Bibliographie sélective OHADA

The reform of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism has provoked much debate among legal scholars and practitioners. The critiques of ISDS mainly arise from concerns regarding the legitimacy of the mechanism such as the perceived tolerance for the lack of impartiality and consistency. To allay these concerns, there have been proposals to reform ISDS by establishing investment courts with tenured judges and appellate tribunals. However, international adjudication systems like ISDS cannot be fully analogized to domestic courts in common law countries: ISDS falls into a broader international regime where there are neither hierarchical/centralized decision-making and enforcement authorities nor a multilateral investment treaty, and the rules and principles on foreign investment protection are fragmented in around three thousand Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Against this backdrop, this thesis argues that, although there is a general agreement among the international community to further legalize international investment law, the process of legalization via the specific avenue of reforming the adjudication mechanism (i.e. ISDS) is subject to (1) the institutional constraint of international investment law, especially the lack of shared understanding among the international community regarding the treatment of foreign investments, and (2) the internal constraints of adjudication as a mode of social ordering. It further cautions that pursuing predictability while disregarding the low level of shared understandings regarding investment protection may cause more legitimacy problems than it solves