Bibliographie sélective OHADA

Much has been written about the consequences for companies of criminal convictions for bribery and other corrupt practices. However, less attention has been paid to the sanctions regimes that have been developed by multilateral development banks in order to combat fraud and corruption in their operations. This is likely to change in view of the fact that on 9 April 2010, the heads of five leading multilateral development banks (MDBs) – the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group – signed the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, which provides for mutual and reciprocal enforcement of debarment decisions taken by any one of them against parties that engage in fraud, corruption, coercion or collusion in connection with MDB-financed projects. For parties that are seeking financing form an MDB or are competing for contracts funded by an MDB, this means that a sanctionable practice committed in a single country could result in global sanctions. Against this background, this thesis examines the type of due process rights that should characterise MDBs’ sanctions procedures. More particularly, the thesis analyses the extent to which MDBs’ sanctions regimes should be bound by the rules of law, analogous to those of national judicial bodies, and the level of due process and transparency that should be required from these ever-evolving regimes. In other words, (how) can the tension between the administrative and business considerations of MDBs’ sanctions regimes (coupled with their immunity from judicial review) be reconciled with due process considerations and principles of fairness that underpin a national judicial model?

DOI: https://doi.org/10.34737/qy480