cyber offences. Most of the offences provided by the 2010 Cyber Law are vague and ambiguous. We therefore recommend that, the 2010 Cyber Law should be amended to address the current issues of ICT. This amendment should include explicit definitions for the different forms of cybercrimes with severe sanctions. Banks are advised to put in place effective monitoring machineries to mitigate cybercrimes.

PURPOSE : Financial institutions such as Bureaux de Change are susceptible to money laundering, posing a significant risk to a nation’s financial stability and security if not properly regulated and supervised. Botswana is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global organisation that sets standards, promotes policies to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing and arms proliferation, all to safeguard the global financial system. Efforts have been made to incorporate FATF recommendations on money laundering into the fiscal laws of Botswana. However, some deficiencies still remain. Although there are no recorded cases of money laundering in Botswana, Bureaux de Change entities are susceptible to it as their business involves cash transactions and rapid money transactions. This paper aims to analyse the challenges faced by Bureaux de Change entities in combating money laundering in Botswana. This will be done by assessing the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework and role of the regulatory authorities in combating money laundering within Bureaux de Change entities. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH : This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the obstacles faced by Bureaux de Change entities in Botswana when it comes to combating money laundering. A qualitative research method and doctrinal research method are both used in this context. FINDINGS : It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will adopt the recommendations provided in the paper to enhance the curbing of money laundering in Botswana. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS/IMPLICATIONS : This paper is only limited to the regulation of money laundering within the Bureaux de Change entities in Botswana and does not provide empirical research. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS : This paper is useful to policymakers, lawyers, law students and regulatory bodies especially in Botswana. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS : This paper suggests changes to the Bank of Botswana (Bureaux de Change) Regulations of 2004 to improve their effectiveness, robustness and competitiveness in combating money laundering. ORIGINALITY/VALUE : This paper is original research on the challenges of combating money laundering within Bureaux de Change entities in Botswana.

Data gatekeepers (data controllers and processors) that use blockchain for data transfer effectively enjoy limited liability for violations of the GDPR. This is due to the fact that applying the GDPR’s data gatekeeper system of liability to a decentralized technology such as blockchain is difficult for three reasons. Firstly, identifying data gatekeepers on the blockchain can only be done by either assigning data gatekeeper roles to actors on the blockchain, or structuring the blockchain as private or permissioned one, so as to fit with GDPR requirements. Neither of these approaches provides a universally applicable and satisfactory method for privacy protection. Secondly, because of their knowledge and investment in infrastructure, large data gatekeepers such as IBM, Amazon and Microsoft have an informational advantage over data protection authorities (DPAs) and an additional protective layer against liability, as their blockchain infrastructure is used by other businesses and corporations that are primarily liable for data processing. Finally, administrative fines and reputational damages for non-compliance with the GDPR are insufficient deterrents for large data gatekeepers, whereas damages awarded to individual data subjects for data gatekeepers’ violations of GDPR are extremely low and too costly to obtain.

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.

L’entreprise constitue une source incroyable d’innovations, de progrès, de créativité et d’enthousiasme. En effet, elle est l’outil le plus efficace de création d’un changement positif. Or, le fossé entre les entreprises et la société reste encore flagrant ainsi que la relation entre les pouvoirs publics et les entreprises est caractérisée par le manque de confiance et de lucidité. Le droit de la compliance apparaît comme la panacée à ces nouveaux défis, et se présente comme l’outil le plus perfectionné de gouvernance pour l’entreprise et qui permet de concilier entre l’intérêt de l’entreprise et celui de la société.Les entreprises sont tenues de respecter les ordres publics nationaux et supranationaux dans lesquels ils s'inscrivent, Les principes de compliance désignent les lois qui imposent un objectif d’intérêt général à l’entreprise tout en la laissant libre des moyens pour atteindre cet objectif. Les pouvoirs et les régulateurs publics ne font que surveiller la manière dont les opérateurs privés se conforment par eux-mêmes (self-policing, self-reporting, self-compliance et self-monitoring) et contrôler la stricte observance de leurs diligences, c’est-à-dire de leur « capacité à s’auto-policer». The enterprise constitutes an incredible source of innovations, progress, creativity as well as enthusiasm. Indeed, it is the most efficient tool of the creation of positive change. Yet, the gap between enterprises and society still remains obvious as well as the relation between the public powers and enterprises is characterized by the lack of confidence and clarity. The law of compliance seems to be the answer to these new challenges, it presents itself as the most ideal tool of governance for the enterprise and which allows to conciliate between the enterprise’s interests and those of society. Enterprises are required to respect the national and supranational public order which they are a part. The principles of compliance mean the laws that impose a goal of general interest for the enterprise while leaving it free the means to achieve this objective. Powers and public regulators only control the way in which private operators conform by themselves ( self-policing, self-reporting, self-compliance and self-monitoring) and control as well the strict observance of their diligence, that is to say, their self-policing ability.

« Réguler c’est faciliter », tel est le slogan de l’Agence de Régulation des Télécommunications au Cameroun. Cela suppose que soient prévues des mesures destinées à assurer l’exécution des décisions de l’Agence, mais surtout leur exécution paisible, celle-ci étant le gage de l’absence de crispation et de méfiance entre les acteurs majeurs du secteur. Le législateur a manqué à cette exigence. Il semble n’avoir pas été plus soucieux de l’exécution paisible des décisions de l’ART autant qu’il l’a été pour les hypothèses d’exécution difficultueuse. Une telle posture n’est pas de nature à « faciliter » l’exécution des missions de régulation, qui doit pouvoir allier avec sagesse la prévention et la répression. Donner une meilleure place aux possibilités d’exécution paisible de ses décisions semble pourtant plus à même d’assurer l’effectivité des décisions rendues par l’ART, sans créer de tension avec les opérateurs. Qui veut la paix ne prépare pas forcément la guerre. Regulating is facilitating” this is the slogan of the Telecommunications Regulatory Board in Cameroon. This presupposes that measures are planned to ensure the execution of the Agency's decisions, but above all their peaceful execution, this being the guarantee of the absence of tension and mistrust between the major actors in the sector. The legislator failed to meet this requirement. He seems to have been no more concerned with the peaceful execution of TRB decisions as much as he was for the difficult execution hypotheses. Such a posture is not likely to "facilitate" the execution of regulatory missions, which must be able to wisely combine prevention and repression. Giving greater importance to the possibilities of peaceful execution of its decisions, however, seems more likely to ensure the effectiveness of the decisions rendered by the TRB, without creating tension with the operators. Whoever wants peace does not necessarily prepare for war.

Compliance with the GDPR while using blockchain technology for data processing results in compliance issues, due to the fact that the blockchain and the GDPR employ different methods to ensure privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default. The blockchain is built on disintermediation and relative decentralization, whereas the GDPR aims for re-intermediation and relative centralization of the data protection process. This paper provides an overview of and suggestions on how to secure compliance with the GDPR while processing data using the blockchain. A focus is placed on the data protection impact assessment on the blockchain network, issues in identifying and determining the role(s) of sole and joint data controllers and data processors, obstacles to exercising the right to rectification and right to be forgotten when the data is recorded on the blockchain, GDPR data transfer requirements as applied to the blockchain, and the protection of privacy in the process of creating blockchain-based smart contracts.